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Brent

Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee

Wednesday 8 March 2017 at 7.00 pm
Boardrooms 7&8 - Brent Civic Centre, Engineers Way, Wembley HA9 0FJ

Membership:

Members	**Substitute Members**
Councillors:	Councillors:
Kelcher (Chair) Davidson (Vice-Chair) Aden S Choudhary Duffy Ezeajughi Stopp Vacancy	Chan, Harrison, McLeish and Naheerathan Councillors: Colwill and Kansagra

For further information contact: Bryony Gibbs, Governance Officer
020 8937 1355; bryony.gibbs@brent.gov.uk

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The press and public are welcome to attend this meeting

recycle for Brent

Agenda

Introductions, if appropriate.

Apologies for absence and clarification of alternate members.

Item		Page
1	**Declarations of interests** Members are invited to declare at this stage of the meeting, any relevant disclosable pecuniary, personal or prejudicial interests in the items on this agenda.	
2	**Deputations (if any)** To hear any deputations received from members of the public in accordance with Standing Order 69.	
3	**Minutes of the previous meeting** The minutes of the previous meeting held on 10 January 2017 are attached for the committee's consideration.	1 - 6
4	**Matters arising (if any)** To address any matters arising (if any).	
5	**Environmental Sustainability** This report provides the Scrutiny Committee with a summary of the work undertaken across key service areas to address the issue of sustainability, with a particular focus on flood risk management.	7 - 14
6	**PREVENT Programme** This report aims to provide an overview of Prevent programme delivery in the borough of Brent. The report will outline how Brent Council are meeting their statutory obligations to deliver the Prevent duty, alongside the aims of the broader Prevent Strategy.	15 - 226
7	**Pre-Cabinet Scrutiny of Proposals Relating to Tackling Illegal Rubbish Dumping and Litter with Uniformed Street Patrols** This paper has been prepared at the request of the Lead Member for	227 - 228

Environment, Cllr Southwood. Cllr Southwood has asked that the formal report recommending options for the on-going deployment of litter enforcement patrols, and which is intended for decision at the April Cabinet, is offered first for pre-scrutiny.

8 Update on the committee's work programme 2016-17 229 - 236

This report updates members on the committee's work programme for 2016 - 2017. Members of the committee are asked to note the contents of the report.

9 Exclusion of Press and Public

The following items are not for publication as they relate to the following category of exempt information as specified in the Local Government Act 1972 namely: Information relating to the financial or business affairs of any particular person (including the authority holding that information).

Appendix - Pre-Cabinet Scrutiny of Proposals Relating to Tackling Illegal Rubbish Dumping and Litter with Uniformed Street Patrols

10 Any other urgent business

Notice of items to be raised under this heading must be given in writing to the Head of Executive and Member Services or his representative before the meeting in accordance with Standing Order 64.

11 Date of next meeting

The committee is asked to note the date of the next meeting.

Date of the next meeting: Wednesday 3 May 2017

Please remember to ***SWITCH OFF*** your mobile phone during the meeting.

- The meeting room is accessible by lift and seats will be provided for members of the public.

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Brent

MINUTES OF THE RESOURCES AND PUBLIC REALM SCRUTINY COMMITTEE
Tuesday 10 January 2017 at 7.00 pm

PRESENT: Councillor Kelcher (Chair), Councillor Davidson (Vice-Chair) and Councillors Aden, S Choudhary, Ezeajughi, M Patel and Stopp

Also Present: Councillors McLennan, Southwood and Tatler

1. **Chair's Opening Remarks**

The Chair welcomed all present to the meeting. Members were informed that Councillor Tatler had accepted the position of Lead Member for Regeneration, Growth, Employment and Skills and had therefore resigned from the committee. Councillor Duffy had been nominated to the vacant position and his appointment would be considered by Full Council at its meeting on 23 January 2017.

2. **Declarations of Interests**

There were no declarations of interest received from Members.

3. **Deputations (If Any)**

There were no deputations received.

4. **Minutes of the Previous Meeting**

RESOLVED: that the minutes of the meeting held on 8 November 2016 be approved as an accurate record of the meeting.

5. **Matters Arising (If Any)**

None.

6. **Order of Business**

RESOLVED: that the order of business be amended as set out below.

7. **Budget Scrutiny Panel Report**

Members considered the report of the Budget Scrutiny Panel; a joint Panel comprising members of the Council's two Scrutiny Committees, which had been convened in October 2016 to consider the 2017/18-2018/19 budget proposals. The Chair advised that he had led the Budget Scrutiny Panel and drew the committee's attention to the key themes identified in the report. A response was invited from Councillor McLennan (Deputy Leader of the Council).

Councillor McLennan welcomed the report and the Panel's support of proposals to accept a four year financial settlement from Central Government and to maintain the existing level of financial reserves. Strongly agreeing with the Panel's view that a cultural shift was required to respond to the changing funding model for local government by 2020, Councillor McLennan advised that the Council was well prepared. Members heard that subsequent to the work undertaken by the Panel, the government Spending Review had announced an additional 2 per cent flexibility on the council tax referendum threshold for local authorities responsible for adult social care. The Council therefore proposed to increase council tax by 4 per cent each year for the next three years, encompassing a 2 per cent increase and the 2 per cent social care precept. Formal consultation on this proposal was being held between 9 January and 1 February 2017 and would include Brent Connects meetings and outreach events in public spaces such as supermarkets.

Several queries were subsequently raised by the committee. Clarity was sought regarding the proposed approach to achieving further savings from council services. The view of the Chief Finance Officer was sought regarding the level of reserves maintained by the authority. Details were requested of the council's strategy for maximising revenue and capital investment opportunities from the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL). Noting the view that the council's previous approach to achieving savings had left the council well placed to address some of the forthcoming financial challenges, a member questioned how Brent's resident's might be expected to benefit from this position. Discussing the proposed increase in council tax, members questioned whether the median income in Brent was expected to rise by an equivalent 4 per cent over the same period and whether the Lead Member anticipated further increases in council tax after 2018. Further details were sought of the anticipated revenue stream from the charge for bulky waste collection and of how the council aimed to reduce the number of senior social work managers who were agency staff.

Councillor McLennan responded that outcome based service reviews would be used to deliver sustainable savings and identify areas requiring additional resources. Consideration would be given to what 'big ticket' issues could be addressed over the next few years. The council was taking a multifaceted approach to improving opportunities for residents, targeting health and wellbeing, education and employment. The council also maintained a council tax support scheme, reviewed annually, to provide assistance to residents. The committee further heard that work was underway with partners to provide key worker housing, to assist in attracting and retaining key workers including social workers, teachers and NHS staff.

Conrad Hall (Chief Finance Officer) confirmed that the council maintained an appropriate level of reserves and advised that questions regarding CIL would be addressed by the subsequent item of business, 'Capital Programme and Investment Strategy'.

Addressing members queries regarding the introduction of the bulky waste charge, Councillor Southwood (Cabinet Member for Environment) advised that this would include a commercial offer, supported by enforcement and that funds from this charge would be reinvested into the service.

During members' discussion, a number of requests for additional information were made of officers, including the current amount of Section 106 and CIL funds held by the Council, projected levels of S106 and CIL funds for the next two years and both historic and projected growth of median income in Brent. It was agreed that this information would be circulated to the committee.

RESOLVED: that the report of the Budget Scrutiny Panel be noted.

8. **Capital Programme and Investment Strategy**

Althea Loderick (Strategic Director of Resources) introduced the report to the committee which provided an overview of the whole Capital programme in Brent, detailed current performance and gave an update on the Investment Strategy. The Committee was asked to the note the budget for the Capital Programme for 2016/17 of £173.06m, the additional in-year budget growth of £12.18m, the four-year budget from 2016-2020 of £457.5m, and the forecast underspend of £72.53m for 2016/17. The report highlighted the key reasons for the expected underspend, which included over optimistic delivery planning, weak capital financial planning, legal planning and procurement issues. An action plan was being implemented to address the historic underperformance of the Capital Programme.

Members raised several queries in the subsequent discussion. Further details were sought regarding the Wholly Owned Investment Company established by the council and Temporary Accommodation (TA) Reform Plan, particularly the type of properties, the allocation process and expected length of occupation. Concerns were raised regarding the financial risk posed and information was sought on the impact on the budget of the additions to the capital programme detailed in the report.

Responding to Members' queries, Conrad Hall (Chief Finance Officer) explained that the TA Reform Plan was approved by Cabinet in March 2016. It contained a number of measures to reduce reliance on and the costs of temporary accommodation, including the acquisition of a private rented sector (PRS) portfolio. By doing this, the Council was able, through its investment company, to act as a responsible landlord and deliver housing at lower cost than the private sector. The properties would be typical residential properties of a variety of sizes and to ensure that it was a viable offer, the tenants would be required to have secured employment within an hour and a half's travel from Brent. The council owned one hundred per cent of the investment company and bore the financial risk of the venture, though this was deemed reasonable and proportionate. Addressing concerns regarding the democratic accountability of the investment company, Conrad Hall emphasised that the Council had set out how the company was to be governed and any proposed action outside of this would require Cabinet approval.

Members received an appraisal of the budgetary impact of additions to the Capital Programme, approved after the budget setting process. Conrad Hall confirmed that the impact was relatively long term. The anticipated savings from the New Accommodation Independent Living (NAIL) programme and TA Reform Plan would be achieved over and above those that were set out in the budget. Whilst the 2016/17 underspend had helped to offset pressures, the council was keen to progress the schemes and realise the associated financial benefits.

Following a request for further information regarding the revenue budget, it was agreed that Conrad Hall would refer members to the appropriate cabinet report.

RESOLVED:

i) That the following be noted:
   a. the budget for the Capital Programme for 2016/17 of £173.06m;
   b. the additional in-year budget growth of £12.18m;
   c. the four-year budget from 2016-2020 of £457.5m, and;
   d. the forecast underspend of £72.53m for 2016/17.

ii) That the following reasons for the expected underspend this year be noted:
   a. over optimistic delivery planning;
   b. weak capital financial planning,
   c. legal, planning, and;
   d. procurement issues.

iii) that it be noted that an action plan was being implemented to address the historic underperformance of the Capital Programme, which would include refreshing the governance arrangements and a range of other measures;

iv) that the progress made in implementing the Investment Strategy be noted.

9. **Report for Scrutiny on Brent's High Streets**

Councillor Tatler (Cabinet Member for Regeneration, growth, Employment and Skills) introduced a report detailing how the Council currently supported Brent's seventeen high streets (considered town centres) and the work being undertaken to improve its future strategy for these areas. Member's heard that this would include the development and implementation of action and investment plans in nine priority high streets. Councillor Tatler highlighted the wide ranging considerations to be encompassed within this work including changing social trends, such as the rise of internet shopping, as well as public health and environmental considerations and welcomed suggestions from the committee.

In the subsequent discussion the committee noted the importance of working in partnership with businesses and community organisations in the development of action plans and highlighted the importance of tackling key issues such as parking, cleanliness and condition and repair of the roads and pavements. Further issues of import discussed included play areas for children, the provision of seating, the encroachment of business on to pavements and homelessness. Additional details were sought regarding the development of Brent's high streets as 'destination' areas and how businesses could be empowered to take a proactive role in this work as community leaders.

In response Councillor Tatler thanked the committee for its input and advised that work was underway to establish business associations across the borough. It was hoped that these would provide a driving force behind the action plans, allow first-hand knowledge of the areas to be utilised and support an entrepreneurial approach. Promotion of the town centres as destination areas, reflecting their unique and distinct characters, was an important focus of the work. A members'

development session would be held to further engage members in taking the High Streets strategy forward.

Several requests for additional information were made by members during the committee's discussion including whether the Council or Veolia (the Council's Public Realm Contractor) retained the income derived from the commercial waste collection service, the financial impact of increasing the fixed penalty charges issued by Kingdom Security Ltd (provider of environmental enforcement services for the Council), the potential to expand the work undertaken by Kingdom Security Ltd over the next few years and the financial impact of this. It was agreed that responses to these requests would be circulated to the committee following the meeting and that members of the committee would also be provided with the report on the review of the one-year pilot scheme with Kingdom Security Ltd when available.

10. **Committee Forward Plan**

RESOLVED: that the Committee's work programme for the remaining meetings of the 2016/17 municipal year be noted.

11. **Any Other Urgent Business**

None.

12. **Date of Next Meeting**

The committee noted that the next meeting would be held on 8 March 2017.

The meeting closed at 9.04 pm

M KELCHER
Chair

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Brent	**Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee 8 March 2017** **Report from Operational Director, Environmental Services**
For Information	

Environmental Sustainability

1.0 Summary

1.1 This report provides the Scrutiny Committee with a summary of the work undertaken across key service areas to address the issue of sustainability, with a particular focus on flood risk management.

2.0 Recommendations

2.1 To note the progress that is being made with respect to these areas of work.

3.0 Detail

Fostering sustainability is a key underlying motivation in the development and provision of all our services, particularly those universal services that are customer facing and which have an impact on the look, feel and condition of our public spaces. The council no longer has a single co-ordinating team or strategy with respect to sustainability. Work to achieve a more sustainable Brent sits largely with separate service areas who manage their own operations to achieve greener outcomes. This report will consider seven key areas:

- Transport and Travel
- Air Quality
- In-house Carbon Management
- Street Lighting and Parking
- Public Realm and Waste
- Parks and Biodiversity
- Flood Risk Management

Transport and Travel

3.1 The council promotes a variety of sustainable transport initiatives to support all transport users in making smarter travel choices. The use of car clubs in Brent has increased over the past few years and the council has electric vehicle charging points in the borough, having joined the Source London contract

which will benefit electric vehicle drivers across London as all charging points will be compatible.

3.2 The council encourages everyone to try cycling. We offer free cycle training to schools, groups and individuals and have funding to install cycle parking on streets and on residential estates. We also organise Safe Urban Driving courses, cyclist awareness training for HGV drivers.

3.3 The council supports schools and businesses with their travel plans and encourages them all to promote sustainable travel to and from work/school and for business travel. WestTrans provide support with the monitoring of work place travel plans and a toolkit is currently being developed as part of the active travel project to signpost businesses to assistance and the services that are available to promote sustainable travel. In addition, personal travel planning training will be made available for those businesses with the highest potential for modal shift.

3.4 The council supports the use of public transport (bus and rail) throughout the borough by lobbying TfL and other operators for service and infrastructure improvements, both in response to complaints by residents and proactively to support regeneration across the borough.

Air Quality

3.5 Brent has levels of air pollution that are occasionally in breach of National Air Quality Standards1. The pollutants of concern are nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and particulate matter (PM10 and P2.5).

3.6 Our Air Quality Action Plan is the council's public account of the state of air quality in the borough and has a five year plan for improvement - or at least to stop further deterioration. This us currently being consulted upon and has been reviewed recently by the Scrutiny Committee.

3.7 Changes in scientific understanding are helping us to implement our new Air Quality Action Plan so that it will not just try to reduce emissions of pollutants, but also help people and communities understand how they can reduce the risk of exposure to protect their health. Diesel exhaust fumes have become a particular concern and in 2012 was classified as a known carcinogen. The Plan also has a greater focus on driving down the use of diesel as a fuel for vehicles. The Council will also reduce pollutant emissions generated by our use of heating, lighting and transport and encourage local businesses to follow our lead. We will use existing powers available to us to control and limit emissions from new and existing sources of pollutant emissions, by the following actions:

- Enforcing Combined Heat and Power and biomass air quality policies
- Using the planning system to ensure new development does not negatively impact on local air quality
- Ensure that Smoke Control Zones are fully promoted and enforced
- Ensure emissions from construction are minimised
- Reduce emissions to air from the burning of waste or from waste facilities using regulatory powers

- Promoting energy efficiency retrofitting projects in workplaces and homes
- Undertake energy efficient improvements in council buildings

Carbon Management

3.8 The Council's Carbon Management Programme aims to reduce CO2 emissions from the operational estate (excluding schools, housing and commercial properties) by 15 per cent over a 4 year period from 2014/5 to 2017/8.

Street Lighting and Parking

3.9 In 2015, the Cabinet endorsed the replacement of the borough's existing street lamps with modern Light Emitting Diode (LED) luminaires. The decision also agreed investment in a Central Management System (CMS), seeking to 'future proof' the LED investment.

3.10 Aside from the long-term savings in energy costs, a significant reduction in carbon emissions also forms a key part of the business case. The project will make a one-third contribution of at least 5% towards the Council's overall target of a 15% reduction in carbon emissions before March 2018. The additional investment in CMS technology has now enabled an even more ambitious target to be set.

Public Realm and Waste

3.11 Through the Public Realm Contract with Veolia, we are committed to achieving five key objectives with respect to sustainability:

1. To record data that establishes the carbon footprint of our public realm services.
2. To procure our public realm services in a way that gives proper consideration to sustainability and environmental impact.
3. To ensure our vehicle movements are organised as efficiently as possible to minimise fuel use and CO2 emissions.
4. To reduce carbon emissions from our grounds maintenance operations by better organising our grass mowing rounds to reduce fuel use and emissions.
5. To consider new and innovative equipment through the life of the Public Realm Contract that improves sustainability. All means of reducing fuel consumption and using cleaner fuels in vehicles are regularly considered.

3.12 Two of the four main Public Realm Contract targets relate directly to improved sustainability:

Residual Waste tonnages

The Contract has annual residual waste disposal targets. If the Contractor doesn't achieve the reductions in tonnes of residual waste they will pay the full disposal costs for every tonne above their target. If the contractor beats their target, Brent will share any saving. This incentivises the contractor to implement the interventions that are needed to divert waste from landfill.

Carbon Emission Reduction

A deduction of £15 is made for each tonne of carbon emitted above the contract target. If they exceed their targets, the contractor will receive an incentive payment.

Parks and Biodiversity

3.13 There are many parks in Brent and more than 1,000 acres of public open space including Fryent Country Park. We design, build, and maintain all the parks and their features and consult on nature conservation.

3.14 It is generally accepted that good quality parks and open spaces are important for enhancing the quality of urban life. Quality green spaces have been shown to support the local economy, enhance physical and mental health, benefit children and young people, reduce crime and fear of crime, support social cohesion, aid movement between spaces, and protect biodiversity and the environment (ODPM, 2005).

3.15 Green spaces are known to improve local biodiversity. They are vitally important in helping us adapt to climate change through the planting and conservation of trees that provide shade from the sun. Proper consideration must be given to the type of planting and of our maintenance regimes so that we conserve water and provide floodplains. We seek to use methods that increase areas of meadows and wild flowers and use machinery with reduced carbon emissions. We will also prioritise the composting of our park waste.

3.16 The three cemeteries in Brent and both our burial grounds are recognised by the GLA as Sites of Importance for Nature Conservation (SINCs). Sensitive grounds maintenance work is undertaken in the care of our cemeteries. We are committed to employing greener grounds maintenance practices in our parks and our cemeteries. This includes minimising the use of herbicides/pesticides, recycling topsoil and old memorials, composting green waste and actively managing plant life and wildlife to maximise biodiversity.

4.0 Flood Risk Management

4.1 Following extensive flooding in the UK in 2007, the Government gave powers and responsibilities to local authorities enabling them to manage flood risk more effectively. The Flood Risk Regulations 2009 and the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, have increased the statutory responsibilities of unitary authorities such Brent Council, which has a new role as the Lead Local Flood Authority (LLFA) for the borough

4.2 The Flood Risk Regulations 2009 gave duties to Local Lead Flood Authorities (LLFAs) to prepare preliminary assessment reports, to identify Flood Risk Areas and to prepare a Flood Risk Strategy. The Flood and Water Management Act 2010 aims to provide better, more comprehensive management of flood risk for people, homes and businesses. It identifies “risk management authorities”; bodies with an interest in flood risk management. The Act outlines the responsibility of the lead local flood authority to “develop, maintain, apply and monitor” a strategy for local flood risk management.

4.3 Brent’s strategy is available online - https://www.brent.gov.uk/your-council/about-brent-council/council-structure-and-how-we-work/strategies-

and-plans/flood-risk-management-strategy/. It builds on the work already carried out in the Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment and Surface Water Management Plans. It details actions the Council and other key stakeholders are taking to manage flood risk in Brent. The Strategy has five objectives:

4.4 **1. Improving the Understanding of Flooding Risks in Brent**

Our Strategy sets out the flood risk to Brent, by presenting the flooding history, the geography of Brent, likely sources of floods and the overall risk of flooding for Brent.

From analysis of the historical incidence of flooding, Brent has a low to moderate flood risk. The key flood risk to Brent is from surface water flooding. This occurs when the volume and intensity of a rainfall event exceeds the capacity of the drainage system, the responsibility for which lies with Thames Water. Brent also has a small risk of groundwater flooding which occurs when the water table rises to ground level and inundates low lying areas.

Getting a better understanding of flood risk will involve more studies modelling the risk posed by surface water, and from information gathered by investigations into flooding events.

4.5 **2. Reducing the Risk of Flooding for People and Businesses in Brent**

Our strategy also details what is already being done towards managing the flood risk in Brent; including systems set up to investigate Flooding Incidents and the register of "Flood Risk Assets" - structures or physical features that have an effect on flood risk in Brent. If a rainfall event is severe enough, maintenance alone will not stop flooding, however maintaining existing assets is important in alleviating the effects of flooding.

4.6 **3. Providing clear information on the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved in flood risk management in Brent**

Our Flood Risk Management Strategy provides a coordinated approach to work in this important area, and draws together the work of other risk management authorities within the borough, such as water companies and the Environment Agency. It explains how all the relevant organisations work together, and who is responsible for what.

Communicating with the Public about Flood Risk is important. The key messages are:

- Flooding is rare in Brent but when it does occur the impact could be severe and it is important that everybody is prepared for it.
- It is important that we increase our knowledge of where there is a risk of flooding so that we can look to reduce that risk. Without this knowledge we cannot act.
- It is important to report flood incidents because it adds to our knowledge on areas at risk and frequency of incidents. This information informs how activities are prioritised.
- We can never be sure down to the level of individual properties where will be affected by flooding.

- The council has a programme of work to improve flood risk where practical affordable solutions can be found.

4.7 **4. Ensuring that emergency plans and responses to flood incidents in Brent are effective.**

Flooding comes in a variety of forms with varying levels of seriousness ranging from ponding to damaging or dangerous flooding. The council's strategy sets out the Council's response in each case.

4.8 **5. To take a sustainable and holistic approach to flood management, seeking to deliver wider environmental and social benefits**

Flood risk management is an environmental activity and the council's strategy supports both local and national plans for sustainable development. It does this by considering key national plans such as the Water Framework Directive and the Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) directive, as well as local plans such as Brent's planning framework

4.9 **Flooding in Parks**

Issues in parks mainly fall within the remit of Thames Water, who are responsible for the water drainage running through them. They respond to emergencies within 2 hours.

In the council's remit

Currently, flooding mainly presents as three main hotspot locations –

- **Barham Park Event Field**
- The event field has always suffered from flooding, being low-lying and close to the railway. The play area is a particularly wet area. Remedial drainage in the park has been installed only in the form of French drains because there is limited immediate wider network to link to. A newly-laid path is now causing some damming issues, but the council's principle drainage engineer has surveyed the location and developed a remediation plan.

- **Roe Green Play Area**
- New low maintenance drainage has been installed this month to help alleviate issues. Historically, though, this is a wet site.

- **John Billam Sports Field**
- This area is a flood plain and the council has invested in a drainage solution that was approved by Thames Water.

- **King Edwards Park, Willesden**
- Flooding has occurred penetrating buildings and gardens of All Souls Avenue. Recent remedial work has been carried out.

Playing pitches and tables have presented issues in the past but most have now had modern drainage installed.

Park areas are always likely to flood when there is persistent heavy rain. The service will respond by keeping gulleys clear and by removing the water where possible.

Out of the council's remit.

King Edwards Park, Wembley - Surface water drainage flowing through the park is prone to blockage causing a surface water drain to flood the tennis courts and the play area. Thames Water are aware their drain has significant root problems and are looking to resource remedial work.

Preston Park - Flooding occurs from Thames's foul sewer main in the park.

Woodcock Park - There have been issues of contaminated water in the Brook. There is also a foul sewer which runs through the Woodgrange Avenue area of the park. Thames water attend to the issues when they occur. The council is currently working with various partners to resolve some long-standing issues and to find more sustainable solutions.

5.0 Financial Implications

There are no financial implications arising from this report.

6.0 Legal Implications

There are no specific legal implications

6.0 Diversity Implications

There are no specific diversity implications

7.0 Staffing/Accommodation Implications (if appropriate)

There are no staffing implications.

Contact Officers

CHRIS WHYTE
Operational Director, Environmental Services

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Brent	**Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee 8 March 2017** **Report from Director of Performance, Policy and Partnerships**
	Wards affected: ALL
PREVENT Programme	

1.0 Summary

1.1 This report aims to provide an overview of Prevent programme delivery in the borough of Brent. The report will outline how Brent Council are meeting their statutory obligations to deliver the Prevent duty, alongside the aims of the broader Prevent Strategy.

1.2 Whilst the Government published a Counter – Extremism Strategy in October 2015, this will not be covered by the report. Counter – Extremism work is complimentary to the aims of the Prevent strategy, but is not currently supported by a statutory duty to deliver it.

1.3 Counter – Extremism work is distinct from Prevent programme delivery and does not form an active part of Prevent work.

1.4 The report will concentrate on the implementation of the Prevent duty and related programmes, and not specific project work funded by the Home Office at a community level.

2.0 Recommendation(s)

2.1 This report is submitted to the committee not as a result of seeking any specific recommendations, but as a direct request from the Committee.

2.2 The committee has specifically requested to look at how the Prevent duty is implemented in Brent, and how we are performing in our statutory duty.

3.0 Detail

3.1 Prevent is one part of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, 'Contest', and works alongside three other strands:

- Protect – strengthening borders, infrastructure, buildings and public spaces from an attack;
- Prepare – to reduce impact by ensuring effective response mechanisms are in place;
- Prevent - to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
- Pursue – to disrupt or stop terrorist attacks.

3.2 The Prevent Strategy 2011 sets out three strategic objectives and these continue to influence Prevent programme delivery at a local borough level. They are to:

(1) Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and of the threat from those who promote it.

(2) Stop individuals from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given the appropriate advice and support;

(3) Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

3.3 In March 2015, the Counter – Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) received royal assent, section 26 of the CTSA placed a duty on "specified authorities" to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism." All Local Authorities and County Councils nationally are considered "specified Authorities". The Prevent duty came into force as a result of a changing national and international threat picture.

3.4 The London Borough of Brent has been identified by the Home Office as a Prevent priority area (PPA) and as a result, receives additional resource to address Prevent work.

3.4 As part of the Local Authority's duty it is mandatory for support to be offered to a person at risk of terrorist related activity, or radicalisation. This support is primarily offered via the multi – agency safeguarding panel which is called Channel. However, it is not mandatory for an individual (or relevant parent/carer) to accept that support. Brent's Channel Panel meet monthly.

Panel members are made up of safeguarding/child protection specialists (adult safeguarding if relevant) and various partnering agencies, for example, the National Health Service (NHS), SO15 Counter – Terrorism Command Police, Schools, Probation etc.

4.0 Local Authority Governance of PREVENT activity.

4.1 Prior to the enactment of the Prevent duty, Prevent activity was solely overseen by the Safer Brent Partnership (SBP). However, in preparation for the Prevent duty it was considered that an additional layer of governance reflecting the statutory guidance to monitor implementation of the duty was required. As a result, the multi – agency Prevent Delivery Group was set up. This group is responsible for the operational effectiveness of the duty.

4.2 During the first year of the duty coming into force, the Prevent Delivery Group met bi-monthly, and thereafter to the present date, quarterly.

4.3 As required by the statutory guidance, the Prevent Delivery Group agrees the annual delivery plan and accompanying risk register.

4.4 The Safer Brent Partnership continue to have strategic oversight of Prevent programme delivery and related reports.

4.5 As a critical reference group, Prevent updates and related activity is reported at the Prevent Leader's Briefing, which sits quarterly. This group is chaired by the Leader of the Council, and is attended by Strategic Directors from Children and Young People and Performance, Policy and Partnerships. It is also attended by the Lead Member for Stronger Communities, with responsibility for Prevent, as well as the Lead Member for Children's Services.

5.0 Requirements of Prevent statutory guidance

5.1 The Prevent Statutory guidance highlights six key areas where activity should be evidenced, they are:

- A Risk Assessment
- An Action Plan
- Partnership work
- Staff training
- Understanding and supporting other agencies and organisations supporting children and,
- Understanding and supporting out of school settings supporting children

6.0 Brent's Risk Assessment and related Action Plan as explained above, is overseen by the Prevent Delivery Group. The Risk Assessment is put together using restricted intelligence documents, as well as a local understanding of risk and threat. The accompanying action plan seeks to mitigate identified risk and threat. These documents are exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom

of Information Act 2000, sections 24(1), 31(1)(a) and 38 (1)(b). These sections relate to National Security, Law Enforcement and Health & Safety respectively.

6.1 The Prevent Delivery Group monitors progress against the agreed live risk assessment and action plan. The Prevent Delivery Group reviews referral pathways and accompanying protocols in order to ensure that the relevant departments and partners, are able to identity Prevent concerns, address potential risk areas and safeguard individuals identified as being at risk of radicalisation.

6.2 As we approach the end of financial year 16 -17, Prevent delivery is in a strong position with 80% RAG rated actions showing as green and 20% showing as amber.

7.0 Partnership Work is also strong within Brent. Key external partners essential to successful coordinated delivery are, S015 Counter – Terrorism Command Police, Borough Policing teams, National Health Service, including the Child & Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAHMS), local schools and colleges.

7.1 Prevent partnership work is also supported by Brent's Local Safeguarding Children's Board. When the duty came into force the LSCB board adopted Prevent as a board priority .The LSCB has since supported audit work in relation to Prevent related referrals, training, process recommendations, community awareness raising and related outreach.

7.2 Internally, key departments imperative to successful implementation of the duty are, Children and Adult services; in particular, Safeguarding, Social Care, Early Help, the Youth Offending Service and Education departments.

7.3 To provide a mainstreamed and proportionate approach to Prevent programme delivery, we have successfully identified and integrated Prevent safeguarding measures and monitoring outcomes to existing internal processes. An Ofsted November 2015 commended partnership work between Prevent, the Metropolitan Police and Children's Services (Ofsted report pages, 31, 32 & 38).

7.4 To provide an example of this partnering and mainstreaming approach, we have ensured that Prevent concerns relating to individuals are reported via the Brent Family Front Door or – Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) teams. In Brent all safeguarding concerns are reporting via these teams. Concerns are triaged by professionals and considered for onward support, be it child sexual exploitation for example, or radicalisation. If professionals decide concerns are sufficient and appropriate only then will a case be referred for an onward offer of support.

7.5 This referral pathway decision was taken by the Prevent Delivery Group, strongly influenced by our community advisory groups. Our community advisory groups have been, the LSCB Community Reference Group, the Prevent Advisory Forum and the Multi – Faith Forum. All groups have consistently fed back that concerns relating to radicalisation should be treated fairly and without prejudice, and in the same manner as other safeguarding concerns.

7.6 In addition to internal and external process integration, we continue to raise awareness of Prevent more broadly through partnering campaigns. Such as, the Charity Commission's Support Syria Safely drive, Project Griffin and Red Button, Counter - Terrorism Awareness week.

8.0 **Training** is predominantly delivered in educational settings, and assists professionals to better understand the Prevent duty and their related responsibilities.

8.1 In addition to educational settings, training is also consistently delivered to internal teams within the council. In particular, teams working with at risk vulnerable individuals, and teams who are making crucial decisions about an individual's/ family's welfare.

8.2 Training is also delivered via the LSCB to the wider community and multi – disciplinary agencies and 3rd sector partners.

8.3 The Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) is the recognised training programme in particular for Ofsted and the NHS. Demand for this training continues to be high and is delivered consistently.

8.4 High quality and consistent training helps Brent to guard against misguided Channel referrals; in particular where there might be a limited understanding of cultural norms and practices. It is our priority whilst trying to successfully deliver the Prevent programme, not to conflate practices that may be regarded as highly observant or extreme, as indicators which actually do not pose a violently extreme, counter – terrorism risk.

8.5 To ensure professionals possess confidence in assessing this area, Brent Council centrally commissioned 'In depth Extremist Ideology Training' to provide wider context and a firmer understanding of the triggers and drivers that solidify terrorist ideologies.

8.6 Brent's Strategic Prevent Coordinator is currently developing a training module that sits between WRAP and the In Depth Extremist Ideology Training to help frontline staff assess for themselves when a case might be better suited to Early Help, Universal Services, the Channel Programme or wider Social Care support.

8.7 To meet our Prevent responsibilities to understand and support **other agencies and organisations supporting children**, we largely work in partnership with members of the Prevent Delivery Group to identify 3rd sector providers delivering in this area. In addition, whilst Legal Services do not sit on the Prevent Delivery Group, they have ensured that in all relevant and newly issued contracts, particularly those relating to children's provisions, the Prevent duty is reflected.

8.8 Alongside this, the borough's Prevent Institutions Officer proactively visits smaller organisations such as children's homes, foster carer networks and early help settings to provide advice and related training and support in this area.

8.9 To meet our Prevent responsibilities to understand and support **Out-of-School settings supporting children,** the Prevent Team, School Effectiveness and Education and Welfare Service, has sought to proactively engage the charitable and voluntary sector working in this area.

8.10 Over the last 3 years, 4 outreach seminars have been hosted by Brent Council to engage this sector. A total of 227 delegates have attended these seminars. To meet our Prevent related responsibilities, WRAP training is offered to these organisations, as are discussions around extremist activity and terror- related concerns. Support is also offered to strengthen governance arrangements, safeguarding protocols and associated responsibilities. Guidance is also provided to assist organisations understand any wider Health and Safety requirements that may fall to them. As reflected in the Prevent statutory guidance, we also promote and encourage voluntary accreditation schemes within this sector.

8.11 Brent has a sizeable supplementary school network, and it became apparent that dedicated in-house support was required. Whilst Prevent continue to support engagement and outreach work in this area, we have recently supported the appointment of an Education and Welfare Officer to Supplementary Schools.

8.12 This role provides targeted advice and support for Brent's supplementary schools and aims to build capacity and resilience within the sector. We believe this will support supplementary schools in light of the Department for Education's (DfE) 'call for evidence' and proposals to regulate this sector.

9.0 CHANNEL

9.1 As explained at point 3.4 Channel is also a statutory duty which Local Authorities must deliver. The Channel Programme is a multi-agency voluntary intervention programme which aims to safeguard and divert individuals away from terrorist activity. Where a mentor is assigned, their remit is to challenge and hopefully deconstruct the violent extremist ideology and present more appropriate alternatives.

9.2 Referrals to the Channel Programme are received and triaged by Brent's Family Front Door or Adult Safeguarding, Multi – Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH). Where referrals are known to Probation services, they are made directly by Probation to SO15 Counter – Terrorism Command and the Local Authority will be notified thereafter.

9.3 Local Authorities are responsible for hosting and chairing the multi – agency safeguarding panel. Brent's Channel Panel is chaired by the Head of Children's Safeguarding and Quality Assurance. Core panel members are,

9.4 Adult Social Care - Safeguarding and Reablement Manager, Head of Community Protection, NHS Child Safeguarding Lead, NHS Adult Safeguarding Lead, NHS Mental Health Lead, SO15 Counter Terrorism

Command Lead/s and the Strategic Prevent Coordinator. Other invitees are determined on a case by case basis.

9.5 Brent's Channel panel has been in operation since 2012. The panel has matured since that time and is now well supported by external partners. Whilst there are some individuals that turn down Channel support, those that do engage experience beneficial outcomes.

9.6 Noticeable themes evident to individuals engaged on Channel are those who:

- May not be previously known to our services,
- have undiagnosed cognitive or mental health issues and,
- those exploring a sense of purpose or belonging.

10.0 Brent 2020 Objectives, Better Locally and Better Place.

10.1 The Prevent duty and related strategy whilst not a cohesion or integration strategy, does support Brent's 'Better Locally' objectives.

10.2 Prevent's outreach work in particular, seeks to raise a better understanding of Prevent and its aims. Where Prevent is able to support and divert individuals away from divisive and terrorist related ideologies, bringing those individuals more closely to engage with the mainstream, then cohesion and integration objectives have been supported.

10.3 Prevent's internal and external partnership work supports Brent's 'Better Place' objectives. Prevent was designed to sit within the pre-criminal space and if we are successful in delivery of the Prevent programme we should be assisting in our efforts to "reduce crime, especially violent crime and make people feel safer".

10.4 The above sections provide an overview of how the Prevent programme and corresponding duty is implemented within Brent

11.0 Financial Implications

11.1 N/A

12.0 Legal Implications

12.1 The Counter – Terrorism and Security Act 2015

12.2 PREVENT Statutory Guidance

12.3 CHANNEL Statutory Guidance

12.4 Freedom of Information Act 2000

13.0 Equality Implications

13.1 The Prevent Strategy 2011 seeks to stop people becoming terrorists, or supporting terrorism within the following groups:

- Northern – Ireland related terrorist groups
- Al – Qaida, its affiliates and like-minded terrorist groups
- Extreme Right Wing terrorist groups
- Animal Rights terrorist groups

13.2 The Government has stated that the greatest threat to the UK and its interests comes from Al-Qaida, its affiliates and like-minded groups, for example, ISIS /ISIL. Brent's main concerns currently come from this strand. These organisations have based their rhetoric on alleged Islamic principles. The borough of Brent has a large Muslim community; this community may feel particularly marginalized as Prevent objectives are addressed.

13.3 Members of staff may be concerned that they will be accused of victimization for raising concerns.

14.0 Staffing/Accommodation Implications (if appropriate)

14.1 N/A

Background Papers

Appendix As:
A.1 PREVENT Strategy 2011
A.2 PREVENT Statutory Guidance
A.3 CHANNEL Statutory Guidance
A.4 Ofsted Report – Brent, 30 November 2015.

Contact Officers

Pascoe Sawyers
Head of Policy & Partnerships
Ex1045

Kibibi Octave
Strategic Prevent Coordinator
Ex 4225

PETER GADSON
Director of Performance, Policy and Partnerships

Prevent Strategy

HM Government

Prevent Strategy

Presented to Parliament by the
Secretary of State for the Home Department
by Command of Her Majesty

June 2011

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1. Foreword

Intelligence indicates that a terrorist attack in our country is 'highly likely'. Experience tells us that the threat comes not just from foreign nationals but also from terrorists born and bred in Britain. It is therefore vital that our counter-terrorism strategy contains a plan to prevent radicalisation and stop would-be terrorists from committing mass murder. Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat from Al Qa'ida inspired terrorism is not.

The *Prevent* programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that *Prevent* should have been confronting.

That is why we have reviewed the *Prevent* programme, and these are the results.

First, we will respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it. In doing so, we must be clear: the ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem; legitimate religious belief emphatically is not. But we will not work with extremist organisations that oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and full participation in our society. If organisations do not accept these fundamental values, we will not work with them and we will not fund them.

Second, we will prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support. We will build on the successful multi-agency 'Channel' programme, which identifies and provides support for people at risk of radicalisation.

Third, we will work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation. Here, progress has been made in recent years, but it is patchy and must be better. So we will work with education and healthcare providers, faith groups, charities and the wider criminal justice system. We will also work to tackle the challenge of radicalisation on the internet.

There will be other changes too. For example, the monitoring and evaluation of *Prevent* projects has not been robust enough to justify the sums of public money spent on them. We will make sure that they are improved, and unless there is evidence that they are effective and of value for money, projects will lose their funding.

Finally, we will do more than any other Government before us to promote integration, but we will do so separately and differently from *Prevent*. As the Prime Minister declared in his Munich speech, the combined effect of this work and of the new *Prevent* strategy will be an unyielding fight against extremism. And as the Deputy Prime Minister said in his Luton speech, we will use smart engagement to take on extremist ideas alongside a ruthless determination to find and punish those who promote or take to violence.

I would like to pay tribute to Lord Carlile of Berriew, who has provided independent oversight for the review. He agrees that this is a sound strategy for preventing the threat of home-grown terrorism. I believe it is a strategy that will serve us well for many years to come.



Theresa May MP
Home Secretary and Minister for Women and Equalities

2. Preface

As the person appointed to provide independent oversight of this review, I welcome the opportunity to write a short preface. In addition to this preface, I have provided the Home Secretary with my more detailed comments.

I have been fully informed of the progress of the review and have participated in it extensively. My activities have included involvement in early scoping, meetings with Ministers and officials and visits to parts of the country where *Prevent* activities could be seen in operation and scrutinised. I have been consulted closely in connection with the text of this strategy document. I have no doubt about the enormous hard work, and intellectual integrity, which have gone into the preparation of this substantial policy.

Although *Prevent* has included some quite broad and occasionally unfocused community cohesion activities in the past, generally it has been productive. It is realistic to accept that some problems have arisen, notably from the feeling of some parts of the community that they have been victims of state 'snooping'. Also, there has been some controversy about the extent to which the public sector should engage with possible extremists, albeit with the purpose of achieving the greater public good. The new policy should enable Ministers and officials to avoid these pitfalls: they will have clarity as to what is properly part of *Prevent*, and of connected activities in Departments other than the Home Office.

This new strategy defines far more strongly than before the proper scope of *Prevent* as an integral part of counter-terrorism strategy. It reflects the clear impetus and policy imperatives arising from the Prime Minister's speech in Munich on 05 February 2011. His powerful and unambiguous message includes that *Prevent* is to be seen as focused on extremism; for it is clear that for many who have committed terrorist acts extremism is the foundation, the driver for terrorism.

The messages from *Prevent* in the future will be clearer, whether delivered at home or abroad. The potential for perceived discrimination will be reduced. Governance will be strengthened at every level, from the application of conventional Government measurement tools to the creation of a national non-executive scrutiny board.

This new strategy is designed to endure. Already it has to deal with a range of terrorism threats, including Al Qa'ida and right-wing extremism. None is singled out for special treatment outside the operational demands of current threat levels. New groups may emerge as others fade.

However, as the recent death of Usama bin Laden has shown, *Prevent* has to cope with a changing and sometimes dramatic agenda. At least in the short term, his death will make us more vigilant about a possible extremist backlash. It should also provide interested organisations, from the student arena to the worlds of business and politics, with an opportunity they should welcome to declare unequivocally that they oppose extremism and all its consequences. Nothing less will do if they wish to enjoy any confidence and cooperation from the British Government and public.

Within that difficult and challenging context, I am satisfied that this document will provide a sound basis for whatever circumstances we reasonably can predict.

It has my considered and strong support.

Lord Carlile of Berriew QC
June 2011

3. Executive summary

3.1 The Government is committed to a *Prevent* strategy. But the strategy over the past few years has not been fully effective and it needs to change. This review evaluates work to date and sets out a strategy for the future.

Context

3.2 The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and like-minded organisations.

3.3 All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are prepared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is significantly greater amongst young people.

3.4 We now have more information about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and then to engage in terrorism-related activity. It is important to understand these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks it poses to our national security.

3.5 We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.

3.6 There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.

3.7 Terrorist groups can take up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popularised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country. This has significant implications for the scope of our *Prevent* strategy. Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist organisations.

Guiding principles: a framework for *Prevent*

3.8 *Prevent* is part of our counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

3.9 *Prevent* will address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security. At present, the majority of our resources and efforts will continue to be devoted to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa'ida, its affiliates or related groups.

3.10 We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. *Prevent* will also mean intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity.

3.11 Policy and programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part of *Prevent* and will be coordinated from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).

3.12 *Prevent* must deal with all forms of terrorism and not just with Al Qa'ida. But the allocation of resources will be proportionate to the threats we face. At present the greatest threat to the UK as a whole is from Al Qa'ida and groups and individuals who share the violent Islamist ideology associated with it.

3.13 We envisage no changes to the legal framework for *Prevent*-related work.

3.14 *Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy. But integration alone will not meet *Prevent* objectives. And *Prevent* must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past.

3.15 There have been allegations that previous *Prevent* programmes have been used to spy on communities. We can find no evidence to support these claims. *Prevent* must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. Trust in *Prevent* must be improved.

3.16 The Government's commitment to localism will support the *Prevent* strategy. Communities and local authorities have a key part in this strategy. But as a national security issue, *Prevent* needs to be developed in very close conjunction with central Departments.

3.17 *Prevent* will be funded from the Home Office and other Departments. Grants will be made available for local authority *Prevent* work. Evaluation of *Prevent* activity to date has been poor. Money has been wasted. We will tighten up arrangements for evaluation at all levels in future. Funding and other support will not be provided to extremist organisations. Neither Government Departments nor the police will rely on extremists to address the risk of radicalisation.

3.18 The review found no evidence to indicate widespread, systematic or deliberate funding of extremist groups, either by the Home Office or by local authorities or police forces. But there have been cases where groups whom we would now consider to support an extremist ideology have received funding. Stricter monitoring is required to ensure this does not happen in future.

3.19 The process of radicalisation in the UK often has overseas connections. To be effective, *Prevent* work must take place overseas as well as in the UK. But that work has not always been effective to date and funds have been wasted. In future, the work needs to be much better aligned with domestic priorities and more rigorously appraised.

3.20 We will assess in the coming year whether the balance between the three main areas of *Prevent* expenditure – local projects, policing and *Prevent* work overseas – is appropriate.

Objectives

3.21 Within this overall framework the new *Prevent* strategy will specifically:

- respond to the **ideological challenge** of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- **prevent people from being drawn into terrorism** and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- work with **sectors and institutions** where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

3.22 These areas of work are outlined in detail in the remainder of the document.

Objective One: the ideological challenge

3.23 All terrorist groups have an ideology. Promoting that ideology, frequently on the internet, facilitates radicalisation and recruitment.

3.24 Challenging ideology and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote it is a fundamental part of *Prevent*.

3.25 Previous work in this area has made some progress but has not consistently reached the few people who are most susceptible to terrorist propaganda. It has failed to recognise the way in which terrorist ideology makes use of ideas espoused by extremist organisations and has not fully understood the implications this should have for the scope for our work. It has not effectively engaged with and used the influence and reach of communities and community groups. Previous *Prevent* work has sometimes given the impression that Muslim communities as a whole are more 'vulnerable' to radicalisation than other faith or ethnic groups.

3.26 Much more needs to be done in this critical area. But it must be proportionate and focused. It must not imply a need to change the attitudes of most people in this country towards terrorism. It must not seem to pass judgment on faith or to suggest only a particular kind of faith is appropriate or acceptable. It must be done in conjunction with communities here and overseas who are often better able than Government itself to disprove the claims made by terrorist groups and to challenge terrorist and associated extremist ideologies.

3.27 A future strategy in this area will include better communication of Government security and foreign policies to rebut claims made about them; more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system to enable understanding of and challenge to terrorist ideology; and support for experts where ideology draws on and misrepresents theology and requires a detailed response.

3.28 It will be vital to challenge apologists for terrorism. Challenge may mean simply debate about extremist ideas which also form part of a terrorist narrative. But, where propagandists break the law in encouraging or approving terrorism, it must also mean arrest and law enforcement action. And where people seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of extremist and terrorist groups, we will also use the Home Secretary's power to exclude them.

Objective Two: supporting vulnerable people

3.29 Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. There are some analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention.

3.30 Programmes of this kind, although central to an effective *Prevent* programme, are comparatively new and evidence of impact is correspondingly limited. Allegations have been made that the programmes have been disproportionate and intrusive and have restricted free speech. We recognise the risk that the criteria for entry to these programmes can be too broad. We have considered further allegations that the programmes have been used for spying.

3.31 We conclude that, properly handled, programmes of this kind are essential. They should pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity. They will not be a means for covert activity. Safeguards will ensure their integrity and, in particular, appropriate protection of data.

3.32 This area of *Prevent* will build upon Channel, the existing multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation. Channel has had some success. The programmes will address the risks from all forms of terrorism. They must draw on the expertise of policing, local authorities and community organisations.

3.33 Organisations commissioned to provide support to vulnerable people are in a position of great influence. They must be credible and able to reach and talk to people at risk. But we will not fund, or work with, extremist groups for this (or any other) purpose.

3.34 As in other areas of *Prevent*, evaluation of these programmes has not been fully effective. It will be significantly enhanced and new procedures will be put in place to ensure value for money.

3.35 We will conduct research and collaborate with other countries to continuously improve our understanding of radicalisation. This is vital to ensure the effectiveness of these programmes.

Objective Three: working with key sectors

3.36 A wide range of sectors in this country are helping to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The way Government works with particular sectors will vary.

3.37 Priority areas include education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. The internet is also included here as a sector in its own right although delivery of Prevent programmes through the internet is a theme running through this review and strategy.

3.38 Some progress has been made in and with all these sectors. Some sectors (like faith) have been at the forefront of work to tackle radicalisation in this country. But more can and must be done. Like other areas of *Prevent*, programmes must be proportionate to the risks we face; we look to engage with these sectors because they are capable of addressing and resolving some of the challenges we face.

3.39 There should be no 'ungoverned spaces' in which extremism is allowed to flourish without firm challenge and, where appropriate, by legal intervention.

Prevent delivery

3.40 This section explains how *Prevent* will be implemented in the future.

3.41 It describes the structures that are in place to ensure effective coordination, oversight and accountability and outlines how we will strengthen them. *Prevent* will be coordinated from and by the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office and the Home Secretary will be the lead Minister.

3.42 We explain here the new arrangements and structures that we will put in place for the local delivery of *Prevent* and the partnerships which will be the basis for success. In future *Prevent* will be prioritised according to the risks we face and not (as has been the case) on the basis of demographics. This is a significant development. The 25 priority areas are listed here. We expect these areas to change over time.

3.43 The role of policing has been important in the development of *Prevent* to date. *Prevent* is not, however, a police programme and it must not become one: it depends on a wide range of organisations in and out of Government. Some changes to the police role in *Prevent* are essential to enhance confidence in the programme. But we judge that one of the effects of *Prevent* to date has been the improvement in understanding and cooperation between police and communities in this country on a range of issues, including security.

3.44 We anticipate that there will continue to be three main areas of *Prevent* funding: local authority work in association with communities; policing; and work overseas. The funding for the first two areas will be provided by the Home Office. The funding for the third will come through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The balance between funding in these areas will be constantly reviewed.

3.45 It has been a theme in this review that evaluation and performance monitoring have been weak and they must now be improved. Data collection has been inadequate. It has not always been possible to understand what funding has been used for, or what impact projects have had.

4. Introduction

4.1 On 09 November 2010, the Home Secretary announced a review of *Prevent*, the counter-terrorist programme which aims to stop people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. *Prevent* is one of the key elements of CONTEST, the Government's counter- terrorism strategy.

4.2 The Government regards *Prevent* as an important area of work but believes the previous *Prevent* strategy has not been fully effective. The Home Secretary directed the review to:

- ensure *Prevent* is proportionate and focused;
- look at the purpose and scope of the *Prevent* strategy, its overlap and links with other areas of Government policy and its delivery at local level;
- examine the role of institutions – such as prisons, higher and further education institutions, schools and mosques – in the delivery of *Prevent*;
- consider the role of other *Prevent* delivery partners, including the police and other statutory bodies;
- consider how activity in the UK can be better coordinated with work overseas; and
- examine monitoring and evaluation structures to ensure effectiveness and value for money.

4.3 Lord Carlile of Berriew QC was appointed to provide expert, independent oversight of the review. It has been written in the OSCT in the Home Office.

4.4 A consultation process in connection with this review began on 10 November 2010 and ran for three months. A web-based questionnaire sought views on specific aspects of *Prevent*: over 400 responses were received. 11 consultation events were held around the country which attracted approximately 600 people. A series of focus groups were also held. Details can be found on the Home Office website. Whitehall Departments also consulted their principal partners.

4.5 This document is both a retrospective analysis and evaluation of *Prevent* work to date and a forward-looking strategy for *Prevent* in the future. The review:

- outlines our current understanding of terrorist threats to the UK and its interests, the scale of radicalisation and the factors driving it (chapter 5);
- provides the framework and objectives for a new strategy (chapters 6 and 7);
- sets out the programmes required to make the strategy a success (throughout); and
- considers issues regarding implementation (chapter 11).

Terminology

4.6 Many terms and expressions are used in discussion and debate about *Prevent*. The review and the consultation indicated that there are almost as many definitions of some of these terms as there are people using them. At Annex A we provide a glossary: we draw particular attention to the way in which this document uses the terms extremism, radicalisation and terrorism.

The devolved administrations

4.7 Counter-terrorism, and therefore *Prevent*, is a reserved matter and the responsibility of the UK Government and UK Ministers.

4.8 However, many of the sectors in which *Prevent* is most active have been devolved: the way *Prevent* has been delivered in Scotland and Wales has sometimes been different from the way in which it has been delivered in England. We look at these different approaches in more detail below (pages 142-145)

4.9 Unless otherwise stated, the majority of this document – and the judgements and conclusions contained within it – applies primarily to England. The main exception is the role of the police in *Prevent* in Wales, which is not devolved.

5. *Prevent:* The context

Summary

The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and like-minded organisations.

All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are prepared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is significantly greater amongst young people.

We now have more information about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and then to engage in terrorist-related activity. It is important to understand these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks it poses to our national security.

We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.

There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.

Terrorist groups can take up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popularised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country. This has significant implications for the scope of our Prevent strategy. Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist organisations.

The threat

5.1 The current threat level to the UK from terrorism is SEVERE. This means that an attack is highly likely and could occur without warning at any time.

International terrorism

5.2 The most significant terrorist threat we face comes from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and like-minded terrorist organisations inspired by violent Islamism. Of the 115 terrorist offenders currently in custody in England and Wales, 79 are associated with these groups. A number of other offenders

who have been convicted under non-terrorism legislation are also known to have engaged in Al Qa'ida-related terrorist activity before their arrest.

5.3 Since the first CONTEST strategy was published in 2006, the threat from violent Islamist terrorism has continued to diversify; more regional terrorist groups have a global agenda and aspire to attack targets here and in other countries. They include Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) – responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks – and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who claimed responsibility for the Times Square car bomb attack in May 2010.

5.4 In recent years we have also seen attempted attacks by unaffiliated (lone) terrorists, often influenced by Al Qa'ida's rhetoric of global jihad, but who have been operating largely on their own. Groups related to Al Qa'ida have specifically encouraged actions of this kind which have significant implications for our *Prevent* strategy.

Northern Ireland-related terrorism

5.5 Historically, the principal threat from terrorist organisations in the UK came from Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups. Between 1969 and the signing of the Belfast Agreement in April 1998, over 3,500 people died in the UK in attacks by the Irish Republican and Loyalist terrorist groups. While the political process and the ongoing implementation of the 1998 Belfast ('Good Friday') Agreement saw an end to the Troubles and a dramatic decline in terrorist activity, there remains a serious and persistent threat from terrorist groups in Northern Ireland.

5.6 This threat has increased significantly over the past two years. The murder of PC Ronan Kerr in April was the sixth attack against national security targets in Northern Ireland this year and followed 40 attacks in 2010 (there were 22 attacks in 2009 and 15 in 2008).

5.7 The current threat comes principally from republican terrorist groups opposed to the political process, including the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), who were responsible for the murder of two soldiers in Antrim in 2009, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), who were responsible for the murder of PC Stephen Carroll in 2009 and Óglaigh na hÉirann (ONH) which has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks since 2009. A smaller number of unaffiliated individuals have been engaged in or have supported attacks.[1]

5.8 Republican terrorist groups have long recognised the political and propaganda value of mounting an attack in Great Britain and in September 2010, the Northern Ireland-related terrorist threat to Great Britain was raised from MODERATE to SUBSTANTIAL meaning that an attack is a strong possibility. The last attack by Northern Ireland-related groups in Great Britain was in 2001. The threat in Northern Ireland itself is SEVERE, which means an attack is highly likely.

5.9 Dealing with the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Northern Ireland is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. While *Prevent* does not deal directly with the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism, the issues dealt with under this *Prevent* strategy and the principles it sets out are relevant to the attempts to counter the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism. Most relevant policy areas are the responsibility of the devolved administration in Northern Ireland with whom we continue to cooperate very closely.

[1] Independent Monitoring Commission (2010), *Twenty-fifth report of the Independent Monitoring Commission*. London: The Stationery Office. Available from: www.nio.gov.uk/twenty_fifth_report_of_the_independent_monitoring_commission.pdf

Extreme right-wing terrorism

5.10 Extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK has been much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. There are 17 people serving prison sentences in this country for terrorism-related offences who are known to be associated with extreme right-wing groups, though none of these groups are themselves terrorist organisations. In 2010, an extreme right-wing ideologue was jailed for 11 years for assembling one of the largest arms caches found in recent years in England.[2] But extreme right-wing terrorist plots have predominantly been undertaken by people acting on their own or with one or two associates.[3]

5.11 People involved in extreme right-wing terrorism have not received the same training, guidance or support as many of those who have engaged with Al Qa'ida or Al Qa'ida-influenced organisations. Nor have they ever aspired or planned to conduct operations on the scale of those planned by their Al Qa'ida counterparts.

Other forms of terrorism

5.12 In the past thirty years many other types of terrorist groups have been active in this country, sometimes planning attacks and at other times raising funds and recruiting people to their cause.[4] Some of the groups have been predominantly secular; others have had both political and religious motivations.

5.13 Between the early 1970s and late 1980s, groups conducted attacks here motivated in particular by the conflict in Israel-Palestine. Sikh separatist groups emerged in the Punjab in the late 1970s and early 1980s and have also been active here. They include Babbar Khalsa, the International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa and Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. From its foundation in 1976, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) recruited people in this country and raised funds here for its operations in Sri Lanka.

Radicalisation, recruitment and *Prevent*

5.14 All terrorist groups need to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. How, where and to what extent they try to do so will vary. Some groups are avowedly elitist and do not seek to expand their membership beyond a small number of people. Others aspire to be mass movements and to transition from being terrorists to insurgents, with the aim of using armed conflict to overthrow recognised governments. The Abu Nidhal Organisation was an example of the first type of group. Al Qa'ida is an example of the second.

5.15 Al Qa'ida and many of the groups associated with it are ambitious. They aspire to radicalise and recruit people in large numbers, in this country and elsewhere, to be part of an international network with an international agenda. This agenda draws selectively on earlier militant Islamist ideologies which sought to remove existing governments in the Muslim majority world, using violence where necessary, and establish what their proponents considered to be genuine Islamic states and ultimately a single Islamic caliphate. Al Qa'ida and its allies believe that terrorism around the world against military and civilian targets is a legitimate means to this end.

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[2] The person responsible was jailed in January 2010 under the Terrorism Act 2000. More than 50 explosive devices, 40 knives and over 30 firearms were discovered. More detail can be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8462205.stm

[3] Gable, G. and Jackson, P. (2011) Lone wolves: myth or reality? (Searchlight): DCLG

[4] The 2009 CONTEST strategy provides a more detailed summary of the historical background to international terrorism. HM Government (2009), *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 7547) pp. 20-24.

5.16 Because Al Qa'ida and related groups pose the greatest current threat to people in this country and our interests overseas and because they seek recruitment and radicalisation on a significant scale, most of our *Prevent* work has been directed to controlling their activities. We judge that this will continue to be the case but we consider the balance of our *Prevent* work in more detail below (pages 61-70).

Scale

5.17 Polling in this country, notably the last Citizenship Survey in 2010, indicates that very small percentages among all faith groups support violence as a way of dealing with injustice or in the name of religion. [5] This survey is largely in line with other polls in this country since 9/11 intended to assess the level of support for terrorism here and overseas. It is important to emphasise, therefore, that the aspirations of Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups in this country have not been realised. They attract very low levels of support. There is no evidence that this support base is growing.

5.18 In the Citizenship Survey, approval of violent extremism is higher amongst young people and for people from lower income and socio-economic groups. [6] We return to the implications of these findings below.

5.19 Overseas, there has been extensive polling to understand the levels of support for Al Qa'ida in particular, for other terrorist groups associated with them, for the types of attack which they have conducted and for the political views which they espouse. There is some evidence that support for Al Qa'ida is decreasing. But the table below shows the picture is not uniform. [7] In some countries, levels of support remain very high, for example, 49% in Nigeria, 34% in Jordan and 20% in Egypt.

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[5] Department for Communities and Local Government (2011), *Citizenship Survey: April–December 2010, England*. London: Communities and Local Government Publications. p.26. For violent extremism in general, respondents were asked 'How right or wrong do you think it is for people to use violent extremism in Britain to protest against things they think are very unfair or unjust?'. For violent extremism in the name of religion, they were asked 'Please tell me how right or wrong you think each of the following is: people in Britain using violent extremism in the name of religion, to protest or achieve a goal.' 1% of all respondents said violent extremism in general was 'always' or 'often right'. A further 5% thought it was 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong'. Less than 0.5% said the use of violent extremism in the name of religion was 'always' or 'often right'. A further 1% thought it was 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong'.
According to the survey (from April 2009-March 2010), 3% of Muslims thought it was 'always' or 'often right' to use violent extremism in Britain to protest against things they judged to be very unfair or unjust compared to 1% of Christians, 1% of Hindus and 1% of those with no religion. While 6% of Christians said violent extremism was 'always/often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong', a higher proportion of Hindus (14%) Muslims (12%) and those with no religion (9%) chose one of these responses.

[6] The survey also divided respondents according to age, income and socio-economic group, among other factors. Between April 2009 and March 2010 (unpublished), 18% of all 16-19 year old respondents judged violent extremism was either 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong' compared to 7% of 25-34 year-olds and 4% of 35-49 year-olds. While 3% of those in managerial/professional employment said violent extremism was 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong', this rose to 6% in intermediate occupations, 7% among those in semi-routine/ routine occupations and those who had never worked/ were long-term unemployed and 16% among full-time students. Furthermore, 11% of those earning under £5,000 per annum felt violent extremism was 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong' compared to between 5 and 7% of those in higher income bands.

[7] Pew Global Attitudes Project (December 2010), *Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah*. Washington DC: Pew Research Centre. Available from: http://pewglobal.org/files/2010/12/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Muslim-Report-FINAL-December-2-2010.pdf. Based on Muslims only. Figures are % favourable. Pakistani views of Al Qa'ida not shown because one question was asked later in survey, which may affect comparability of results. See also Pew Global Attitudes Project (2008), Unfavourable views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe. Washington DC: Pew Research Center, p.4. Available from: http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/03/Pew-2008-Pew-Global-Attitudes-Report-3-September.pdf. We have not seen polling about attitudes following recent events in the Middle East and North Africa.

Support for some of the political positions associated with Al Qa'ida, such as attitudes towards the West, is much higher.[8]

% *favourable*	Hezbollah	Hamas	Al Qa'ida
Jordan	55	60	34
Lebanon	52	49	3
Nigeria	45	49	49
Indonesia	43	39	23
Egypt	30	49	20
Pakistan	19	18	–
Turkey	5	9	4

Drivers

5.20 Since the last *Prevent* strategy, academic, intelligence and other Government work has illuminated the drivers of radicalisation, the characteristics of people who have been radicalised and who have joined terrorist groups, and the specific pathways to support for, and participation in, terrorist acts.

5.21 Much of the research is focused on terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida, but has also drawn on knowledge of other types of violence, including non-Al Qa'ida-related terrorist activity, gang violence and cults.[9] We return below to consider drivers for other types of terrorism which pose a current threat to the UK.

5.22 Some recent academic work suggests that radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community. It has been argued in particular that some second or third generation Muslims in Europe, facing apparent or real discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage, can find in terrorism a 'value system', a community and an apparently just cause.[10] We note that organisations working on *Prevent* have also found evidence to support the theory that identity and community are essential factors in radicalisation.

5.23 Social movement and social network theory emphasise that radicalisation is a social process particularly prevalent in small groups. Radicalisation is about 'who you know'. Group bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination are necessary to encourage the view that violence is a legitimate response to perceived injustice. We have also seen evidence to support this theory from classified Government reporting.

5.24 The first CONTEST strategy judged that there was evidence to support these and other perspectives and argued that there were five broad issues driving radicalisation by Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups in this country: an ideology that purported to justify and oblige acts of terrorism; people who promoted that ideology, often taking advantage of places and institutions in this country; a vulnerability in some people created by a very wide range of experiences and

[8] WordPublicOpionion.org Program on International Policy Attitudes (2007), *Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda*. University of Maryland, p.7 and pp.21-22. Available from: www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf

[9] See external research commissioned by OSCT including: Munton, T. et al (forthcoming), *Vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa'ida influenced violent extremism – Learning from the gang, cult, political activism and violent extremism literature*. London: Home Office, Disley, E. et al (forthcoming), Individual disengagement from violent extremist groups - A Rapid Evidence Assessment. London: Home Office Publications.

[10] Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010), Violent Radicalisation in Europe: What We Know and What we Do Not Know. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 33 (9) pp. 797-814

social factors; a lack of resilience in some places and communities; and grievances, some real and some imagined, which were frequently exploited by apologists for violence and made a reason for engaging in it.

5.25 So far as Al Qa'ida-related terrorism is concerned, this review has found that our earlier analysis of the key drivers of radicalisation remains largely valid. So we believe that radicalisation – in this country – is being driven by: an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence; a network of influential propagandists for terrorism, in this country and elsewhere, making extensive use of the internet in particular; and by specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors which make the ideology seem both attractive and compelling. The strategy which we develop in the second part of this document is based on this assessment.

5.26 The 2010 Citizenship Survey sheds further light on what we describe above as personal vulnerabilities and local factors. It has shown that support for all kinds of violent extremism is more prevalent not only among the young but among lower socio-economic and income groups. It has also shown that people who distrust Parliament, who believe that ethnic and faith groups should not mix, and who see a conflict between being British and their own cultural identity are all likely to be more supportive of violent extremism. Support for extremism is significantly associated with a perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment. It is also associated with a negative view of policing. [11]

5.27 In June 2009, qualitative research on issues relevant to *Prevent* was conducted in a small number of local areas.[12] This research broadly corroborates the Survey. Support for violence is associated with a lack of trust in democratic government and with an aspiration to defend Muslims when they appear to be under attack or unjustly treated. Issues which can contribute to a sense that Muslim communities are being unfairly treated include so-called 'stop and search' powers used by the police under counter-terrorism legislation; the UK's counter-terrorism strategy; a perception of biased and Islamophobic media coverage; and UK foreign policy, notably with regard to Muslim countries, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the war in Iraq.[13]

5.28 We regard the findings of the Citizenship Survey and this separate research as important and return to them later in this study. They are largely supported by other classified work which we cannot publish here. At this stage we note that they indicate the dependence of successful *Prevent* work on developing a sense of belonging to this country and on a perception of the importance and legitimacy of integration. They also underline the relevance to this strategy of measures the Government has already taken to address disproportionate and in some cases unnecessary counter-terrorism powers.[14] We return to this point below.

5.29 Neither the survey nor the DCLG research referenced here provide a full picture of personal issues that can lead to radicalisation, specifically towards terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. They have less to say about the influence of ideology, although respondents to the qualitative

[11] Citizenship Survey (April 2009-March 2010) (unpublished). Logistical regression analysis was conducted by DCLG to understand the key variables associated with the response that violent extremism was 'always wrong'. To ensure presentational consistency in this document, the results here are transposed to reflect factors associated with more support for violent extremism.

[12] Department for Communities and Local Government (unpublished).

[13] See also, Research, Information and Communications Unit (2010), *Understanding perceptions of the terms 'Britishness' and 'Terrorism'*. London: Home Office pp. 44-45.

[14] Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations, HM Government, January 2011. www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/

survey referred to confusion among young Muslims regarding issues of faith in a 'plural doctrinal environment'. The Citizenship Survey and the research also have little to say about the influence of peer groups – sometimes family members – and particular charismatic radicalisers in the radicalisation process. On the evidence we have seen, we regard this as important. We return to these issues below.

5.30 Recent open source research provides insight into the background of people convicted of Islamist terrorism-related offences over the past ten years.[15] The data indicates that most offences have been committed by men under the age of 30. Most were British. Almost 25% had links to Pakistan – either as British nationals with Pakistani heritage or Pakistani nationals - and almost 15% to East Africa (notably Somalia). Almost 50% of the sample were resident in London at the time of their offence, notably in the north or north east of the city; 13% were resident in the West Midlands (12% in Birmingham), 9% in Yorkshire/Humber (9%) and 7% in the South East. Just over one third of the British citizens and just under one third of the total for whom information on education was available had attended university or a higher education institute. Fewer than half, however, were either in employment or full-time education. 35% were unemployed.

5.31 These statistics track very closely with classified analysis of people engaged in terrorism-related activity who have not yet been convicted. A significant additional point is that many people convicted for terrorism-related crimes have previously engaged in (although not necessarily been convicted for) non-terrorism-related criminal activity.[16]

5.32 There are important overseas aspects to the radicalisation process in this country. A large number of people who have engaged in terrorism in this country have come here from overseas, notably from countries in the Muslim-majority world which have been affected by conflict and instability: most of those convicted here between 1999 and 2009 were British nationals but fewer than half were born in this country.[17] Similar percentages have been found among people who have engaged in terrorist-related activity and who have not been convicted.

5.33 Many people who have been radicalised here have been significantly influenced by propagandists for terrorism who are based overseas and in many cases they have spent time in a current or historic theatre of conflict in the Muslim-majority world. Some have been influenced by the time they have spent in religious institutions in their countries. Many have been recruited while they have been travelling or resident overseas. These connections all highlight the key fact that *Prevent* work in this country is often dependent on essential *Prevent* work overseas, conducted by the UK, other governments or by multilateral organisations. We return to this below (pages 52-54).

Terrorism and extremism

5.34 In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups of all kinds very often draw upon ideologies which have been developed, disseminated and popularised by extremist organisations that appear to be non-violent (such as groups which neither use violence nor specifically and openly endorse its use by others).

[15] Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. pp.227-232 and 237-245.

[16] See Bakker, E. (2006), *Jihadi terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study*: The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, p.48.

[17] Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. p.232-235

5.35 Some politically extreme organisations routinely claim that: the West is perpetually at war with Islam; there can be no legitimate interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims in this country or elsewhere; and that Muslims living here cannot legitimately and or effectively participate in our democratic society. Islamist extremists can specifically attack the principles of participation and cohesion, rejection of which we judge to be associated with an increased willingness to use violence (see pages 24-25). Islamist extremists can purport to identify problems to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution.

5.36 Likewise, extreme right-wing groups, whose white supremacist ideology advocates the use of violence to address perceived social injustice, have provided both the inspiration and justification for people who have committed extreme right-wing terrorist acts.

5.37 Evidence also shows that some people who have engaged in terrorist-related activity here have previously participated in extremist organisations. According to the open source survey to which we refer above, about 15% of people convicted for terrorist-related offences here between 1999 and 2009 had been connected with the extremist group Al-Muhajiroun (which, with its various successor organisations, is now proscribed under terrorism legislation). We know that a handful of others have been connected to Hizb-ut-Tahrir. [18]

5.38 In some cases, people who have been radicalised to the point of approving of terrorism have passed through a prior extremist phase. But this is not always so. Some people are recruited into a terrorist organisation and radicalised at the same time.

Northern Ireland-related terrorism

5.39 A range of factors drive recruitment to and support for Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups. Ideologically, the key factor for republican groups throughout the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland has been the constitutional position and in particular the ongoing British presence in Ireland.

5.40 While the 'Good Friday' Agreement provided a political resolution to this issue by enshrining the principle of consent (that Northern Ireland will remain part of the UK until a majority vote otherwise), a small number of people have become disillusioned with the pace of progress and with the political parties engaged in the new political systems set up by the Agreement.

5.41 But in Ireland, as elsewhere, ideology is rarely the only factor in the process of radicalisation and recruitment. Recruitment is often personality-driven or dependent on family or local allegiances. The promise of status, excitement and in some cases financial reward are all relevant. Socio-economic factors also play a significant role: communities with significant terrorist activity generally score highest on a range of social deprivation indicators.

Extreme right-wing terrorism

5.42 Given the small number of relevant cases (and the absence here of extreme right-wing terrorist organisations and formal groups) our understanding of how people become involved in extreme right-wing terrorism is inevitably less developed than it is for terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. But there are similarities.

[18] It is important to note however that it will not always be clear to what extent a person who engages in terrorist-related activity here has been involved with extremist groups, so these statistics need to be treated with some caution.

5.43 Extreme right-wing terrorism, like Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorism, is driven by a supremacist ideology, which sanctions the use of extreme violence as a response to perceived social injustice and dysfunction. That ideology is a response to and reflects a perception that identity itself is under threat from social change. People can be drawn to right-wing terrorist ideology through the rhetoric and language of apparently non-violent right-wing extremist groups.

5.44 Peer pressure and the prospect of personal benefit are also important: one of the most common routes into extreme right-wing terrorism can be through contact with like-minded people. But extreme right-wing terrorism is not driven or justified by religion: this has a substantial impact on how we may intervene to prevent terrorism of this kind.

5.45 People drawn to extreme right-wing terrorism are usually male, poorly educated (although there are some cases of high-achieving individuals) and often unemployed. In some cases, previous involvement in criminal activity has been an issue. The internet plays a key role in reinforcing ideology and facilitating activity.

5.46 In recent years, Islamophobia has increasingly become part of extreme right-wing terrorist ideology. People have justified their actions as a response to Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorism, extremist organisations and to alleged threats from Muslim communities. But extreme right-wing groups and radical Islamist groups such as Al-Muhajiroun increasingly define themselves by their opposition to each other: that opposition facilitates radicalisation and recruitment.

6. Guiding principles: A framework for *Prevent*

Summary

Prevent *is part of our counter-terrorist strategy, CONTEST. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.*

Prevent *will address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security. At present, the majority of our resources and efforts will be devoted to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and related groups.*

We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent *will also mean intervening to try to stop people moving from extremist groups or extremism into terrorist-related activity.*

Policy and programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part of Prevent *and will be coordinated from DCLG.*

Prevent *must deal with all forms of terrorism and not just with Al Qa'ida. But the allocation of resources will be proportionate to the threats we face. At present the greatest threat to the UK as a whole is from Al Qa'ida and groups and individuals who share the violent Islamist ideology associated with it.*

We envisage no change to the legal framework for Prevent*-related work.*

Prevent *depends on a successful integration strategy. But integration alone will not meet* Prevent *objectives. And* Prevent *must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past.*

There have been allegations that previous Prevent *programmes have been used to spy on communities. We can find no evidence to support these claims.* Prevent *must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. Trust in* Prevent *must be improved.*

The Government's commitment to localism will support the Prevent *strategy. Communities and local authorities have a key part in this strategy. But as a national security issue,* Prevent *needs to be developed in very close conjunction with central Departments.*

Prevent *will be funded from the Home Office and other Departments. Grants will be made available for local authority* Prevent *work. Evaluation of* Prevent *activity to date has been poor. Money has been wasted. We will tighten up arrangements for evaluation at all levels in future. Funding and other forms of support will not be provided to extremist organisations. Neither Government Departments nor the police will rely on extremists to address the risk of radicalisation.*

We will assess in the coming year whether the balance between the three main areas of Prevent *expenditure – local projects, policing and* Prevent *work overseas – is appropriate.*

The review found no evidence to indicate widespread, systematic or deliberate funding of extremist groups, either by the Home Office or by local authorities or police forces. But there have been some cases where groups whom we would now consider to support an extremist ideology have received funding. Stricter monitoring is required to ensure this does not happen in future.

The process of radicalisation here often has overseas connections. To be effective, Prevent *work must take place overseas as well as in the UK. But that work has not always been effective to date and funds have been wasted. In future, the work needs to be much better aligned with domestic priorities and more rigorously appraised.*

The aim and scope of *Prevent*

6.1 The aim of the *Prevent* strategy is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. *Prevent* is part of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy. It draws on counter-terrorism funding, in some cases legislation and on counter-terrorism resources.

6.2 Whereas *Prevent* is part of CONTEST, a counter-terrorism strategy, and deals with terrorism, the Government will address the challenge of extremism – and extremist organisations in particular – primarily through other means. They include: the Government's new approach to promoting integration, which DCLG is leading; other parts of the criminal justice system, notably legislation regarding religious and racial hatred; and debate and civic challenge.

6.3 Government policy regarding groups who may be associated with extremism (notably policy regarding Ministerial or official engagement) will also be coordinated by DCLG.

6.4 But the line between extremism and terrorism is not always precise. As we have said in the first part of this document, terrorist groups very often draw on extremist ideas developed by extremist organisations. Some people who become members of terrorist groups have previously been members of extremist organisations and have been radicalised by them. Others (though not all) pass through an extremist phase.

6.5 Preventing people becoming terrorists will require a challenge to extremist ideas where they are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. It will also require intervention to stop people beginning to move away from extremist but legal groups into proscribed illegal terrorist organisations.

6.6 The relationship between terrorism and extremism is therefore complicated and directly relevant to the aim and objectives of *Prevent*. It will not always be possible or desirable to draw clear lines between policies in each of these areas. But the lines can be clearer than they have been hitherto. That will also bring greater clarity to the *Prevent* strategy.

6.7 We note that previous *Prevent* documents used the phrase 'violent extremism'. The review found that the term is ambiguous and has caused some confusion in the past, most notably by giving the impression that the scope of *Prevent* is very wide indeed and includes a range of activity far beyond counter-terrorism. We avoid using the phrase here, although we recognise that programmes comparable to *Prevent* are being run in other countries under the banner of preventing or countering violent extremism.

The review concludes that the main aim of* Prevent *must be to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. That will also require challenge to extremist ideologies which can be made to justify terrorism and intervention with some extremists who are moving into terrorism.* Prevent *is part of the Government's much larger toolkit designed to challenge extremism, extremist groups and terrorism.

6.8 In line with CONTEST, the previous *Prevent* strategy focused on the most significant risks to national security, namely the threat from terrorism associated with and influenced by Al Qa'ida. This threat continues to be the most significant facing the UK and its interests.

6.9 The original strategy allowed for the possibility that *Prevent* could be used to tackle other forms of terrorism. The review found evidence that local *Prevent* practitioners (notably the police) have done this, and in particular that some projects have addressed the threat posed by extreme right-wing groups. But the common perception is that *Prevent* has dealt solely with terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida.

6.10 A majority (over 80%) of respondents to the consultation which accompanied this review believed that *Prevent* should address a wider range of threats, including not only Al Qa'ida but also violence from extreme right-wing or other ethnic or religious organisations.

6.11 We believe that *Prevent* should be flexible enough to address the challenge posed by terrorism of any kind. *Prevent* programmes should be able to support people being drawn into all forms of terrorism. To take a single example, work in schools to discuss and consider what terrorism is should look at terrorism in the round and not just at Al Qa'ida. It is vital to understand how, historically, terrorism has drawn recruits from all parts of societies and from many faith groups.

6.12 However, it is also the case that the greatest terrorist threat we currently face comes from Al Qa'ida and groups associated with it. For as long as that remains the case resources must be prioritised accordingly and focused on this area.

The review concludes that* Prevent *should address all forms of terrorism, but continue to ensure resources and effort are allocated on the basis of threats to our national security. As it is the greatest threat to the UK as a whole, the priority will be to focus on terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida.

Legal issues

6.13 The Terrorism Act of 2006 established offences which in effect relate to *Prevent*. They include in particular the offence of encouraging terrorism or disseminating publications that seek to encourage terrorism.[19] These offences of incitement to terrorism have become known as 'glorification' offences.[20] These provisions were intended to curtail radicalising activity in this country by prominent apologists for terrorism. But prosecuting people under some of this legislation has not been simple. Since the Act was passed, only 3 people have been convicted for these offences under sections 1 and 2 of the Act.[21]

6.14 The conviction rates do not necessarily reflect the wider deterrent impact of such legislation, though we have no authoritative evidence to indicate what that might be. More people who have been engaged in propaganda and radicalisation have been prosecuted under generic terrorist offences than under offences specific to what has become known as 'glorification'.

6.15 We have heard during the consultation process that preceded this publication that legislation about glorification and other powers has had the inadvertent effect of making some people reluctant to engage in legitimate debate and discussion about terrorism. This is often important to *Prevent* – a subject to which we return. We believe this indicates a need to be much clearer about the purpose of the legislation.

6.16 Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe groups currently 'concerned in terrorism'.[22] This power aims, *inter alia*, to curtail radicalising activity by terrorist organisations. Proscription makes it a criminal offence for a person to belong to, or invite support for, that organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation or wear clothing or carry articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. Proscription sends a strong message that terrorist organisations are not tolerated in the UK and deters them from operating here.

6.17 In its January 2011 review of some aspects of the UK's counter-terrorism and security powers the Government considered whether existing proscription legislation and powers should be extended and powers created to proscribe organisations promoting hatred. The review concluded that the powers should remain unchanged.[23]

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[19] Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes it an offence to publish statements (in any form) that are *'likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism'*. Section 2 of the Act makes it an offence to disseminate terrorist publications that similarly seek to directly or indirectly encourage terrorism. In effect, these sections build on Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 which made it an offence to collect or make a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. It also makes it an offence to possess a document or record containing information of this kind.

[20] The term 'glorification' was the general descriptor used by the then Government before the bill was passed. In the Counter-Terrorism Act 2006, the term is only used in the context of one of the offences relating to the indirect encouragement of terrorism.

[21] Home Office (2009/10) *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: arrests, outcomes and stops and searches*. Crown Copyright 2010. Home Office statistical bulletin, 28 October 2010. London: Home Office.

[22] An organisation 'is concerned in terrorism' if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2006 extended the meaning of promoting or encouraging terrorism to include the unlawful glorification of acts of terrorism.

[23] HM Government (2011), *Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 8004) Available from: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/

6.18 The holding of extremist views is protected by Article 10 of European Convention on Human Rights and cannot be addressed through criminal law. However, in addition to counter-terrorism legislation, a range of other laws and executive powers have been used to deal with aspects of extremism and radicalisation. Powers derived from public order-related legislation, for example, can address activity which contributes to stirring up racial or religious hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.[24]

6.19 Legislation also impacts on *Prevent* in a different way. Research suggests that counter-terrorism legislation and wider policing powers can contribute to the radicalisation process. In the survey we quoted above, specific reference was made to 'stop-and-search'. In its review of counter-terrorism powers, the Government has already taken steps to address disproportionate and in some cases unnecessary counter-terrorism powers, including 'stop-and-search' in particular.[25]

Preventing terrorism and promoting cohesion

6.20 The first part of this paper indicated that there is an association between support for terrorist violence and a rejection of a society where ethnic and faith groups mix easily and trust one another – a society which is cohesive and integrated. We judge that communities who do not (or, alternatively, cannot) participate in all civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation by all kinds of terrorist groups.

6.21 A stronger sense of 'belonging' and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists. We believe that *Prevent* depends on integration, democratic participation and a strong interfaith dialogue.

6.22 But it is important not to overstate the relationship between radicalisation and community or individual isolation. We have also seen classified evidence that indicates very clearly that apparently well-integrated people have committed terrorist attacks.

6.23 The last *Prevent* strategy recognised connections between *Prevent* and work on cohesion (as it was then generally known), although at the time the strategy was introduced data from the Citizenship Survey was not available. One of the 2007 *Prevent* strategy objectives was to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; another was to address grievances, whether real or perceived, which might be exploited in the radicalisation process. But the term resilience was never fully or comprehensively defined; the 2009 CONTEST strategy noted that grievances included perceptions of British foreign policy, racism, discrimination, inequalities, lack of social mobility, under-employment and the experience of criminality.[26] Both these objectives therefore implicitly and sometimes explicitly encouraged the use of *Prevent* funding and *Prevent* delivery structures for a very wide range of projects, some of them more to do with cohesion than with counter-terrorism.

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[24] Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 makes it an offence, amongst other things, to say or do something or to possess or display written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting and which is intended to stir up racial hatred or make it likely that racial hatred will be stirred up. Part IIIA of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008) makes it an offence to use threatening words or behaviour, or to display any written material which is threatening, if it is intended to encourage religious hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. Prosecutions for these offences require the consent of the Attorney General. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended by the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001) creates racially or religiously aggravated offences in relation to specified assaults, criminal damage and specified public order offences.

[25] HM Government (2011), *Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 8004) Available from: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/

[26] HM Government (2009), *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 7547), p.91.

6.24 Other factors appear to have contributed to the use of significant amounts of *Prevent* funding for wider community cohesion programmes. In England, funding provided for *Prevent* to local authorities under the Area Based Grant (ABG) (totalling £45.7 million over the spending review period from 2008 to 2011) was not ring-fenced, which gave authorities flexibility to decide how it should be spent. At the same time, some local authorities encountered opposition to *Prevent* work and therefore chose to use the funding for less contentious cohesion or community safety projects more likely to receive community support.[27] Finally, responsibility for *Prevent* was in many cases given to local authority staff already responsible for wider community-based interventions. This encouraged the convergence of *Prevent* and cohesion programmes.

6.25 In 2008, the Government published a review into early *Prevent* funding.[28] The review estimated that the 261 projects delivered in England in 2007/08 had reached an estimated 44,000 people.[29] The results provided a breakdown of the types of activity local authorities were supporting. The table below illustrates this in more detail.

Percentage	Activity type	Examples
54%	**Debates, discussions and forums**	'Safe space' debates to discuss current affairs or grievances
33%	**General educational activities**	Presentations to schools about Islamic beliefs and culture. Addressing under-achievement of Pakistani boys
27%	**Leadership and management activities**	Establishment of mosque management committees. Provision of professional media training to key contacts to help them manage media interest around terrorism issues.
26%	**Non-accredited training**	Active citizenship training for local Muslim women's forum. Training of imams in English language, ICT and British society by qualified tutors.
19%	**Arts and cultural activities**	Local theatre production which raised issues of extremism in communities
13%	**Sports and recreation**	Boxing clubs, football clubs

[27] For example, Waltham Forest's *Prevent* action plan was entitled 'Working Together, Living Together, Being Together' and positioned the work on *Prevent* within their wider community cohesion strategy. The authority, like many others, felt that this approach provided the best way to engage communities and secure their support.

[28] Department for Communities and Local Government (2008), *Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund Mapping of project activities 2007/2008*. London: Communities and Local Government Publications. Available from: www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1092863.pdf

[29] See also The Taxpayers' Alliance (2009), *Council Spending Uncovered II No.5: The Prevent Strategy.* London: The Taxpayer's Alliance. Available from: www.taxpayersalliance.com/Prevent.pdf. This report provides a record of projects commissioned by local authorities in the Pathfinder year (2007-8) and the first year of ABG (2008-9) based on FOI requests submitted to local authorities.

6.26 Consolidated records of projects commissioned by local authorities indicate that just over 1000 further projects were delivered across England over the three years of funding under DCLG's ABG.[30] The findings of an internal review exercise based on a limited sample of around 220 projects delivered during 2009/10 and 2010/11 show that the emphasis on resilience and cohesion continued through the end of the ABG period. The projects were assessed in terms of how far they dealt directly with counter-terrorism. The following table shows approximate breakdowns of the different types of activity:

	Approximate percentage of projects	Description and examples
MOST CT	**20%**	**Activity focused on terrorism and targeted at the most vulnerable people and sectors** • activity which challenges the terrorist ideology for example, speakers challenging terrorist narratives; • support for vulnerable people through identification, referral and intervention; and • projects addressing grievances for example, 'safe-space' debates on issues related to terrorism.
	25%	**Cohesion and integration activity with reference to extremism and/or terrorism** • projects aimed more specifically at extremism and/or terrorism, but with no attempt to focus on vulnerable people or institutions.
	40%	**General cohesion and integration** • broad interfaith, anti-racism and Islamic education projects, without reference to extremism or terrorism; • activity aimed at Muslim communities viewed as diversionary (for example, sports activity) but without any focus on the most vulnerable or with any reference to extremism or terrorism; and • general Muslim forums, Muslim women's groups, leadership and mentoring for young people.
	10%	**Governance, research, training** • internal local authority training, additional posts, research and evaluation.
LEAST CT	**5%**	**Capacity building** • general training of imams, faith capacity building.

6.27 We believe that some *Prevent* police funding has also been spent on initiatives primarily intended to build resilience and promote cohesion. For more information on the police's galvanising role in *Prevent* pages 136-138.

[30] Information on local authority projects derived from local *Prevent* progress monitoring collated via the Government Offices. Information was provided on the basis of local authority action plans which were not all updated regularly. Additional information was provided at the discretion of local authorities and some differences do exist between authorities. Some data in some areas was unavailable.

6.28 During the consultation for this review there was substantial support for the principle that *Prevent* funding should not be used for the much wider objectives of promoting integration and community cohesion. Respondents noted that this created the impression that the Government was supporting cohesion projects only for security reasons and in effect 'securitising integration'. Respondents gave examples of where funding for cohesion and also faith-based projects could only be obtained by using counter-terrorism funds and, sometimes, by dealing with counter-terrorism officials and police officers.

6.29 In March 2010, the House of Commons Select Committee for Communities and Local Government report on *Prevent* stated that 'much *Prevent* money has been wasted on unfocused or irrelevant projects, as a result either of misunderstanding of *Prevent* or of a lack of willingness and capacity of local organisations to deliver.'[31] The report recommended more work on cohesion but also concluded that it should be decoupled from *Prevent*.

6.30 The relationship between *Prevent* and cohesion and integration needs to be very carefully managed. *Prevent* depends on a successful cohesion and integration strategy. But, as a general rule, the two strategies and programmes must not be merged together. Combining the strategies risks using counter-terrorism funds and delivery structures for activities which have a much wider purpose and whose success will be jeopardised by being given a security label. Moreover, channelling *Prevent* funding into cohesion projects has the further effect of making it less likely that *Prevent* will meet its own objectives. *Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy but that strategy by itself will not deliver the *Prevent* objectives.

6.31 We recognise that in some circumstances there will be exceptions to these general rules. Some projects whose purpose goes much wider than counter-terrorism will also have such a direct benefit to *Prevent*-related work that they justify *Prevent* funding. But these projects will be the exception not the norm. We also accept that many staff working on *Prevent*, notably in policing and local authorities, will continue to have cohesion-related functions, something that is more rather than less likely as local authorities look for opportunities to make efficiency savings.

The review concludes that* Prevent *will depend on a successful integration programme. But, as a general rule,* Prevent *and cohesion programmes must remain distinct, though coordinated with one another. Counter-terrorism* Prevent *funding must not be used extensively for community interventions which have much wider social objectives.

The Government has already decided that responsibility for* Prevent *will lie with the Home Office (in the OSCT) and responsibility for integration with DCLG.

The review also concludes that significant funding was provided to local authorities without sufficient guidance, accountability or oversight. In future,* Prevent *programmes should be more tightly focused.

[31] House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee (2010), *Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10*. London: The Stationery Office. p.61. Available from: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf

Prevent and *Pursue*

6.32 *Prevent* and *Pursue* are two of the four main programmes in CONTEST, the Government's counter-terrorism strategy. The aim of *Prevent* is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The aim of *Pursue* is to stop terrorist attacks in the UK and against our interests overseas. *Pursue* depends upon intelligence gathering by the police and the security agencies in this country and overseas.

6.33 There are touch points between these two programmes: *Prevent* depends on *Pursue* to facilitate the disruption and conviction of people engaged in radicalisation activities which are clearly illegal; *Pursue* depends on *Prevent* to restrict the number of people engaging in terrorism-related activity.

6.34 But one of the most damaging allegations made about *Prevent* in the last two years has been that it has strayed into the area of *Pursue* and become a means for spying on Muslim communities. This allegation was raised in the media and in a research paper in late 2009.[32]

6.35 The allegation was based on claims that: some *Prevent* projects received funding on the proviso that they collected information which was then passed to the police; statutory authorities were being encouraged to identify to the police for *Prevent*-related support, people who were being radicalised but who were holding views which were not illegal; the information the police were seeking was highly intrusive and included data on mental health, sexuality, and associates; and that *Prevent* was encouraging the police and local authorities to seek information about Muslim communities to an extent that would not apply to other faith communities. There was general concern that for a programme intended to deal with people who were not yet engaging in illegal activities, the police played a disproportionate role.

6.36 The Home Office conducted a review into the more detailed allegations and concluded that there was little or no evidence to support them (a copy of the public response can be found on the Home Office website). *Prevent* project funding was not conditional on the disclosure of sensitive personal information. Arrangements for sharing data about vulnerable people (Information Sharing Agreements) were in accordance with the Data Protection Act and standard arrangements between public sector agencies. There was no evidence that data was being collected as a matter of course on a wide range of personal issues.

6.37 The allegations were also considered by the Communities and Local Government Select Committee report on *Prevent* in 2010. The report stated that different use of terms such as intelligence gathering, spying and surveillance were posing challenges to *Prevent*. Information collection for the purposes of project monitoring and community mapping was sometimes being confused with covert operational activity.[33] The report accepted that the allegations about data sharing were based on a misunderstanding about the process for supporting vulnerable people.

6.38 But the consultation process to this review indicates that there remain wider concerns about the relationship between *Prevent* and *Pursue*. We aim to address some of these concerns (which go wider than policing) in the course of this report. We look at the role of *Prevent* Engagement Officers and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers below (pages 136-139).

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[32] Kundnani, A. (2009), *Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism*. London: Institute of Race Relations. Available from: www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf and Dodd, V. (2009), Government anti-terrorism strategy 'spies' on innocent. *The Guardian*, 16 October. Available from: www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/anti-terrorism-strategy-spies-innocents

[33] House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee (2010), *Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10*. London: The Stationery Office., p5. Available from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf

6.39 But here we emphasise that it must be a guiding principle of *Prevent* that the programme is not used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. We do not believe that has been the case. It must not be.

6.40 Data collected about people for the purposes of *Prevent* must be necessary and proportionate. There should be transparency about the way it is collected and the purpose for which it is intended. The data must be protected in accordance with standard procedures among public bodies (as set out in Information Sharing Agreements between local partners) and those procedures must be transparent.

6.41 There may be occasions where, in the course of *Prevent*-related work (as in the course of any other work), local authorities, statutory partners or the police identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal terrorism-related activity. People suspected of being involved in such activity should be referred to the police for an investigation to be considered. That investigation cannot take place or be conducted under the auspices of *Prevent*.

6.42 We understand concerns among some police officers that nothing should be said in the context of *Prevent* which inadvertently undermines community engagement and the work they do to encourage people to report suspicious activity and criminal behaviour. But we can see no contradiction between this objective – which we clearly endorse – and the principles we have set out here. Rather the opposite: covert use of *Prevent* damages community trust and will inhibit the reporting of suspicious activity.

6.43 While *Prevent* must not be used as a means of systematically gathering intelligence on people or communities, it is essential that accurate and relevant information about the terrorist threat is shared by the police with local *Prevent* partners. Over the past two years Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) have been developed for this purpose.[34] Although the quality of early reports was variable, we believe that they are consistently improving and that they are they are vital to a successful *Prevent* strategy.

The changing context for *Prevent* delivery

6.44 Over the past few years, *Prevent* has been delivered through a combination of central Departments, local government, policing and local, regional and national community organisations. In general terms, the Government has set *Prevent* objectives as part of its overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Organisations have developed programmes to try to meet these objectives. As we have argued above, the implementation of the strategy has been variable.

6.45 We continue to believe that, as a key national security issue, *Prevent* has to be developed centrally, in this case by the Home Office, on the basis of extensive consultation, research and understanding. The Home Office should also continue to monitor the delivery of *Prevent*, recognising the requirement for much closer evaluation. We consider this in more detail below (pages 141-142).

6.46 Home Office Ministers have already made the decision to fund *Prevent* coordinators in up to 25 local authorities. Their role will be to ensure delivery of *Prevent* objectives by bringing together organisations engaged in *Prevent* work, ensuring that appropriate programmes are in place and,

[34] CTLPs are police-owned and produced classified reports that outline the threat from terrorist activity within a specific area, police force, or local authority area. CTLPs are distributed to a small group of people and have facilitated a dialogue between police and partners, enabling them to understand how the terrorist threat relates to their local communities.

where necessary, facilitating effective interaction with a wide range of communities and community organisations with an interest in *Prevent*. They will continue to work closely with local *Prevent* policing leads.

6.47 The Government has already taken and implemented a decision to abolish Government Offices in the regions. Government Office regional *Prevent* coordinator posts have also ended. Local authority leads will work in partnership with the *Prevent* teams in central Departments, notably the Home Office.

6.48 As part of wider public service and local government reforms designed to create the Big Society, the Government is committed to a fundamental shift of power away from central Government to communities, families and individuals across the nation. Localised decision making will become a normal part of everyday life, giving people more say, more choice and greater opportunities for ownership of their local facilities and services.[35]

6.49 During the consultation process, respondents clearly saw the benefits that localism could bring to *Prevent*. It was seen first and foremost as an opportunity to use the knowledge, access and influence of people and communities to challenge extremist and terrorist ideology. Respondents also noted that communities very often had the best understanding of how and with whom *Prevent* could best be delivered.[36]

6.50 A number of specific reforms have been enacted or are due to be enacted in the near future which will alter the way *Prevent* operates locally, especially in England. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, currently before Parliament, provides for the introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in every police force in England and Wales from May 2012.[37]

6.51 PCCs will represent their communities, understand their crime and anti-social behaviour priorities and hold the Chief Constable to account for achieving them. They will have a broad remit to ensure community safety, with their own budgets to prevent crime and tackle drugs. They will work with local authorities, community safety partnerships and local criminal justice boards, helping to bring a strategic coherence to the actions of these organisations at force level.

6.52 Under these reforms, a Chief Constable will remain operationally independent and retain the direction and control of their police force, including for counter-terrorist policing. The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) will set a Police and Crime Plan for their force area which will set out publicly the strategic objectives and budget with which the Chief Constable shall be responsible and held account for delivering. The Bill provides for both the PCC and the Chief Constable to be bound by a strong duty to have regard to the Strategic Policing Requirement which will set out the requirement for policing capabilities to tackle threats that go beyond police force boundaries. This will include CONTEST, of which *Prevent* is a key strand. We expect PCCs to be engaged in *Prevent* and to agree to an appropriate local strategy for *Prevent* policing in their area.

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[35] For more background on the Government's localism agenda, see HM Government (2010), *Decentralisation and the Localism Bill: an Essential Guide*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government. Available from: www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/1793908.pdf. This makes the case for a radical shift of power from the centralised state to local communities, and describes the six essential actions required to deliver decentralisation down through every level of government to citizens. The guide focuses on the Localism Bill, which provides the legislative foundation for change and exemplifies all of the six actions described.

[36] Many respondents also agreed that all *Prevent* partners, local and national, needed to more systematically and freely share examples of good practice and communicate more effectively the lessons learned from the previous four years of *Prevent* activity.

[37] The Mayor of London will take on the role of Police and Crime Commissioner for the City of London.

Funding

6.53 There are three important issues regarding the funding of *Prevent*: the degree to which it is subject to central control and ring-fencing; the type of organisations who may receive it; and the relative balance between the three areas which currently receive the bulk of the funding (local authorities, policing and the FCO for *Prevent* work overseas).

6.54 Since 2007, *Prevent* in England has been funded mainly by the Home Office, DCLG and FCO. These Departments have in turn allocated resources to a wide range of organisations, agencies, other Government Departments and local government. Some Departments (such as the Departments for Education (DfE), Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and Health) have supplemented this with funding from their own budgets.

6.55 In the past, funding for local authority *Prevent* projects was allocated on the basis of Muslim population size, with those areas with the largest Muslim populations receiving the most funding. The limitations of this approach are clear, but at the time, it was considered the best available. With the benefit of greater information and understanding, funding to local authorities in the future will be prioritised on our assessment of the risk of radicalisation in specific areas. We set out a model for this later in this document.

6.56 As we have seen, the Government's localism agenda aims to shift power from central Government to the local level. In terms of funding to local authorities, this generally involves abolishing ring-fenced grants to allow local authorities to set their own agendas and priorities.

6.57 Unlike most other areas of local authority business, *Prevent* is intended to address risks to our national security. It is one part of our national counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. We have already seen, however, that implementation of it to date has been very variable in quality and (to the extent we can determine) in effect. For these reasons, we intend to provide precisely targeted and dedicated funding for *Prevent* for the foreseeable future with the aim of ensuring consistency in delivery against the objectives we have set. But we also expect proposals for funding to be developed locally – by local authority leads in conjunction with other *Prevent* partners – and we have no intention of micro-managing local projects.

6.58 Funding decisions also need a careful assessment of the organisations to which the funding is being given. The review examined claims that *Prevent* funding had been deliberately given to groups and organisations advocating extremist ideologies on the grounds that they were better able to deal with challenges posed by radicalisation.[38]

6.59 The review noted that under the previous strategy a small number of Muslim organisations had been funded from the Home Office to deliver programmes to support people at risk of radicalisation (outlined below, chapter 9) on the basis that, unlike other organisations, they were able to relate to and therefore work with the people concerned.

6.60 We are concerned that insufficient attention has been paid to whether these organisations comprehensively subscribe to what we would consider to be mainstream British values: democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind. We are also concerned that some funding provided to them for the purposes of *Prevent*-related work has been used to help people with

[38] By extremism here we mean the active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. See Glossary, pages 107-108 below.

vulnerabilities which are not connected to radicalisation. Funding for these organisations has already been amended and is still under review. Any future funding will also be contingent upon much tighter monitoring and evaluation.

6.61 The review found evidence that some *Prevent* funding from central Government and local authorities had reached a small number of organisations who had expressed (or employed people who had expressed) extremist views.

6.62 Within the context of Home Office *Prevent* funds, all recipients have been subject to regular scrutiny, including by the police. Grant conditions for intervention providers have required security vetting. However, it is clear that monitoring of these organisations, especially those dealing with vulnerable people, has been insufficient. We return to this below.

6.63 Records and audit trails for *Prevent* funding have not always been comprehensive. It is therefore possible that *Prevent* funding has reached extremist groups of which we are not yet aware. We will continue to investigate this issue.

6.64 In future, neither *Prevent* funding nor support will be given to organisations that hold extremist views or support terrorist-related activity of any kind, in this country or overseas. This applies irrespective of the source of the funding: central Government, local government or policing.

6.65 The review concludes that new obligations on local authorities and other public bodies to publish details of expenditure will introduce greater levels of transparency, enabling people to challenge funding that they believe is not in the wider interest of their community. We believe that the work that DCLG is doing to oversee Government engagement with organisations that may be extremist will also be an important additional safeguard (see above, pages 27-28).

6.66 We note that in some areas security vetting will be unable to identify people or groups who espouse views that conflict with the basic principles of *Prevent* and care needs to be taken for this reason.

6.67 We would emphasise that criteria for funding are different from criteria for engagement (such as contact and dialogue). There may be cases where the Government judge that there is a need to engage with groups or individuals whom it would never choose to fund. That may particularly be the case overseas, where we may need to engage with groups or individuals that are seen as moderate in their own country but not in the UK.

6.68 In recent years there have been three large areas of *Prevent* funding: local authority work; policing; and *Prevent* work overseas. During this year – as in the last two years – funding for *Prevent* police work will be the single largest area of expenditure.

6.69 During the consultation exercise for this review, we have repeatedly been advised of police concerns that they are holding too great a part of the *Prevent* agenda. There are a number of reasons for this but one is simply the fact that they have received more funding than anyone else and have used that funding to dedicate more resources to this agenda. The number of people employed by the police to deal with *Prevent* exceeds the numbers who have been employed by local authorities.

6.70 We are not convinced that this is the right use of the resources we have available. The effect has been to create the impression that *Prevent* is a police programme, which it is not. As we have seen in this section, that impression can in turn create suspicion of *Prevent* and a reluctance to engage with it. As we begin delivery of the new strategy, we will therefore examine the division of funding more closely and specifically consider if the funding for local authorities and community groups needs to increase at the expense of funding for *Prevent* policing. We are sympathetic to this case but also alive to the central role that policing will always need to play in *Prevent* delivery. We consider the issue of funding for *Prevent* work overseas further below.

Evaluation

6.71 Evaluating preventative programmes is inherently challenging. Success is often reflected in changing attitudes as much as behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure and assess. The review concludes that, while many efforts have been made to evaluate *Prevent*, their success has been patchy. Progress has been made in measuring outputs but not always in measuring outcomes. Adequate monitoring and evaluation processes have not always been in place and some are still in development. The requirement to deliver *Prevent* quickly, combined with generous funding allocations, led to limited quality control. These problems were apparent at all levels of the programme.

6.72 In England, local authorities were expected to evaluate their *Prevent* work routinely. Some areas also commissioned independent evaluation of their *Prevent* programmes. Monitoring of local activity also took place through the local government performance framework and through quarterly trackers completed by Government Offices. But, as we have seen, *Prevent* work was often joined with work on wider cohesion issues and *Prevent* funding did not address specific *Prevent* objectives. Where programmes did address *Prevent* objectives, success criteria were not in place. The absence of any national-level evaluation of local authority projects delivered over the last three years of DCLG funding remains a significant gap.

6.73 Police activity has been monitored at a local, regional and national level through self-assessment against the activities contained within the Association of Chief Police Officer's (ACPO) *Prevent* Development Plan.[39] While this has provided some measure of progress, it has not always assessed impact or outcomes. ACPO's review of *Prevent* policing in 2010 agreed that a clearer set of performance measures and outcomes were necessary and that improved performance data would enable resources to be focused more clearly on priority areas.

6.74 Nationally, Departments worked hard to understand what impact *Prevent* programmes might have (such as in prisons or education) but struggled to get a baseline idea of the risks that the programmes were intended to mitigate and thus to measure progress in addressing risk over time.

6.75 Programmes to support vulnerable people should in theory have been easier to assess and evaluate and more progress has been made in this area. But data collection has not always been satisfactory and there have not always been common methods used across a wide range of community organisations, making like-for-like comparison of impact and value-for-money difficult.

6.76 Overseas, efforts have been made to understand what factors in a specific state might lead to progress in addressing radicalisation. But these factors are themselves the subject of intense academic and analytical debate and the degree to which they can be influenced by UK policies and investment is rarely obvious.

[39] The ACPO Prevent Development Plan 2010/2011 is a publicly available document, available on the ACPO website at: www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/WhatPreventmeanstoyou.aspx

6.77 Going forward, we will look for much greater rigour in addressing *Prevent* projects. Funding decisions must be made on the ability to deliver against *Prevent* objectives. The focus must be on impact and outcomes (attitudinal or behavioural change in a target audience) not on outputs (for example, a simple assessment of numbers reached by a particular project). Wherever possible, common methods need to be followed across the many state and non-state providers on *Prevent*. Overseas we need to be much clearer in demonstrating impact, not only in the country concerned but also in the UK. We return to the issue of evaluation below (page 141).

Prevent overseas

6.78 Terrorist attacks planned against targets in this country have very often had connections overseas. Some have been planned in or directly involved people from third countries; some have been funded from overseas; many have involved people who have been trained abroad. Terrorist attacks overseas have also been conducted by people from this country. Domestic and international terrorism are interconnected.

6.79 The radicalisation process also has significant overseas connections. Many people radicalised here have been influenced by ideology developed overseas and by messages broadcast into this country from abroad. The great majority of terrorist-related websites that most concern us are hosted outside this country. Many people from this country who have been radicalised have travelled overseas and during that time have met and been influenced by extremist or terrorist organisations: their travel is part of the radicalisation process. A significant number of radicalised people now resident here have travelled to this country from overseas and were radicalised before they arrived.

6.80 Radicalisation has had a major impact on states whose security is vital to our own. We noted above the high levels of support for aspects of the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida (page 23).

6.81 All our counter-terrorism work has to have an international component to it and *Prevent* is no exception. To stop people supporting or becoming terrorists, we need to work overseas as well as at home. But the challenges overseas are much greater than the challenges we face here. Levels of support for terrorism are often higher; the influence we have is much less and the evidence base for what is effective is generally incomplete.

6.82 It is therefore vital that *Prevent* work overseas is carefully prioritised. But in the past, the FCO funded activity overseas that aimed to build community resilience and support wider cohesion goals (for example English language training for imams or empowering Muslim women). We do not believe this work is effective in *Prevent* terms and the focus has since moved.

6.83 We judge that *Prevent* overseas must wherever possible have a demonstrable impact on UK domestic security in general and the domestic *Prevent* agenda in particular. It otherwise needs to have an impact on risks which have a wider bearing on our national security.

6.84 The FCO has more recently prioritised work in Pakistan and in other countries with significant diaspora communities here. In these countries, work to address radicalisation can have a significant domestic UK impact. The FCO has also prioritised a different group of countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, whose Muslim institutions and organisations have considerable global influence which can positively or negatively shape the *Prevent* agenda. We believe this work can have a very significant impact here.

6.85 The Department for International Development (DfID) also has a role to play. Although its main purpose is to reduce poverty, overseas development work in some areas can help to build resilience to terrorism through programmes that strengthen governance and security, create jobs, and provide basic services including education.

6.86 A great deal of work has also been done by many Departments and agencies here to share and learn best practice on *Prevent* with and from other countries. Some of this work has been done bilaterally. Other work has been done through multilateral organisations, notably the EU and the UN. Again, we believe that this work is important.

6.87 In common with domestic *Prevent* programmes, the focus and evaluation of *Prevent* work overseas has been mixed. The overseas programme worked against the same set of objectives as the domestic programme and therefore suffered from similar problems. Some of it was more relevant to cohesion than to *Prevent*. Other programmes had no discernible impact on the UK. In many cases, evaluation was focused on outputs (such as the number of people who attended an event or read a message) and not on whether the people concerned were amongst those who we would regard as vulnerable to extremism or terrorism. Much has already been done to address these issues. Moving forward, *Prevent* work overseas will be increasingly aligned with domestic *Prevent* work.

6.88 There will remain a key question about the appropriate balance of investment between *Prevent* work at home and *Prevent* work overseas. During financial year 2010/11, approximately one quarter of *Prevent* spend related to activity overseas. We question whether this accurately reflects the balance of priorities or returns that funding can bring. We note that in 2010/11 the Government spent approximately the same on *Prevent* overseas as it did on *Prevent* work funded by DCLG through local authorities. We intend to keep this under review, alongside the funding issues regarding police and local authorities (see pages 47-50 above).

7. A new *Prevent* strategy

7.1 The new *Prevent* strategy will be based around the guiding principles outlined in chapter 6. They represent a significant departure from the previous strategy:

- The aim of *Prevent* should be to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
- *Prevent* should address all forms of terrorism, but continue to prioritise according to the risks to our national security. Its principal focus will therefore remain terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida and related groups.
- *Prevent* needs to deal with extremism where terrorism draws on extremist ideas; and where people who are extremists are being drawn towards terrorism-related activity.
- *Prevent* will depend on wider Government programmes to strengthen integration and should be carefully coordinated with them. Other than in exceptional circumstances, *Prevent* should not fund these programmes and should be distinct from them.
- *Prevent* will remain one part of our counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The relationship between *Prevent* and what we call *Pursue* (such as work to investigate and disrupt terrorist activity) must be very carefully managed. *Prevent* is not a means for spying or for other covert activity.
- We intend that agencies and Departments work to a common set of objectives in this area. But we look to local authorities and communities to consider how those objectives can best be implemented: they will have the expertise and the understanding of local context which in this as in many other policy areas is vital.
- Funding for local authority projects will be precisely targeted and dedicated to ensure it is used for the purposes for which it is intended. But central Government should not seek to micro-manage decisions about local delivery which are properly the responsibility of local partners.
- Funding will not be provided to extremist organisations.
- It will not be part of this strategy to use extremists to deal with the risk from radicalisation.

- Public funding for *Prevent* must be rigorously prioritised at home and overseas. The balance of investment within domestic *Prevent* work and between that work and *Prevent* overseas needs to be regularly assessed. All our *Prevent* programmes need to be relevant to *Prevent* objectives.

- The evaluation of *Prevent* work is critical and must significantly improve. Data collection must be more rigorous.

7.2 Within this overall framework the new *Prevent* strategy will have three objectives. It will:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;

- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and,

- work with a wide range of sectors and institutions (including education, faith, health and criminal justice) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

7.3 We believe that these objectives reflect our understanding of the radicalisation process and the factors which are important to it.

7.4 We also regard the internet as vital to *Prevent* work, not just because we need to more effectively disrupt terrorist use of the internet, but because of the range of opportunities it provides to challenge terrorist ideology. How we use the internet and how it is being used in the radicalisation process are issues which appear throughout this document. A section below also considers the internet as a sector in its own right and looks at the work that we are doing with the internet industry itself to address radicalisation and terrorism online.

7.5 In the terms of reference for this review, the Home Secretary directed that *Prevent* should be proportionate and focused. We regard this as particularly important because of the view that the last *Prevent* strategy was disproportionate – in particular, that it stigmatised communities, suggested that they were collectively at risk of radicalisation and implied terrorism was a problem specific to Muslim communities.

7.6 We judge that the strategy we outline here is proportionate to the threat we face. It recognises that the vast majority of people of all faiths in this country reject terrorism without any qualification. The purpose of *Prevent* is not to convince the majority of people that terrorism is wrong – they need no convincing. Rather, the purpose is to enlist the support of people in our country to reach the much smaller minority who may be drawn into terrorism, often through extremist views.

7.7 The strategy will not allocate resources according to a crude calculation of Muslim population density. It will allocate resources on the basis of risk, an assessment in turn informed not by numbers of people of any faith but by the activity we have seen by terrorist organisations and terrorist sympathisers. This is a fundamental reorientation of our *Prevent* work. The strategy implies no judgment on particular communities: it reflects a judgment on the groups which intend to cause us harm.

7.8 At present, the greatest threat we face remains that from Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups. That has to be the focus on our *Prevent* work. But the new strategy will apply to all terrorist threats we

face, including in particular the threat from extreme right-wing terrorism. Although this strategy does not directly apply in Northern Ireland, many of the principles can be applied to Northern Ireland-related terrorism.

7.9 In contrast to the previous *Prevent* strategy, the revised strategy will therefore be more focused, more rigorous and consequently more effective.

7.10 The following three sections consider in more detail the three key objectives of the new *Prevent* strategy. They describe the challenges we face, assess work to date and explain our future priorities.

8. Objective One: Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it

Summary

All terrorist groups have an ideology. Promoting that ideology, often through the internet, facilitates radicalisation and recruitment.

Challenging ideology and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote it is a fundamental part of Prevent.

Previous work in this area has made some progress but has not consistently reached the few people who are most susceptible to terrorist propaganda. It has failed to recognise the way in which terrorist ideology makes use of ideas espoused by extremist organisations and has not fully understood the implications this should have for the scope for our work. Nor has it effectively engaged with and used the influence and reach of communities and community groups. Previous Prevent *work has sometimes given the misleading impression that Muslim communities as a whole are more 'vulnerable' to radicalisation than other faith or ethnic groups.*

Much more needs to be done in this critical area. But it must be proportionate and focused. It must not imply a need to change the attitudes of most people in this country. It must not appear to pass judgment on faith in general or to suggest only a particular kind of faith is appropriate or acceptable. It must be done in conjunction with communities here and overseas who are often better able than Government to disprove the claims made by terrorist groups and to challenge terrorist and associated extremist ideologies.

A future strategy in this area will include better communication of the Government's security and foreign policies to rebut claims made about them; more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system to enable understanding of and challenge to terrorist ideologies; and support for experts where ideology draws on and misrepresents theology and requires a detailed response.

It is vital to challenge apologists for terrorism. Challenge may mean simply debate about extremist ideas which form a part of terrorist narrative. But where propagandists break the law in encouraging or approving terrorism it must also mean arrest and law enforcement action. And where people seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of extremist and terrorist groups we will also use the Home Secretary's power to exclude them.

Introduction

8.1 Central to the development of any movement or group is the construction of an ideological framework. Ideology offers its believers a coherent set of ideas that provide the basis for organised political action, whether it is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power.[40] Ideology may also coordinate activity in the absence of leadership or a command structure.[41]

8.2 Some organisations, including those engaged in terrorism, have very detailed ideologies, based on historic texts and extensive contemporary literature, including what purports to be rigorous thinking about key texts from the recent and even distant past. Other groups pay much less attention to developing a specific ideological position and rely instead on a few slogans and one or two key written texts.

8.3 Ideology is a central factor in the radicalisation process. People who accept and are motivated by an ideology which states that violence is an acceptable course of action are more likely to engage in terrorism-related activity. People who come to believe in such an ideology may be not only willing to kill but also to sacrifice their own lives.[42] Challenging that ideology is therefore an essential part of a preventative counter-terrorism programme.

8.4 Some terrorist groups, such as Al Qa'ida, use religion as both a basis for their ideology and as a means of justifying their actions. Understanding the connection between ideology and theology and how the first can masquerade as the second is important.

8.5 Ideology depends on ideologues, people who promote that ideology and encourage others to subscribe to it. Some apologists for terrorism have a particular appeal for young people across the world. Who they are (their background and life history) and how they behave is as central to their appeal as what they say. Challenging ideology also means identifying these ideologues, ensuring they cannot take advantage of the freedoms in this country to peddle their messages without debate or rebuttal, prosecuting them where they have broken the law and restricting their access to this country where we judge it is appropriate to do so.

8.6 Communications technology has transformed the capability of terrorist groups. The internet in particular has not only facilitated attack planning but also the distribution of terrorist propaganda and the process of radicalisation and recruitment. Ideological challenge has to use all the communications tools which have been adopted by terrorists and where necessary also intervene in the virtual space to curtail illegal activities.

8.7 Challenging ideology is also about being confident in our own values – the values of democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind. Challenge must be accompanied by advocacy of the very systems and values which terrorists in this country and elsewhere set out to destroy. To that extent, challenging ideologies is a collective responsibility.

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[40] Heywood, A. (2007), *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. 4th Ed.: Palgrave Macmillan.

[41] The Change Institute (2008), *Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies and narratives. A study carried out by the Change Institute for the European Commission – Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security*. London: The Change Institute. Available from: www.changeinstitute.co.uk/images/publications/changeinstitute_beliefsideologiesnarratives.pdf

[42] Schmid, A. (2010), The Importance of Countering Al Qa'ida's Single Narrative. *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives*. The Hague: National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb). Available from: http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Countering%20Violent%20Extremist%20Narratives%20-%202_tcm92-259489.pdf?cp=92andcs=25496

8.8 Our consultation on *Prevent* showed mixed views on whether a future *Prevent* strategy should include a counter-ideological element. Some expressed concern that the Government was involving itself in matters of faith in a way that they believed was inappropriate. Many others thought activity in this area was essential and we had to do more. Respondents wanted Government to provide factual information to facilitate ideological challenge at a local level.

8.9 We agree with those who said activity in this area is essential. Although challenging ideology is of central importance to *Prevent*, it can also be complicated. It raises key issues of principle as well as practice. We need to be clear what we are trying to achieve, who is best placed to achieve it and what we think success might look like. But we believe it is the responsibility of Government to facilitate and support the creation of a wide range of efforts to challenge terrorist ideology, including where appropriate supporting websites, blogs and social networking activities. We endorse the proposal that Government facilitates wider community challenge by providing appropriate information.

8.10 In this section, we focus on issues relating to the type of terrorism that is associated with Al Qa'ida because this represents the greatest risk to this country and to our interests overseas. We also reference other types of terrorism where appropriate.

Al Qa'ida and its associates

8.11 The ideology associated with Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups proposes that most governments in Muslim majority countries are 'un-Islamic' or 'apostate'. It calls for their overthrow by *jihad* and for the imposition of new governments, (and ultimately a pan-Islamic Caliphate) based on a very specific interpretation of Islamic law. The ideology claims that these 'apostate' regimes have been supported and in some cases occupied by western states that are waging a war on Islam. It proposes that violent *jihad* and terrorism against these states are not only legitimate but a religious duty. It makes no distinction between civilian and military targets.

8.12 Many of the key principles advanced by Al Qa'ida were new. There was no precedent for the claim that killing 'Americans and their allies' was a duty for every Muslim.[43] But in some respects the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida and its associated groups draws on and often manipulates a considerable body of literature, some of it written many years ago.

8.13 Senior figures in Al Qa'ida have acknowledged their debt to Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist and the ideological inspiration behind parts of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Qutb significantly developed the notion of violent jihad as a means of establishing what he regarded as a true Islamic state in a world which he believed was characterised by unbelief and amorality. Qutb did not, however, suggest that violence should be perpetrated in western countries.

8.14 Al Qa'ida sympathisers also draw on and extensively develop detailed concepts in the Salafist theological tradition. They have broadened the possible application of the doctrine of *takfir*, the practice of declaring judgement on people, groups or institutions considered to be theologically inferior or misguided. They have then reinterpreted Salafist doctrine to incite hatred, enmity and violence (*jihad*) to people considered to be unbelievers. They regard violence and martyrdom as a form of worship and submission to God.[44]

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[43] A claim made in 1998 in the manifesto of the then newly established World Islamic Front.

[44] For further background on Al Qa'ida ideology, see in particular *Al Qaeda in its own words*, ed. Kepel and Milelli, Harvard: 2008. pp. 147-170. Al Qa'ida and the Muslim Brotherhood now hold very significantly different views and Al Qa'ida would regard the Brotherhood as having betrayed their cause. Many Salafist organisations would also have very significant differences with the exploitation of Salafist theology by Al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.

8.15 The traditions on which they draw are reflected in the range of names which have been used to describe the ideology of Al Qa'ida and other like-minded groups. They include 'global jihadists', 'jihadist terrorism', 'militant Salafists', 'Salafi jihadists' and *takfiris*. Many (though not all) Salafist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and a wide variety of other organisations are also sometimes described as 'Islamist', a word used in a variety of ways to refer to a political philosophy which, in the broadest sense, promotes the application of Islamic principles to governance. Groups like Al Qa'ida are sometimes described as militant or violent Islamists and we have used these terms in this document.

8.16 It is clear that the narrative associated with Al Qa'ida includes a number of important propositions about non-Islamic, western countries. It claims that because the West is at war with Islam, Muslims living in western countries cannot associate or socialise with non-Muslims or legitimately participate in the democratic process. It uses derogatory labels and encourages adherents to draw a sharp distinction between true Muslims and the kafir (un-believers). It rejects notions of integration or cohesion and regards democracy itself as illegitimate.

8.17 These propositions are not unique to Al Qa'ida or like-minded terrorist groups. They are also part of an ideology shared by extremist organisations operating in this country and elsewhere: as we noted in the first part of this review (pages 33-34) there is no precise line between what we have described here as terrorist ideology and what we elsewhere describe as extremist ideology. Some of these extremist organisations are also Salafist in orientation; others are associated with different radical Islamist movements.

8.18 A considerable amount of research has now been completed into the ways in which the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida now circulates in this country. We know that comparatively few texts circulate on the internet and in hard copy and will be known to people who have been radicalised here.[45] Many of these texts are carefully studied and debated. We have also seen radicalisation manuals which take highlights from source material to construct a case for terrorism and which are intended for use in private study groups.

8.19 We know that visual material (circulating on the internet or by DVD) is an important additional tool in the radicalisation process. This material frequently includes footage of terrorist attacks and often graphic and brutal images of people being killed. In some cases it shows the death of innocent Muslims. The material tries to enhance the reputation and credibility of terrorist groups and to justify what they do.

8.20 But the transmission of ideology for the purposes of radicalisation also depends on people who both develop thinking about the case for terrorism and then set out to disseminate their views to their target audience. Twenty years ago some of these ideologues operated in public in this country with apparent impunity. Their activities are persistent but now very often more discreet. It is rare that apologists for terrorism who are living here have a public profile.

8.21 Terrorist cells in this country see it as part of their job to covertly persuade other people of the legitimacy of their cause and to recruit people to their organisations. A great deal of the time of some cell members has historically been devoted to this area of work. Our research indicates

[45] The list includes, in particular, works by Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdissi, Abu Musab as-Suri, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Usama bin Laden and Anwar Al Awlaki. For further background see: The Change Institute (2008), *Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies and narratives. A study carried out by the Change Institute for the European Commission – Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security.* London: The Change Institute. Available from: www.changeinstitute.co.uk/images/publications/changeinstitute_beliefsideologiesnarratives.pdf

that although the internet has a critical role to play, the activity of influential and often charismatic propagandists who have covert face-to-face contact with vulnerable people is a key part of the radicalisation process.

8.22 The scope of the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida, the numbers of people engaged in disseminating all or part of it, and the various formats in which it is presented indicate the extent of the challenge posed by this aspect of preventative work. We return to this when we evaluate work in this area to date.

8.23 It should be the role of Government to address some of the claims made by terrorist and extremist groups, for example the assertion that the West is at war with Islam and that it is deliberately mistreating Muslims around the world. Challenging other parts of terrorist and extremist narratives is at least partly a role for Government; but can equally be a task better addressed by people and organisations in communities in this country whose own experiences often best disprove the claims made for and about them.

8.24 But dealing with the theology of Al Qa'ida is only a role for Government in certain well-defined and exceptional situations. Although the Government may provide support and assistance, it must avoid seeming either to want or to endorse a particular kind of 'state Islam'. That is certainly not our purpose. The vast majority of this work can and should only be done by communities and scholars in this country or overseas.

Activity to date

8.25 By 2007, two years after the terrorist attacks on London, very little work had been done to address the ideological challenge posed by terrorism and extremism. But the 2007 *Prevent* strategy led to more effort and, in particular, projects intended to:

- enable Government to effectively communicate its policies in areas of controversy (including both foreign policy and counter-terrorism);
- enable people and organisations to better challenge terrorist ideology;
- address some of the theological claims made by contemporary terrorist groups; and
- disrupt the activities of apologists for terrorism in this country.

8.26 We have looked in detail at projects in each of these four areas and the progress they have made. We summarise our findings below. We conclude with comments on lessons which have been learned. We return to some of these themes under Objective 3 (pages 63-94) below.

8.27 The vast majority of our work which we cover here was focused on the ideology of Al Qa'ida and related groups. At the end of this section we look at the work that needs to be done to challenge other terrorist ideologies.

Communications

8.28 The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) was established in the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office in 2007. At that time, it comprised representatives from the Home Office, DCLG and the FCO and reported to Ministers in all three

Departments. Its function was to coordinate Government communications about the terrorist threat and our response to it and to facilitate and generate challenge to terrorist ideology and the claims made by terrorist groups. RICU also undertook research to support these two objectives.

8.29 In its first few years, RICU developed proposals about ways to describe the terrorist threat which were accurate, likely to be understood and accepted but which would not inadvertently lend credence to the claims about counter-terrorism made by extremist and terrorist groups. Some of these proposals were adopted by Government and reflected in the language which Government used (the term 'war on terrorism', for example, was judged to be prone to misinterpretation and has generally been avoided in this country).

8.30 RICU has also conducted research to show the impact of the language it recommended. We comment further on this work below. We note here that in some respects it erred in seeking to make language acceptable to some in Muslim communities, at the expense of candour; and in giving more weight to forms of expression which can reach people in British Muslim communities rather than all communities in this country.

8.31 After 2007, the FCO and DfID devoted much more effort to communicating their work to audiences in this country, making the point that, far from being at war with Islam, the then Government was making great efforts to address deprivation, human rights issues and governance in Muslim-majority countries. This communications work broke new ground and was a significant departure from previous practice. The FCO has also helped foreign governments challenge terrorist ideology in their own countries.

8.32 We know that some apologists for terrorism in this country have claimed that domestic counter-terrorism work is simply another aspect of what they claim is a war on Islam. Conscious of these claims, the police have also sought and developed a much closer dialogue regarding their counter-terrorism work with communities in the UK, and in particular with Muslim communities often most directly affected by counter-terrorism operations. Police outreach has many purposes, but it has addressed some concerns about police work in particular and counter-terrorism work in general. The police must be careful in their contacts and accountability for police actions in this area should be strong.

8.33 In section 11 (page 95), below, we reference recent research that indicates how police relations with Muslim communities have improved over the past few years. We believe that police understanding of Muslim communities has improved significantly as a result of *Prevent*. We highlight in particular the importance of work with communities to discuss how and why counter-terrorism operations are conducted. This work, notably the police programme Operation Nicole,[46] has increased understanding among all participants.

Community challenge

8.34 The last *Prevent* strategy made available professional communications skills to community groups who appeared to be well-placed to challenge the ideology we associate with Al Qa'ida. This work was coordinated by RICU, often in conjunction with local authorities and civil society groups, and more recently has focused on a few geographical areas where evidence indicates high levels of extremist and terrorist propaganda have been circulating. Further work has been conducted with

[46] Operation Nicole is a table top exercise that has been developed by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) *Prevent* Delivery Unit in conjunction with independent facilitators. It is specifically designed to break down barriers between police and communities by promoting an understanding of how counter-terrorism operations work.

some national, international and multilateral organisations with the objective of creating networks capable of developing and promoting a wider counter-narrative. The best of this work has engaged with new media (including community television) and with groups run by victims of terrorism to create a genuinely powerful message.

8.35 The last strategy made a start in providing schools with advice on how to equip young people with the knowledge and skills to challenge extremist narratives. It supported the development of citizenship education in madrassahs through the Islam Citizenship Education Project, backed by the Schools Development Support Agency and community-based organisations. In higher education, BIS worked with student unions to ensure better awareness of extremist speakers on campus and to ensure that their views were balanced by speakers with different perspectives. In prisons the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) supported Muslim chaplains in work to challenge extremist views. Some authorities also ran projects with faith organisations and institutions. We return to this below (pages 85-127).

Theology

8.36 The last strategy recognised the difficulty of the Government taking a position on matters of theology. But the Government designated Islamic studies as a 'strategically important and vulnerable subject', allowing the Department to facilitate networking and collaboration between academics.[47] It supported work by a group of leading scholars, community leaders and academics to consider how Islam is contextualised in this country.[48]

8.37 The FCO and DCLG also sponsored a series of 'road shows' by Muslim community groups around the country involving lectures, debates and cultural events aimed at promoting a mainstream message of Islam on a number of key issues, including terrorism. The FCO supported further initiatives overseas, networking imams from this country with counterparts elsewhere to understand extremist issues and how they might best be addressed.

Disrupting propagandists

8.38 The last *Prevent* strategy led to some action to sensitise Government Departments, agencies and public places for which Departments have responsibility, to the actions of known radicalising people and organisations, particularly those holding speaking events in public. BIS published guidance to raise awareness of the risk of radicalisation in higher and further education institutions. NOMS provided practical support and training for staff to help them manage terrorist offenders effectively. UK Border Agency (UKBA) staff in Immigration Removal Centres and prisons received training to help them identify the signs of radicalisation.

8.39 The Home Secretary has the power to exclude or deport non-British citizens on grounds of national security and, in some circumstances, to deprive people of British citizenship. In 2005, the then Home Secretary announced that those who engage in what were termed 'unacceptable behaviours' would normally be excluded from the UK. Unacceptable behaviour includes public speaking or publishing material that foments, justifies or glorifies terrorist violence or fosters hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK or otherwise can be demonstrated as providing support for extremists.

[47] The 'strategic importance' of these subjects refers to the need for some kind of assistive intervention to facilitate provision. Where such intervention is necessary in order to address a mismatch between supply and demand, the subject is designated as both strategically important and vulnerable.

[48] Suleiman, Y. et al (2009), *Contextualising Islam in Britain: Exploratory Perspectives*. Cambridge: Centre for Islamic Studies. Available from: www.cis.cam.ac.uk/CIBPReportWeb.pdf

8.40 Since the introduction of this policy, over 130 people have been excluded from the UK, including extreme animal-rights activists and anti-abortionists, anti-Semites, Islamophobes and neo-Nazis, as well as people broadly associated with terrorist and other extremist groups.

Evaluation

8.41 Work to counter ideology has therefore been wide-ranging. Some of it has been done by Government (in particular where Government policies which feature most frequently in terrorist propaganda need to be clearly explained) and some of it by people and organisations in communities, facilitated by Government where necessary. But the work has faced a number of problems.

8.42 In the first place, this work has not sufficiently disaggregated the concept of ideology and explained what it means, what it includes, what needs to be done about it and by whom. A clearer explanation is more likely to reduce misunderstandings and correct any misconceptions – in particular, that Government is taking upon itself the role of theological arbiter or that this part of *Prevent* means that Government is passing judgement on Islam itself.

8.43 Second, some of the early work proceeded without a clear idea of the audience for whom it was intended. At best, this wasted money and diverted valuable resources. At worst, it gave the impression that the Government had to convince Muslim communities in this country of something which the vast majority know very well already – that terrorism is unacceptable and wrong.

8.44 Third, it is not yet clear whether this work has had a direct impact on the small percentage of people in this country who may be vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organisations. In some cases we judge this is unlikely. Too often, projects have been evaluated on the basis of the number of individuals who have received a message, undertaken training or attended a workshop, rather than the impact that that message, training or workshop has had on their thinking or behaviour. In some cases (for example, on some of the work on theology) little or no attempt has been made to translate very high quality thinking and research into something that makes a difference to people outside a specialised academic environment.

8.45 Finally, work to date has not recognised clearly enough the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused by apparently non-violent organisations very often operating within the law. We have noted this issue in considering the context for and the proper scope of *Prevent*. In the context of this section, this means that *Prevent* must also challenge extremist ideas where they form part of a terrorist narrative.

8.46 We also believe that there needs to be much more coordination between work to challenge ideology overseas and work in the UK. We judge that a better understanding of diaspora communities, centres of authority and examples of best practice is central to this aim and more research is needed in this area.

8.47 RICU has had a central role in developing counter-ideological or counter-narrative work. We believe that their track record has been mixed. Research has enhanced understanding of audiences here and the impact of specific messages. Coordination of outward-facing Government communication about counter-terrorism has improved. But the language that RICU has proposed to describe terrorism and the terrorist threat (for example, 'terrorists are criminals') has risked removing the ideological component which it should be the purpose of RICU to address.

8.48 The impact of RICU's counter-narrative work has been variable. Some projects designed before the evidence base had matured suffered from lack of precision around target audiences and messages. They struggled to have an impact and were difficult to evaluate. Although RICU was right to focus on working with local and national organisations to develop and disseminate counter-narratives, some of those organisations have struggled to make themselves heard and failed to draw a clear line between messages about counter-narrative and cohesion. More care now needs to be taken to identify credible partners and to develop powerful and specific narratives across a range of communications channels, especially on the internet (which we cover at greater length below).

8.49 We also believe that insufficient work has been done to understand how to rebut the more complex texts circulating in this country which justify terrorism. Government has a key role to play here in providing information about what those texts are. Communities and theologians have a role to play in explaining why they are wrong.

8.50 The previous strategy was not systematic enough in coordinating the range of tools available to the Government in challenging those who promote extreme or terrorist ideologies. There has been some recent and relatively limited engagement with regulatory bodies such as the Charity Commission (see below, pages 127-130) Ofcom and Ofsted but more needs to be done in this area.

Next steps

8.51 Work to challenge ideology must be part of *Prevent*. But not enough has been done, or done effectively, to date. This section sets out how we will address that problem.

8.52 First, we need to recognise that terrorist ideology has a number of components - theological, political and social. Government can take the lead in some of these areas; in others, Government is better placed to facilitate work by communities in this country and overseas.

8.53 In addressing ideological issues, we also need to be very clear about our purpose and method. The great majority of people in this country find terrorism repugnant and will never support it. Work to challenge ideology should not try to change majority opinion because it does not need changing. Our purpose is to reach the much smaller number of people who are vulnerable. The Government must help mobilise and empower communities to challenge terrorism, not give the impression that they need to be convinced terrorism is wrong.

8.54 We will continue to communicate clearly our policies overseas, in particular in Muslim-majority countries. Departments and agencies will have a key part to play in explaining why we need to address the terrorist threat here and how we intend to do so. The Government has also already moved to change the legal foundation of our counter-terrorism work to ensure it is proportionate and necessary to the challenges we face. Departments and agencies working overseas will also need to make it clear to other countries the fact that the UK will be more active in challenging extremism of any kind.

8.55 The new *Prevent* strategy will identify more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system which enable people to challenge terrorist ideology effectively. The earlier strategy only made a start in these areas. In each case we will want to demonstrate that, directly or indirectly, the projects have tangible impact.

8.56 We will not want to engage in matters of theology but we recognise the imperative for theologians, academics and communities to do so. We will support their efforts by providing information on the texts which are being used to radicalise people in this country; we want to ensure that counter-narrative work is widely circulated and in a form that reaches as many people as possible.

8.57 Although we will not engage directly in theology, we will engage robustly in politics, working with others to reduce the appeal of the political element of extremist ideology to people who might be attracted to terrorism.

8.58 We will also encourage and seek to work with the many mosques in the UK who have already taken a leading role in challenging terrorism. We recognise and want to support the key role of imams in reaching young Muslims and being able to engage with them on these issues.

8.59 We will continue to work with other countries to mobilise informal non-government networks who can best challenge terrorist propaganda. We must do better at understanding and evaluating the projects to ensure that they are having an impact.

8.60 We will retain RICU, largely in its current form, but will expect much sharper and more professional counter-narrative products. We welcome the fact that new, more cost-effective programmes have already been designed which will engage a wider range of credible civil society partners, deliver tightly-focused projects able to tackle specific local threats in the UK, and link overseas and UK diaspora audiences to greater effect.

8.61 We will carefully and independently assess the help RICU provides to non-government organisations. We will continue to invest in communication research and evaluation. We will retain capacity to innovate and experiment with counter-narrative campaigns, making best use of emerging information and communications technology. There will be much greater scrutiny of RICU projects, costs and value-for-money.

8.62 Our primary focus for counter-ideological work online is on increasing the confidence of civil society activists to challenge online extremist content effectively and to provide credible alternatives. We will continue to work with social media enterprises, such as Facebook, to help civil society organisations understand the effect of social media and web 2.0 on marketing communications, online influence and public relations. We hope this will help civil society groups plan and manage their digital communications more effectively and gain experience of putting these tools and techniques to effective practical use.

8.63 Taking action against propagandists and radicalisers requires careful coordination between work in the Pursue and *Prevent* areas of CONTEST. Some of the actions of people engaged in propaganda work are illegal under UK counter-terrorism or race and religious hatred legislation and require intervention by the police. We look at this above (pages 34-37).

8.64 As we said in part 6 of this review, we can see no case for amending any of the legislation which relates to this issue. The recent review of counter-terrorism powers and legislation did not consider offences regarding glorification but it did look at issue of proscription and specifically whether proscription should be extended to cover groups who may be engaged in inciting racial hatred. It concluded that there was no compelling case to change existing proscription legislation.

8.65 Going forward, we will want to emphasise the connection between extremist and terrorist ideologies. We believe that there is scope for more work to identify and take action against propagandists for terrorism in this country and overseas. This research, which should be led by the OSCT and partner agencies, needs to be shared with a wider range of statutory partners in a standard format, likely to be prepared by RICU.

8.66 Propagandists for terrorism and for ideologies taken up by terrorists should not be permitted to make use of publicly owned venues. Local authorities and others must be ready to take appropriate action. Where conferences and speaker meetings involving propagandists are taking place in universities and colleges, communities and privately-owned locations, authorities – including the police – should always be ready to brief the owners and ensure they understand what is taking place.

8.67 The Government has already moved to ensure robust application of the unacceptable behaviours exclusion criteria, taking steps to improve the processes that support identification and assessment of potential exclusion cases and the implementation of decisions to exclude. We will now also look for a closer dialogue with a number of states overseas, from where propagandists may be speaking and travelling to communities here.

8.68 FCO and UKBA are considering how to deliver unambiguous messages about extremism and terrorism, and the penalties involved, through the visa application and issuing process. Such an approach would also include advice about our core values, including our belief in human rights, democracy and the rule of law. UKBA will consider which communications messages and channels would be most effective as a priority and will offer solutions to Ministers.

8.69 We will also seek to work more closely with regulatory bodies by developing stronger and closer partnerships with Ofcom, Ofsted and the Charity Commission.

8.70 Our work to address the ideologies underpinning others forms of terrorism, such as extreme right-wing terrorism, is less developed than work on terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. We will address this as a priority.

9. Objective Two: Protecting vulnerable people

Summary

Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. There are some analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention.

Programmes of this kind, although central to an effective Prevent *programme, are comparatively new and evidence of impact is correspondingly limited. Allegations have been made that the programmes have been disproportionate and intrusive and have restricted free speech. We recognise the risk that the criteria for entry to these programmes can be too broad. We have considered further allegations that the programmes have been used for spying.*

We conclude that, properly handled, programmes of this kind are essential. They should pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity. They will not be a means for covert activity. Safeguards will ensure their integrity and, in particular, appropriate protection of data.

This area of Prevent *will build on Channel, the existing multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation. Channel has had some success. The programmes will address the risks from all form of terrorism. They must draw on the expertise of policing, local authorities and community organisations.*

Organisations commissioned to provide support to vulnerable people are in a position of great influence. They must be credible and able to reach and talk to people at risk. But we will not fund or work with extremist groups for this (or any other) purpose.

As in other areas of Prevent*, evaluation of these programmes has not been fully effective. It will be significantly enhanced and new procedures will be put in place to ensure value for money.*

We will conduct research and collaborate with other countries to continuously improve our understanding of radicalisation. This is vital to ensure the effectiveness of these programmes.

Introduction

9.1 Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process, behaviours as well as opinions are likely to change. These changes may be apparent to the friends, families and work colleagues of the person concerned.

9.2 In January 2009, Nicky Reilly was convicted after he attempted to attack a restaurant in Exeter. Previously, he had regular contact with mental health services and had spoken about terrorism to them. In December 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly killed himself in a bomb attack in Stockholm, Sweden. Al-Abdaly's extreme beliefs and behaviours had raised concerns at the mosque he attended in Luton. He had been challenged by mosque leaders and eventually expelled but mosque leaders did not consider it appropriate to refer him to the authorities. Andrew Ibrahim was jailed in July 2009 for plotting to blow up a shopping centre in Bristol. Ibrahim was arrested after members of the Muslim community, who had attended an awareness workshop on *Prevent*, raised concerns about him to the police.[49]

9.3 These cases and others indicate the scope for positive intervention in the radicalisation process before a law enforcement response is required, and demonstrate the consequences if interventions do not take place or do not succeed.

9.4 This area of *Prevent* is based on the premise that people being drawn into radicalisation and recruitment can be identified and then provided with support. The purpose of that support is to dissuade them from engaging in and supporting terrorist-related activity. This support is sometimes described as 'de-radicalisation', a term which is sometimes used to refer to cognitive or behavioural change: in the context of our own programmes we use it to refer to both. We seek to remove people from the influence of and from contact with terrorist groups and sympathisers, and to challenge any support they have for them.[50]

9.5 Like other aspects of *Prevent*, programmes to support vulnerable people in this country and elsewhere are comparatively new. The evidence for success is correspondingly limited. Methodologies have not yet been fully proven and they continue to develop. Programmes of this kind raise significant civil liberties issues. The identification and referral process can, if poorly handled, include people who are not at risk of radicalisation. At worst, it can appear that these programmes are an attack on freedom of expression and are both unnecessary and disproportionate. It has been alleged that data collected about innocent people has been shared by statutory authorities with policing and that the data has been placed on police records. This area of *Prevent*, it has been claimed, is a form of spying.

9.6 We return to these allegations below. They highlight that these *Prevent* programmes are not strictly comparable to programmes to prevent drugs use (about which few if any of these allegations could or would be made) and need to be handled with great care. Proportionality is again important. But we also believe that, if properly handled, these programmes are essential and that safeguards can be put in place to ensure their integrity. Taking early action to protect people from radicalisation is not the same as surveillance or intelligence gathering. It is intended to pre-empt not to facilitate law enforcement action.

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[49] A short film produced by Avon and Somerset Police shows how his case illustrates the signs of vulnerability and the role that those in contact with individuals at risk can have in raising potential concerns. This is currently available to frontline staff and community organisations.

[50] For a recent overview of some of these issues see Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S., Ghez, J. and Boucek, C. (2010) *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Activity to date

9.7 Programmes to support people at risk of radicalisation were noted in the 2007 *Prevent* strategy but did not develop substantively until the following year. In many areas, these programmes are now delivered through Channel, a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels.

9.8 From a two-site pilot in 2007, 28 coordinators and a handful of support posts, Channel now covers about 75 local authorities and 12 police forces. Channel is modelled on other successful multi-agency risk management processes such as child protection, domestic violence and the management of high risk offenders. It uses processes which also safeguard people at risk from crime, drugs or gangs. Funding for Channel is provided by OSCT.

9.9 The latest guidance on Channel was published by the OSCT in partnership with ACPO and DCLG in 2010.[51] It explains that the Channel process comprises three discreet steps: identification; risk assessment and referral; and support.

9.10 The guidance states that identification of vulnerable people should be made by a wide range of statutory organisations. They include local authorities; police; youth offending services; social workers; housing and voluntary groups. Identifications must be made carefully and against a range of possible indicators.

9.11 The indicators (if observed) set the bar for referral quite high and would not (as is sometimes claimed) enable the referral of people simply for the holding of political opinions or having commitment to a faith. They include: expressed support for violence and terrorism; possession of violent extremist literature; attempts to access or contribute to violent extremist websites; possession of material regarding weapons and/or explosives; and possession of literature regarding military training, skills and techniques. Under a section entitled 'personal history' the guidance proposes that attention be paid to: claims of involvement in organisations; espousing violent extremist ideology; claims of attendance at training camps; and claims of involvement in combat or violent activity on behalf of violent extremist groups.

9.12 Under the previous *Prevent* strategy, many Departments and statutory partners have undertaken activity to raise awareness and help frontline staff to identify signs of vulnerability. At the heart of this work has been the Workshop to Raise Awareness of *Prevent* (WRAP), an interactive and facilitated workshop developed by OSCT. Based around a DVD, WRAP covers issues such as the history of terrorism, radicalisation as a social process, connections to other forms of extremism, the Al Qa'ida 'narrative' and factors which may contribute to vulnerability. The workshop, available since 2009, is intended to provide frontline staff with:

- an awareness and understanding of *Prevent* and their role within it;
- the knowledge and confidence to discuss related issues; and
- the ability to use existing expertise and professional judgement to recognise and refer potentially vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation.

[51] http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/ http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent/channel-guidance

9.13 About 15,000 frontline staff have received WRAP training. Delegate feedback collected between September 2010 and March 2011 indicates that 92% of WRAP delegates felt they finished the course with a good or very good understanding of *Prevent* and related issues. 80% of delegates felt they had an enhanced or excellent understanding of the radicalisation process, vulnerability factors, and how to identify and refer and 84% believed as a result they were better able to contribute to *Prevent*. The Scottish Police have identified and adopted WRAP as their premier tool in raising awareness of terrorism. Working with OSCT, the Scottish Police have also delivered this training to colleagues and delivery partners (such as the Scottish Prison Service as well as education and health staff) across Scotland.

9.14 The police have also supported awareness-raising of identification and referral processes within local authorities through delivery of the Operation Hindsight exercise. This session is based on a real example of radicalisation and provides key local authorities; statutory and voluntary agencies with the tools to identify vulnerability and offer appropriate intervention measures and support mechanisms.

9.15 As of September 2010, analysis from the Government Office tracker showed that 74% of the 94 local authority funded areas (and 49% of the remaining areas) had processes in place to identify, assess and refer vulnerable people.

9.16 Following identification of vulnerable people, the Channel guidance proposed that referrals be made to a Channel coordinator, typically a police officer or a local authority employee. Referrals are assessed by the coordinator and senior statutory partners to establish if the person concerned is vulnerable to terrorism or instead should exit the programme or be referred elsewhere.

9.17 A multi-agency panel then considers what support maybe provided. That might include: counselling; faith guidance; civic engagement; working with support networks; and mainstream services. It follows that providers of support might be statutory or community organisations. Arrangements were put in place to ensure providers were checked against the Criminal Records Bureau.

9.18 Clearly, any Channel-type programme will only be as good and effective as the intervention providers on whom it can call. Under the previous *Prevent* strategy, support has taken a variety of forms, in some cases involving mainstream service provision such as help with social or personal problems like finding employment or counselling about relationships. But some cases have also called for more specific interventions to debate and refute radical ideologies.

9.19 Interventions have been delivered by either mainstream services or community-based projects funded by local authorities. But they have also been provided by a number of community-based interventions projects developed and directly funded by OSCT in conjunction with some other central Departments and the police. OSCT has gradually developed a network of community-based providers, based across the country.

9.20 The OSCT-funded intervention providers receive cases from Channel. They work directly with some other referral partners, in effect by-passing the multi-agency assessment panel in Channel itself. They also generate a number of cases through their own outreach or gateway activities. They are sometimes well placed to challenge radicalising groups in their community.

9.21 We have noted above (pages 47-48) that some of the organisations funded to provide interventions to people of particular backgrounds and in some specific geographical areas have held views that are not consistent with mainstream British values. We return to this below.

9.22 The Channel guidance provided a clear statement about the information sharing principles and legislative framework for Channel and covered the following areas:

- **Necessity and proportionality:** personal information should only be shared between Channel partners where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public.

- **Consent:** wherever possible the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before sharing any information about them. In the absence of consent personal information cannot be shared without satisfying one of the gateway or exemption conditions.[52]

- **Power to share:** the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998.

- **Data Protection Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality:** in engaging with non-public bodies, the Channel coordinator should ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act.

9.23 Evaluation of Channel has been primarily process based. We judge that mapping of outputs has again been hampered by a lack of quality-assured data. Channel coordinators currently record management information in line with ACPO guidance. Recording standards have varied over time and across forces, so aggregated data may not be internally consistent and there is some evidence of the entry of imperfect data which it has not been possible to clean or correct. The available data (which covers the period April 2007 to the end of December 2010) shows that:

- 1120 people have been referred to the Channel programme;

- the majority of referrals were made by education partners, the police and youth offending services;

- the majority of referrals were aged between 13 and 25;

- there were 290 referrals aged under 16; and 55 referrals aged under 12.

- of the total number of referrals, over 90% were male;

- of those referred as potentially vulnerable to violent extremism:

  - 88% were referred owing to concerns around international terrorism;

  - 8% were referred owing to concerns around right-wing violent extremism; and

  - 4% were referred owing to concerns around other types of violent extremism.[53]

- 286 referrals were assessed by a multi-agency panel to be in need of an intervention.

[52] http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent/channel-guidance

[53] The terminology used here reflects the historic nature of this data. 'International terrorism' in this context refers to terrorism influenced by Al Qa'ida.

9.24 For the same period (April 2007 to December 2010), information has also been gathered from police forces showing that the faith of 67% of referrals was recorded as being Muslim; 26% was 'not known'; and 7% was of 'other religion'.

9.25 The total funding for Channel for the period April 2007 to March 2011 was approximately £4.7 million.

9.26 In October 2008, OSCT, in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), undertook a process evaluation of Channel. The lessons learned fed in to the development of the national Channel guidance. For confidentiality reasons this evaluation has not been published.

9.27 In December 2008, the Lokahi Foundation was awarded a tender to evaluate OSCT-funded interventions providers. The exercise assessed a range of criteria: methodological rigour; case management; governance; management, administration and practice and financial management on a four point scale. Its focus on implementation provided an insight into how the projects were performing and where improvements needed to be made, as a foundation for later assessment of outcome. It was not tasked with evaluating on the basis of outcome.

Next steps

9.28 We believe that Channel is an important component of *Prevent*. But, like other *Prevent* programmes, it is important to absorb the lessons that have been learned over the past few years. It is also essential that going forward Channel reflects the framework principles for this new strategy (section 6, above).

9.29 Channel is about stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It must not be confused with a strategy to deal with extremist organisations. Where people holding extremist views appear to be attracted to or moving towards terrorism they clearly become relevant to Channel multi-agency boards. Otherwise they do not.

9.30 Channel needs to deal with all types of terrorism. We note that in practice this is already happening at the initiative of the police and local authorities. We welcome this and it should continue.

9.31 Channel programmes should be prioritised around areas and places of higher risk, defined as those where terrorist groups and their sympathisers have been most active.

9.32 During the consultation to this review, we found that the attraction of community cohesion work appears to have sometimes steered people towards Channel who may have been perceived as potentially vulnerable in some broader sense, rather than specifically at risk of being drawn into terrorism. We have also noted the extent to which the nature of intervention capability available locally has determined the kinds of cases that are being dealt with through the programme. These trends need to be corrected.

9.33 We have found that Channel has facilitated local multi-agency partnership working between police and local statutory partners. Some sites have recognised the synergies between Channel and other local safeguarding mechanisms and frameworks and have worked locally to include *Prevent* indicators in the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) and safeguarding policies.[54] We welcome this though we note differing views about the utility of CAF as a tool for *Prevent*: it may not have the flexibility to assess people who are vulnerable to radicalisation.

[54] The CAF is a shared assessment and planning framework for use across all children's services and all local areas in England. It aims to help the early identification of children and young people's additional needs and promote coordinated service provision to meet them. Further details can be found at www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/strategy/integratedworking/caf/a0068957/the-caf-process

9.34 It is essential in this area, more even than in other areas of *Prevent*, that data collection is improved against a standard set of criteria. A key next step will be the development and implementation of a new Case Management Information System (CMIS) and more robust consistent risk assessment framework for Channel coordinators. This will also enable better performance monitoring of all intervention providers, whether they are funded locally or centrally by OSCT.

9.35 We note that at present OSCT-funded intervention providers do not have a 'standardised' risk assessment tool; each project has developed and deployed its own risk assessment. Other statutory referrals to Channel are assessed using a framework owned by that particular statutory partner.

9.36 Intervention providers are in a position of great influence over vulnerable people. They must be credible and able to reach and relate to people who will very often be alienated and separated from mainstream society and Government. Some of these people may have been in prison. It is clearly vital that we select intervention providers carefully, understand how they work, their values and outlook, and are completely clear about the results they obtain. We will significantly enhance the monitoring of the intervention process. *Prevent* will not fund interventions providers who promote extremist ideas or beliefs.

9.37 Recognising the sensitivities related to recording and managing personal information associated with Channel, access to CMIS must be strictly controlled. But once it is finalised the risk screening and assessment tool which will be part of CMIS will be available on the Home Office OSCT website.

9.38 We are considering possible changes to the governance of Channel. But we believe it is vital that the risk assessment stage and development of support intervention continue to be led by local multi-agency panels in conjunction with the police. We recognise that the police have a key role to play – not least in ensuring that people engaged in criminal activity are not put on the Channel programme – but their involvement must be balanced by input from local authorities and other statutory partners. There is considerable work still to be done to build confidence in Channel amongst voluntary workers, the general public and religious institutions and leaders.

9.39 OSCT commissioned three Rapid Evidence Assessments to help develop our understanding of research on radicalisation and de-radicalisation.[55] There is little empirical evidence underpinning intervention work in this area here in the UK and internationally. Further research may be needed in future but we are also clear that valuable learning and best practice is more likely to come from intervention providers and the Channel process. Subject to data protection it is essential that this learning is identified and shared.

9.40 We have focused in this section on the principal programmes which have been set up to support people vulnerable to radicalisation. We note however that there is a wider range of work with which this needs to be coordinated. This includes work in education, healthcare and in particular in prisons. We consider this further in the next section.

[55] Munton, T. et al (forthcoming), *Vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa'ida influenced violent extremism – Learning from the gang, cult, political activism and violent extremism literature.* London: Home Office, Disley, E. et al (forthcoming), Individual disengagement from violent extremist groups – A Rapid Evidence Assessment. London: Home Office Publications; Bouhana, N. and Wikström, P. (forthcoming), Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment guided by Situational Action Theory, London: Home Office.

9.41 It is harder to focus limited overseas resources on supporting vulnerable people – the FCO's *Prevent* work overseas has generally targeted projects and programmes at groups. The FCO and DfID will now consider how they can contribute further to this objective. We note that DfID's wealth creation programmes, aimed at reducing poverty and facilitating growth, will help to create jobs and economic opportunities, including access to financial services and skills development. These programmes will also help to address the lack of employment opportunities which may increase the chances of vulnerable people being attracted to terrorism.

10. Objective Three: supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation

Summary

A wide range of sectors in this country are helping to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The way Government works with particular sectors will vary.

Priority areas include education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. The internet is also included here as a sector in its own right, although delivery of Prevent *programmes through the internet is a theme running through this review and strategy.*

Some progress has been made in and with all these sectors. Some sectors (like faith) have been at the forefront of work to tackle radicalisation in this country. But more can and must be done. Like other areas of Prevent*, programmes must be proportionate to the risks we face. We engage with these sectors because they are capable of addressing and resolving some of the challenges we face.*

This section considers each of these sectors in turn, explains why they are relevant to Prevent*, how they are affected by radicalisation, what work has been done to date and what we plan to do in future.*

Introduction

10.1 In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge. Some of these places are the responsibility of Government, some are Government-funded but have considerable autonomy and others are both privately owned and run (but may still be subject to Government regulation).

10.2 As part of this strategy, we will work with these sectors and places to ensure that they understand their obligations in this area, that there is an awareness and understanding of the risks of radicalisation and of how radicalisers work and that each sector is capable of developing an effective response. This objective complements and supports our previous objectives.

10.3 The nature of that response and the role of Government in and with it will clearly vary according to the sector. Measures that are suitable in a prison will not be suitable in a university. The role of Government in dialogue with faith institutions will be significantly different from its role in any other area and will raise particular challenges.

10.4 For all these reasons, flexibility is therefore required within one broad overall objective: that through preventative work we want to contain and challenge radicalisation and minimise the risks that it may present to our national security.

10.5 The first part of this document noted that sympathy for terrorism is highest among young people. Statistically, it is clear that in this country and overseas most terrorist offences are committed by people under the age of 30. We therefore regard it as vital that *Prevent* engages fully – though in differing ways – with schools, higher and further education.

10.6 We have also noted (see page 27) that some people engaged in terrorist-related activity in this country have previously been engaged in other forms of criminality. We believe that engagement in criminality can create a vulnerability to radicalisation. We need to minimise the risk of radicalisation of offenders while they are in prison or under supervision in the community – notably, but not only, radicalisation of offenders by people who have been convicted for terrorism-related offences.

10.7 This review and strategy are primarily concerned with what we regard as the key threat and risk to the security of the UK – terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. We know that Al Qa'ida has sought to provide a theological justification for terrorism. We know also that over the past ten years, people sympathetic to Al Qa'ida have sought to use mosques in this country (and overseas) to disseminate Al Qa'ida-related ideology and to radicalise individuals. Mosques, and to some extent madrassahs, therefore play an important part in supporting the new strategy.

10.8 We have referred to the internet throughout this document but primarily in the context of how it can be used to facilitate *Prevent* delivery. Here we consider how we deal with the internet as a sector in its own right and the legal framework for doing so.

10.9 We also consider below two other sectors – health and charities – where, for different reasons, *Prevent* work is also important.

10.10 It is important to recognise that a *Prevent* strategy needs to engage with many of the sectors considered here because they have the capability of addressing and resolving challenges we face. Schools are important not because there is significant evidence to suggest children are being radicalised – there is not – but because they can play a vital role in preparing young people to challenge extremism and the ideology of terrorism and effectively rebut those who are apologists for it. The vast majority of people who attend mosques in this country will have no sympathy with terrorism. It is exactly for that reason that they can play a vital role in reaching out to young people who maybe vulnerable to radicalisation.

10.11 The strategy needs to be flexible, aware of risks but also of the proper constraints on Government in developing counter-terrorism work. This section considers *Prevent* in specific sectors, reviews what has been achieved to date and outlines what steps will be taken in future.

Education

Schools and children

Background

10.12 In England about 8 million children are educated in some 22,000 publicly-funded and around 2,400 independent schools. The publicly-funded English school system comprises maintained schools (schools maintained by local authorities), and academies (state-funded independent schools).[56] As part of the Government's changes to the schools system, teachers, parents, and other members of the public will also be able to set up Free Schools where there is demand.

10.13 About one-third of publicly funded schools are associated with a specific faith group. Many of these schools give priority in some or all of their admissions to pupils from that faith and many teach religious education and hold collective worship in accordance with its principles.

10.14 The privately funded, or independent, English school system also includes a significant proportion of faith schools, mainly funded by fees paid by parents. They set their own curriculum but must comply with the Independent Schools Standards, which include a requirement that schools promote tolerance and harmony between different cultural traditions.

10.15 All schools are required by law to teach a broad and balanced curriculum which promotes the spiritual, moral and cultural development of pupils and prepares them for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of life. Publicly funded schools are required to promote community cohesion, a duty first introduced through the Education and Inspections Act 2006.

10.16 There are also safeguards against biased or unbalanced teaching and the promotion of partisan political views in publicly funded schools. These require that all reasonably practicable steps are taken to ensure that, where political or controversial issues are brought to pupils' attention, they are offered a balanced presentation of opposing views.[57]

10.17 The Education Act 2002 puts a duty on local education authorities, maintained schools and further education institutions, including sixth-form colleges, to exercise their functions with a view to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children.[58] The Act puts the same duty on independent schools, including academies, through the Independent Schools Standards.

10.18 All publicly-funded schools – including academies and Free Schools – are inspected by the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) and are subject to intervention if they fail to provide a satisfactory education. Where failure is very severe schools can be closed.

10.19 Privately-funded independent schools are inspected by Ofsted or one of three independent inspectorates. If they fail to meet the Independent School Standards, they must remedy the problem or be subject to de-registration (which would make their continued operation illegal).

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[56] The devolved administrations have different school systems. There are about 1,900 state schools offering free education to more than 470,000 pupils in Wales. Scotland has 2,722 state schools serving around 700,000 pupils.

[57] Education Act 1996 as regards to maintained schools. These safeguards are reflected in Free School Funding Agreements and will be in Academies' Funding Agreements.

[58] DCSF (2010) *Working together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.* London: DCSF.

10.20 Concerns have been raised about the robustness of the regulatory system for independent schools and in particular about the clarity of the Independent School Standards (the regulations against which independent schools are inspected). In 2009 Ofsted conducted a survey which concluded that, overall, the regulations are fit for purpose, but that there is a lack of clarity in the language of the regulations[59]. If the regulations are not clear, or are not clearly understood, there are clear risks that schools might not fully understand their obligations and that extremist or intolerant messages may go undetected by inspectors. This is of particular concern, given that open-source reporting has suggested that extremism may be more of a problem within some of these institutions than in publicly-funded schools.

10.21 The Charity Commission has a regulatory role where schools are charities or are run by charities and are not under the jurisdiction of another regulatory body. The Charity Commission can investigate if charity law is not being observed. Charity law stipulates that education cannot be used to promote a political (including an extremist) point of view (see pages 127-130) for further background).

10.22 On 30 March 2011, the Government announced proposals for promoting the compliance of academies, sixth form colleges and foundation and voluntary schools as exempt educational charities. It is proposed that as Principal Regulator, the Department for Education (DfE) would have a role in raising awareness of the principles of charitable status (and the nature of charitable education), similar to the Charity Commission's. However, any misuse of a charity for non-charitable purposes would be for the Commission, in consultation with the Principal Regulator, to address.

10.23 Protecting children from harm and promoting their welfare depends on a shared responsibility and effective joint working between different agencies. Section 11 of the Children Act 2011 requires a range of organisations to make arrangements for ensuring that their functions, and services provided on their behalf, are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

10.24 Each local authority in England is responsible for establishing a Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB) in their area and ensuring it is run effectively. There are 148 LSCBs covering 152 top level Children Services Authorities. The LSCB is the key statutory mechanism for agreeing how the relevant organisations in each local area will cooperate to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, and for ensuring the effectiveness of what they do.

10.25 On 10 June 2010, the Secretary of State for Education and Children and the Families Minister asked Professor Eileen Munro to conduct an independent review to improve child protection. The Munro review has been looking at the obstacles preventing improvements to child protection and the steps required to improve child protection. Professor Munro submitted her report at the end of April 2011.

10.26 Children spend a substantial amount of time attending out of school clubs and classes, online and informal social activities. With the exception of activities organised by full-time schools, none of these activities are subject to the rules and regulations that apply to schools, although

[59] Ofsted (2009), *'Independent Faith Schools:* Is the standard relating to spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils, together with the five regulations underpinning it, fit for purpose? Manchester: Ofsted. Inspectors visited 51 registered independent primary and secondary faith schools for children from Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu religions.

some are bound by child protection and health and safety legislation. Research has shown that out-of-school-hours activities can play an important role in a child's development and academic attainment as well as in communities.[60]

10.27 For a significant number of children, at least some out-of-school learning will be about faith. Many children in England (perhaps 100,000) attend Muslim supplementary schools, sometimes referred to as madrassahs.[61] As with other extra-curricular activities like Scouts, sports clubs and Christian Sunday schools, there is no formal regulation or registration process and so the exact number of madrassahs in the UK is not known. Estimates put the number of madrassahs in the UK between 700 and 2,000.[62]

10.28 Madrassahs teach Arabic and Qur'anic studies and some also offer a wider programme of religious instruction. Most mosques have a madrassah but more informal classes are also held in local schools, community centres or in people's homes.[63] Children, usually aged between four and fourteen, attend madrassahs after school or at the weekend.

Prevent, schools and children

10.29 The youngest person convicted of terrorism-related offences in this country in recent years was 16. He was 15 at the time when he was recruited by a terrorist group. At least 3 separate Al Qa'ida-related operations in this country (in 2003, 2005 and 2006) have involved people who, to varying extents, became involved in extremism while they were at school.[64] Of the 127 convictions for terrorism-related offences associated with Al Qa'ida, 11 have been committed by people in the age range of 15-19.[65]

10.30 We have seen no systematic attempt to recruit or radicalise people in full time education in this country, either in the state or independent sector. But we do know that some people who are supportive of terrorist groups and ideologies have sought and sometimes gained positions in schools or in groups which work closely with young people. One of the 7/7 bombers, for example, worked as a learning mentor with children at a school in Leeds.

10.31 The majority of referrals to the Channel programme (described above, pages 74-81) have been under 25, with most aged between 15 and 19. Very few have been younger.

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60 Maylor, U., et al (2010), *Impact Of Supplementary Schools On Pupils' Attainment: An Investigation Into What Factors Contribute To Educational Improvements.* London: Department for Children, Schools and Families. Available from: www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/DCSF-RR210.pdf

61 See Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (2006), *Child Protection in Faith-based Environments: A Guideline Report.* London: Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. Available from: www.muslimparliament.org.uk/documentation/childprotectionreport.pdf. There are an estimated 5,000 'supplementary schools' in Britain, providing out-of-hours education for children and young people. They offer a range of activities, including lessons on national curriculum subjects, religious studies, language classes and cultural studies as well as sport, music, dance and drama. Generally, they are run in the evenings and at weekends, are set up by local community groups and tend to operate in a variety of venues. Some supplementary education is faith-based.

62 Cherti, M., Glennie, A., Bradley, L. (2011), *'Madrassahs' in the British media.* London: Institute for Public Policy Research.

63 Hart Dyke, A. (2009) *Mosques made in Britain*. London: Quilliam Foundation 487 mosques responded to the survey conducted in September 2008. 86% said that they held classes in the evening during the week, 23% at weekends and only 5% said that they had no classes at all.

64 See Taylor, P (2010), *Talking to Terrorists: A Personal Journey from the IRA to Al Qaeda*. London. Harper Press.

65 Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion, p.229.

10.32 There have been allegations that a minority of independent faith schools have been actively promoting views that are contrary to British values, such as intolerance of other cultures and gender inequality.[66] There have also been reports that some independent faith schools have allowed extremist views to be expressed by staff, visitors or pupils.[67] In 2009, Ofsted found that 8 out of 51 independent faith schools surveyed were found to be displaying teaching materials that had a bias in favour of one particular group.[68] Some teaching materials were also seen to contain biased or incorrect information about other religions.

10.33 Recent media reports have suggested that some madrassahs are promoting a highly conservative version of Islam and promulgating extremist views, particularly against non-Muslims. A BBC Panorama investigation in November 2010 reported that some madrassahs were using textbooks with anti-Semitic and homophobic messages.[69] The Government is currently considering ways to stop children coming into contact with material of this kind in and out of school provision.

Activity to date

10.34 Over the last few years in England, DfE has engaged in a range of *Prevent*-related initiatives through a dedicated *Prevent* team.

10.35 Following an informal consultation process with headteachers and local authority children's services in early 2008, the Department published a toolkit to help schools prevent what was described as 'violent extremism'. The toolkit sought to raise awareness of the risks from violent extremism and provided guidance on developing a positive and inclusive ethos that championed democratic values and human rights.

10.36 To support the roll-out of the toolkit, and efforts to tailor it to local conditions, DfE and OSCT provided £4.7m to local authorities and the police. An additional £950,000 was made available regionally to support local authorities and schools in embedding the toolkit. Following requests for more practical advice, DfE developed a 'workbook', based on the Ofsted self-evaluation framework, which linked *Prevent* in to other school safety and improvement policies.

10.37 In 2009, ACPO produced guidance entitled '*Prevent*, Police and Schools' to help police officers work more effectively with teachers and school staff. ACPO have also developed an initiative called 'Act Now' which helps stimulate debate on violent extremism. The product is aimed at young people and explores political and historical terrorism as well as human rights.

10.38 In 2008-09, ACPO, DfE and OSCT provided funding for 'Watch Over Me', a DVD designed to help secondary school teachers discuss challenging topics such as terrorism. DVD box sets of this series have been given out to every secondary school in England and training events were held for police officers, teachers and community leaders.

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66 Bald, J. et al (2010), *Faith Schools we can believe in.* London: Policy Exchange and MacEoin, D. (2009), *Music, Chess and other Sins: Segregation, Integration and Muslim Schools in Britain.* London: Civitas.

67 BBC Panorama (2010), *British Schools, Islamic Rules.* 22 November, and Channel 4 Dispatches (2011), *Lessons in Hate and Violence.* 14 February.

68 Ofsted (2009), *'Independent Faith Schools: Is the standard relating to spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils, together with the five regulations underpinning it, fit for purpose?* Manchester: Ofsted.

69 BBC Panorama (2010), *British Schools, Islamic Rules.* 22 November.

10.39 DfE, DCLG and the Department for Children, Education, Lifelong Learning and Skills in Wales also funded the Religious Education Council of England and Wales to deliver the 'Resilience' project. The project provided training and materials to help teachers of religious education discuss contentious issues, including extremism.

10.40 To reach children and young people outside school, DfE has jointly funded two projects with DCLG: the Islam and Citizenship Education project (ICE) and the Young Muslims Advisory Group (YMAG). ICE sought to help young Muslims in 300 madrassahs and 100 independent Muslim faith schools explore their faith and understand its compatibility with broader citizenship values. YMAG was designed to help young Muslims find solutions to a range of challenges, including discrimination, extremism and civic participation.

10.41 Local authorities are increasingly recognising *Prevent* as an important issue in safeguarding young people. According to a DfE assessment in March 2010, 61% of local authorities' children's services were actively engaged in *Prevent* work and had a specific plan in place to engage schools (though this does not necessarily reflect on whether the quality and scope of that engagement is appropriate). This is an increase of 11% from 2009.

10.42 Awareness of *Prevent* in schools has increased. A survey conducted by Ipsos MORI in 2011 indicated that a majority of schools (84%) know at least *something* about their role in preventing violent extremism and most (75%) regard this role as important.[70] But a significant minority (20%) disagreed. A majority of schools (70%) felt they need more training and information to build resilience to radicalisation.[71]

10.43 The three information sources on *Prevent* most widely used by schools surveyed by Ipsos MORI were guidance issued by DfE, local authority guidance and the media. Only a small number (26%) of schools surveyed had used the police to provide information and support about *Prevent*.

Next steps

10.44 We regard *Prevent* work with children and with schools as an important part of the strategy. But this work needs to be proportionate. It must not start from a misplaced assumption that there is a significant problem that needs to be resolved. We have seen some evidence of very limited radicalisation of children by extremist or terrorist groups. There is further evidence that some schools – and some supplementary schools – have used teaching materials which may encourage intolerance. And we know that some extremist or terrorist organisations have held positions of influence in education or in other organisations working closely with children. But these issues must be kept in perspective. And they are not all within the remit of *Prevent*.

10.45 Schools can help to protect children from extremist and violent views in the same ways that they help to safeguard children from drugs, gang violence or alcohol. Schools' work on *Prevent* needs to be seen in this context. The purpose must be to protect children from harm and to ensure that they are taught in a way that is consistent with the law and our values. Awareness of *Prevent* and the risks it is intended to address are both vital. Staff can help to identify, and to refer to the relevant agencies, children whose behaviour suggests that they are being drawn into terrorism or extremism.

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70 Ipsos MORI (2011), *Community Cohesion and Prevent: How have schools responded?* London: Department for Education. Available from: www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/DFE-RR085.pdf

71 *ibid*

10.46 We are particularly concerned not to encourage or create an environment where children are referred to the support programmes discussed in the previous chapter (for example, Channel) unless there is very clear evidence that they are being radicalised and there is clearly no alternative or more proportionate means of dealing with the issue. Referring very young people has rightly been a source of community concern and risks undermining the credibility of the Channel programme as a whole.

10.47 We believe that schools of all kinds can play a role in enabling young people to explore issues like terrorism and the wider use of violence in a considered and informed way. According to a survey by the UK Youth Parliament in August 2008, 94% of young people said they thought schools were the best environment in which to discuss terrorism.[72] We agree. Schools can facilitate understanding of wider issues within the context of learning about the values on which our society is founded and our system of democratic government. These are important for reasons which go far beyond *Prevent* but they connect to the *Prevent* agenda.

10.48 The Government's vision for the English school system is set out in *The Importance of Teaching: Schools White Paper 2010*[73]. The White Paper explains the importance of head teachers having the freedom to manage their own institutions and the need to keep top-down bureaucracy to a minimum. Teachers, parents and other members of the public will be able to apply to set up Free Schools where there is demand.

10.49 The Government is clear that there is no place for extremists in any school. That is why a Preventing Extremism Unit, which includes experts in counter-terrorism, has been established within DfE. The unit will work with partners across Government and beyond. The Preventing Extremism Unit will conduct effective financial and non-financial 'due diligence' to minimise the risk that unsuitable providers can set up Free Schools. The unit is expected to become a centre of excellence of its kind for due diligence on individuals and groups who may use education as their route into radicalisation.

10.50 Free Schools must be inclusive. A rigorous process will minimise the risk of unsuitable providers. Applicants will also need to demonstrate that they would support UK democratic values including support for individual liberties within the law, equality, mutual tolerance and respect.

10.51 The White Paper also proposes changes to the inspection of publicly funded schools so that it focuses on schools' core education purpose and exempts outstanding schools from routine inspection. The Chief Inspector will retain discretion to re-inspect any school about which Ofsted has concerns.

10.52 Working with DfE, Ofsted will ensure that inspectors have the necessary knowledge and expertise to determine whether extremist and intolerant beliefs are being promoted in a school and then to take appropriate action. Consideration is being given to strengthening Independent School Standards. DfE is working to establish a new set of standards for teachers and an independent review has been set up to look at how these can include standards of ethics and behaviour. In future, new standards should better enable schools to take action against staff who demonstrate unacceptable views.[74]

72 www.ukyp.org.uk/debatable
73 www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/publicationdetail/page1/CM%207980
74 www.education.gov.uk/schools/teachingandlearning/reviewofstandards

10.53 Publicly funded schools remain under a duty to promote community cohesion. The Education Bill which is currently before Parliament removes the current duty on Ofsted to report on schools' contribution to community cohesion. However, the stronger focus on teaching and learning and a continuing focus on provision for pupils' spiritual, moral, social and cultural development will enable inspectors to identify inappropriate practice, including the promotion of messages that undermine community cohesion.

10.54 The Government is considering ways to stop children coming into contact with extremist views in out-of-hours provision with partners such as Ofsted and the police.

10.55 Over the lifetime of this strategy, DfE will undertake the following *Prevent*-related work in England:

- ensure that teachers and other school staff know what to do when they see signs that a child is at risk of radicalisation;
- continue to collaborate and encourage collaboration with policing and the development of products for teachers;
- as part of the planned changes to the inspection arrangements for maintained schools, give due weight to schools' activities in support of our shared values, and for any concerns to be reflected in the report;
- strengthen the Independent School Standards to ensure that schools understand their obligations;
- establish a set of standards for teachers which clarifies obligations regarding extremism;
- provide effective financial and non-financial 'due diligence' to minimise the risk that those with unacceptable views can set up Free Schools or gain control of academies or other publicly-funded schools;
- work with the Charity Commission to ensure that schools that are charities and under their jurisdiction comply with charity law;
- work to reduce the risk that children and young people are exposed to extremist views in out of school hours provision; and
- help children's services work with schools and other agencies, including Channel, to identify children at risk of radicalisation and take necessary steps to protect them from harm.

Higher and further education

Background

10.56 Universities and colleges promote and facilitate the exchange of opinion and ideas, and enable debate as well as learning. The Government has no wish to limit or otherwise interfere with this free flow of ideas, and we must be careful to balance the need to preserve national security with protecting our civil liberties.

10.57 We are completely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But universities and colleges also have a legal and moral obligation to staff and students to ensure that the place of work and study is a tolerant, welcoming and safe environment.[75] Although it is vital that universities and colleges must protect academic freedom, it is a long-established principle that universities also have a duty of care to their students. Universities and colleges – and, to some extent, university societies and student groups – have a clear and unambiguous role to play in helping to safeguard vulnerable young people from radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist organisations.

10.58 The sector is regulated by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). Universities and other higher education institutions are charities and must comply with charity law, guidance on which is provided by the Charity Commission. The Charities Act 2006 requires all student unions to register with the Charity Commission by the end of June 2011 after which student unions in England and Wales are regulated by the Charity Commission and governed by charities legislation.[76]

10.59 Legally, all charities must work for the public benefit and must act to avoid damage to the charity's reputation, assets and associated individuals. Higher education institutions and student unions can be challenged on whether they have given due consideration to the public benefit and associated risks notably when they, or one of their affiliated societies, invite controversial or extremist speakers to address students. Student unions and higher education institutions should also take an interest in the activities and views being expressed within affiliated societies to ensure compliance with charities legislation, which includes provisions relating to human rights, equalities and political neutrality.

10.60 Further information on charities legislation can be found in the section on the charitable sector below (pages 127-130). The Education (2) Act 1986 also requires higher and further education institutions to maintain and update a code of practice on the freedom of speech, setting out procedures and conduct for organising and attending meetings.

Higher and further education and Prevent

10.61 More than 30% of people convicted for Al Qa'ida-associated terrorist offences in the UK between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended university or a higher education institution. Another 15% studied or achieved a vocational or further education qualification. About 10% of the sample were students at the time when they were charged or the incident for which they were convicted took place. These statistics roughly correspond to classified data about the educational backgrounds of those who have engaged recently in terrorist-related activity in this country: a significant proportion has attended further or higher education.[77]

10.62 Some students were already committed to terrorism before they began their university courses: some of those convicted following Operation Overt are an example.[78] Other students were radicalised while they studied at university, but by people operating outside of the university itself: they include the terrorist who recently killed himself in an attempted terrorist attack in Sweden, and who had been educated in Luton.

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75 As regards staff, see Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and Equality Act 2010. They are available at www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/37/contents and www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents respectively.

76 There are separate provisions and regulators for Scotland and Northern Ireland.

77 Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. pp.227-232 and 237-245.

78 www.bbc.co.uk/news/10455915

10.63 A third group of students appear to have been attracted to and influenced by extremist ideology while at university and engaged in terrorism-related activity after they had left. We believe that the person responsible for the attempted bombing of an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 was an example.

10.64 We believe that this data is important in highlighting ways in which universities can play a key role in *Prevent* while still upholding their commitment to academic freedom and learning.

10.65 We have considered throughout this report the way in which terrorist groups can make use of extremist ideas developed by extremist organisations. We have said that where this is the case we need to be able to challenge those ideas and the organisations that exploit freedoms in this country to promote them.

10.66 We believe there is unambiguous evidence to indicate that some extremist organisations, notably Hizb-ut-Tahrir, target specific universities and colleges (notably those with a large number of Muslim students) with the objective of radicalising and recruiting students. The Al-Muhajiroun organisation has done the same. Although that group has now been proscribed under counter-terrorism legislation, splinter groups from it continue to operate in the same way.

10.67 We also judge that some extremist preachers from this country and from overseas, not connected to specific extremist groups, have also sought to repeatedly reach out to selected universities and to Muslim students. There is evidence to suggest that some people associated with some Islamic student societies have facilitated this activity and that it has largely gone unchallenged. Five former senior members of university Islamic societies have also been convicted of terrorism-related offences.[79]

10.68 Following the failed Detroit bombing, Universities UK (UUK) – the main higher education sector umbrella body – set up a working group to look at ways to prevent radicalisation on campuses while protecting freedom of speech. In its report published earlier this year, UUK concluded that the higher education sector does need to be vigilant and aware of the challenges posed by extremism.[80]

10.69 The report focused largely on universities' legal responsibilities relating to freedom of speech and academic freedom. It made recommendations regarding universities' work with charity and higher education regulators and student unions as part of future efforts to tackle extremism, which we come back to later in this chapter.

10.70 The UUK report noted that managing potentially controversial speakers is a challenge for universities. Some universities were found to have well-developed protocols in place but the report recommended that universities should review their arrangements, and ensure they were aligned with their student union.

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79 Centre for Social Cohesion (2010), *Radical Islam on UK Campuses: A comprehensive list of extremist speakers at UK universities'*. London: Centre for Social Cohesion. Available from: www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1292336866_1.pdf

80 Universities UK (2011), *Freedom of Speech on Campus: Rights and Responsibilities in UK Universities.* London: Universities UK. Available from: www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/Publications/Documents/FreedomOfSpeechOnCampusRightsAndResponsibilitiesInUKuniversities.pdf

Activity to date

10.71 In England, BIS has led recent work to tackle extremism and radicalisation in the sector. We have touched on some of their work above (pages 99-100).

10.72 In 2009, BIS identified about 40 English universities where there may be particular risk of radicalisation or recruitment on campus. BIS invited these universities to assess their ability to manage this risk. Not all of the institutions responded to the request.

10.73 For those universities that did, the assessment looked at their working relationships with key *Prevent* partners including the police, their internal policies and procedures to identify and manage risk and the training and awareness-raising provision within each institution. This highlighted some good practice and the need for sharing of best practice, intelligence and training to help faculty and other staff identify the signs of radicalisation and understand how to offer support.

10.74 In 2009, these universities received intelligence briefings and were subsequently offered a small grant for further *Prevent* work and training. Some of these universities now have a dedicated police officer to advise on these issues.

10.75 The majority of work in this area has focused on providing advice, guidance and support to help institutions manage the risk of radicalisation on campus. Guidance for all higher education institutions was issued in 2008. In conjunction with the police, the Home Office and the National Union of Students (NUS), BIS have also supported a number of projects designed to help key members of staff to identify vulnerability when they see it and offer appropriate support.

10.76 Most of the 650 student unions in the UK are affiliated to the NUS and BIS have funded a full-time position there to build a better knowledge base and to develop training materials for staff working within student unions. The NUS also operates a 'No Platform' policy, which forbids any officer of the NUS sharing a platform with a 'racist' or 'fascist'. Organisations currently subject to the 'No Platform' policy are the British National Party, Combat 18, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, MPAC UK, and the National Front. This policy has been largely effective although some organisations seek to circumvent it by changing their name to avoid detection.

10.77 The NUS has recently produced a Good Governance Code of Practice for its member unions to help them adjust to their new status as registered charities.[81] The new code aims to promote good practice in student union governance and provide a framework for a good working relationship between student unions and their university or college. The Charity Commission has also recently produced guidance aimed at trustees of charities on how to perform 'due diligence' of individuals and organisations associated with the charity.[82]

10.78 The NUS has taken positive steps towards tackling extremism, including building their relationship with a number of their affiliated societies including the umbrella body for Islamic societies, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS). We judge that FOSIS has not always fully challenged terrorist and extremist ideology within the higher and further education sectors. FOSIS needs to give clearer leadership to their affiliated societies in this area.

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81 www.nusconnect.org.uk/goodgovernance/sections/

82 Charity Commission (2011), *Compliance Toolkit: protecting charities from harm (the 'compliance toolkit')*. London: Charity Commission. Available from: www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Our_regulatory_activity/Counter_terrorism_work/protecting_charities_landing.aspx

10.79 There are several examples of students engaging in terrorism or related activities while members of university societies affiliated to FOSIS. Such extremists must have no part in any organisation that wishes to be recognised as a representative body. It is critical that FOSIS continue to strengthen their engagement with the NUS and that (like any other student body), their members take a clear and unequivocal position against extremism and terrorism. Although FOSIS have received no direct funding from BIS, the Department does give FOSIS advice and guidance on how to improve their ability to communicate to their members.

10.80 Some local authorities have engaged with universities and colleges and included them on *Prevent* groups alongside representatives from the local police, the local authority and youth and probation services.

10.81 Research by the Institute of Community Cohesion in March 2010 showed that there remain concerns across both the higher and further education sectors about the skills and confidence of staff to deal with radicalisation.[83] This survey illustrates the demand for better information sharing. According to this research, only 45% of universities and 40% of colleges engaged with any frequency with the police on *Prevent* related work and 40% of universities and 30% of colleges with local authorities.

10.82 There has been much less activity in the further education sector than in universities: what activity there has been has tended to focus on guidance and training. *Prevent* guidance to local partners, published in 2008, made it clear that colleges need to be part of local *Prevent* partnerships. In 2009, two further documents set out the role that colleges can play in preventing violent extremism, including a toolkit with practical advice. ACPO has distributed guidance emphasising the importance of police entering into an ongoing dialogue with staff and students in colleges and are currently developing further guidance.

10.83 In 2008, the Champion Principals Group, made up of college principals, was established to provide leadership for the further education sector. The group has promoted available guidance and helped raise awareness and engagement levels in colleges across the country.

Next steps

10.84 Universities and colleges have an important role to play in *Prevent*, particularly in ensuring balanced debate as well as freedom of speech. They also have a clear responsibility to exercise their duty of care and to protect the welfare of their students. We firmly believe these objectives are consistent with a commitment to academic freedom and learning. We believe this is recognised in the UUK report.

10.85 We have seen that people may be radicalised at different points in their life. Whether radicalisation occurs on campus or elsewhere, staff in higher and further education institutions can identify and offer support to people who may be drawn into extremism and terrorism.

10.86 We accept that universities and colleges of further education will need guidance, information and best practice to address these issues, for example, no single group should be allowed to control prayer facilities on any campus. But we are concerned that some universities and colleges have failed to engage in *Prevent*.

[83] Beider, H. and Briggs, R. (2010), *Promoting Community Cohesion and Preventing Violent Extremism in Higher and Further Education*. London: Institute of Community Cohesion.

10.87 This lack of engagement must be addressed. We believe that staff in every university and college have a responsibility for the welfare of individual students as well as the wider student body. University and college staff should have access to support if they suspect one of their students may be becoming radicalised. We will support the sector to improve their capacity in this area, training staff to recognise the signs of radicalisation and helping them improve their awareness of the help that is available.

10.88 We note that much less has been done with further education colleges, although young people at college may be as vulnerable to radicalisation as those attending university and for the same reasons. This is a gap in activity which we will also address as a priority.

10.89 BIS will lead the delivery of *Prevent* in these sectors. Over the life-time of this strategy, BIS will, with the assistance of other Departments where appropriate, undertake the following work:

- help universities and colleges better understand the risk of radicalisation on and off campus and secure wider and more consistent support from institutions of most concern;
- work to ensure that all institutions where there is risk of radicalisation recognise their duty of care to students to protect them from the consequences of their becoming involved in terrorism, and take reasonable steps to minimise this risk;
- support local police forces in working with those institutions assessed to be at the greatest risk;
- create better links between universities, colleges, local authorities and communities engaged in *Prevent* work;
- establish links between universities and colleges and local programmes to support people vulnerable to radicalisation;
- appoint regional champions in each of the nine regions in England and host a central point of information where practitioners can share information, advice and good practice;
- fund the NUS to undertake a programme of work to ensure that their sabbatical officers and full time staff are fully trained and equipped to manage their responsibilities under charities legislation and are able to implement the NUS' guidance on external speakers.
- work closely with UUK and the Association of Colleges to provide advice, guidance and support particularly to universities and colleges that are in *Prevent* priority areas;
- ensure that HEFCE and the Charity Commission execute their regulatory duties consistently across the sector; and
- work with the police and other partners to ensure that student societies and university and college staff have the right information and guidance to enable them to make decisions about external speakers.

The internet

Background

10.90 The internet has transformed the extent to which terrorist organisations and their sympathisers can radicalise people in this country and overseas. It enables a wider range of organisations and individuals to reach a much larger audience with a broader and more dynamic series of messages and narratives. It encourages interaction and facilitates recruitment. The way people use the internet also appears to be conducive to these processes. Despite the wealth of information available, people often talk to those whose views are similar to their own, encouraging group thinking and inhibiting external challenge.

10.91 For many years, the security and intelligence agencies and police have worked to disrupt the ability of terrorists to use the internet for operational purposes. But tackling terrorist use of the internet is as vital to *Prevent* as it is to *Pursue*.

10.92 Many of the programmes we have outlined in the sections above depend on the internet for successful delivery. RICU, for example (see pages 65-66) runs a range of projects designed to challenge terrorist ideology online through effective counter-narratives, positive messaging from credible sources and critical analysis of extremist propaganda.

10.93 But there are a number of internet-specific measures which we need to take to address the threat of radicalisation online. They include steps to:

- limit access to harmful content online in specific sectors or premises (notably schools, public libraries and other public buildings); and
- ensure that action is taken to try to remove unlawful and harmful content from the internet.

10.94 This work will require effective dialogue with the private sector and in particular the internet industry. It will also require collaboration with international partners: the great majority of the websites and chat rooms which concern us in the context of radicalisation are hosted overseas.

10.95 The legal framework for this work is provided by Sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (TACT), which create the offences of encouragement of terrorism (s.1) and the dissemination of terrorist publications (s.2). Section 3 of TACT provides that those served with notices who fail to remove, without reasonable excuse, the material that is unlawful and terrorism-related within a specified period are treated as endorsing it.

10.96 The serving of notices was intended to achieve the rapid and effective removal of material. Notices can be served on anyone involved in electronic publication or dissemination.

Activity to date

10.97 A cross-departmental approach to counter-terrorism on the internet, including programmes in the areas set out above, is coordinated by OSCT.

10.98 OSCT has engaged with DfE, Regional Broadband Consortia and the filtering software industry to explore effective filtering options across the public estate (for example, schools, libraries, etc).[84] DfE and OSCT have also secured the inclusion of language that promotes terrorism and extremism in the filtering technology 'kitemark'.[85] The kitemark covers commercial filtering software on sale to schools and families and the first accredited product is now on the market.

10.99 The police have made no use of formal Section 3 notices as had been intended by the legislation. In practice a close relationship with the industry in this country has meant that, once alerted to its existence, providers have removed material voluntarily. The powers have proved ineffective in dealing with content hosted overseas.

10.100 10.100. In early 2010 the police, in association with the Home Office, launched a Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU). The CTIRU is a dedicated police unit intended to assess and investigate internet-based content which may be illegal under UK law and to take appropriate action against it, either through the criminal justice system or by making representations to internet service providers or, where necessary, by both these means. The CTIRU has removed material from the internet on 156 occasions over the last 15 months. The CTIRU is beginning to liaise with law enforcement agencies overseas to obtain agreement to remove websites in their jurisdiction.

10.101 Online material can be referred to the CTIRU through the Directgov website, which also explains how material which is unlawful or offensive can be referred directly to the company which hosts the relevant site and whose contractual terms of use may be breached by it.[86]

10.102 As well as police activity to enforce the law, there have been some projects intended to educate internet users so that they can protect themselves online. These projects have educated users in the techniques being used by online radicalisers and have reached schools, community groups, youth centres and mosques. Some are police-led; others have been taken forward by local authorities with *Prevent* funding.

10.103 OSCT has engaged with the internet industry to explain the Government position on acceptable material and explore ways to reflect that position in industry standards and best practice. Internet service providers set out their own terms of use and act when they find that these terms have been breached. To help their users, they provide mechanisms to highlight examples of unacceptable use: we note that YouTube has introduced a 'promoting terrorism' referral flag for videos of a terrorist nature, enabling YouTube users to report terrorist content which might be in breach of YouTube's Community Guidelines. If found to be in breach, YouTube will remove it.

10.104 Among other initiatives, OSCT has secured agreement from AOL to assist in raising the visibility of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorism Hotline by ensuring it is presented when certain specific search requests are entered.

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84 Regional Broadband Consortia (RBCs) are associations of local authorities established to provide cost-effective broadband connectivity to schools in England.

85 Kitemark is a registered mark owned and awarded by BSI, the kitemark was originally developed by the British Standards Institution. This kitemark is in reference to the PAS 74 (Publicly Accessible Specification 74:2008. Access control systems for the protection of children online).

86 www.direct.gov.uk/reportingonlineterrorism

10.105 There has been some multilateral collaboration on the issue of terrorist use of the internet. Europol's 'Check the Web' project aims to strengthen cooperation between member states while also sharing the task of monitoring and evaluating terrorist and extremist internet open sources on a voluntary basis. The European Commission's 'Public Private Dialogue to Fight Online Illegal Activities' seeks EU-wide voluntary self-regulatory measures to tackle crime, chid exploitation and terrorism.

Next steps

10.106 We have reviewed the programme of activity to date and the steps that might be taken to strengthen it. We believe that the overall *range* of activities is appropriate: promoting the filtering out of harmful content; law enforcement action; educating users; working with industry and international engagement. These initiatives are in addition to those throughout this document which seek to deliver *Prevent* and *Prevent*-related projects through the internet.

10.107 But in each area much more is needed. We do not yet have a filtering product which has been rolled out comprehensively across Government Departments, agencies and statutory organisations and we are unable to determine the extent to which effective filtering is in place in schools and public libraries. Given the scale of the challenge, the inception of CTIRU was late (and we have no data at all on the number of interventions made before it was created) and the number of referrals to the CTIRU is still not yet sufficient: the numbers of websites which have been disrupted so far is a fraction of the problem. Many countries are not sufficiently seized of the threat posed by terrorist use of the internet.

10.108 Internet filtering across the public estate is essential. We want to ensure that users in schools, libraries, colleges and Immigration Removal Centres are unable to access unlawful material. We will continue to work closely with DfE, BIS, the CTIRU, Regional Broadband Consortia and the filtering industry. We want to explore the potential for violent and unlawful URL lists to be voluntarily incorporated into independent national blocking lists, including the list operated by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF).

10.109 CTIRU needs to become a model of international best practice. We expect the CTIRU to develop further its technical, investigative and international capabilities. OSCT will work with the CTIRU, international law enforcement and industry to foster an environment of mutual assistance with respect to the further removal of terrorist material across the globe. We also believe the CTIRU can play a significant role in developing an unlawful URL blocking list for use across the public estate.

10.110 We should continue to educate internet users at risk. We will encourage programmes of this kind, led by local police forces, communities and local authorities, raising awareness of the CTIRU and Directgov websites. Local police forces will incorporate the CTIRU into talks, training sessions and other forms of support they give to libraries, internet cafés and schools. The objective is simply to better enable communities to alert the authorities and the industry to content which is harmful and possibly illegal.

10.111 We will want to engage effectively with the internet industry and encourage corporate social responsibility. We will continue to engage and draw on the experience of the international internet industry, encouraging and supporting further voluntary measures and cooperation with the CTIRU. We will encourage more user regulatory measures such as terrorist video referral mechanisms, clearer and more visible acceptable use policies and stronger enforcement of user referrals which highlight breaches.

10.112 We must also step up our international work, where our most important single relationship is with the United States. The US is by far the biggest provider of internet hosting services in the world, and therefore terrorists have hosted significant amounts of material on servers in the US, the content of which can breach UK legislation and be freely viewed by UK users. We are engaged with the US Government in this area on a basis of mutual understanding and valuing of each others' legislation. We are also in contact with the internet community in the US, with their strong sense of social responsibility, to help address this problem. The Government welcomes the developments in this area and will support and encourage further activity going forward.

10.113 We will also continue to work closely with the EU and EU Member States to explore self-regulatory measures to tackle terrorist use of the internet and seek to optimise existing projects and initiatives. Although there have been some bilateral exchanges with EU Member States to date, this has not proceeded systematically and we will take steps to improve those connections.

Faith institutions and organisations

Background

10.114 Historically, many terrorist groups have tried to legitimise their actions by reference to theology. Religion has provided both a motivation and an apparent justification for their actions. Contemporary terrorist groups therefore belong to a tradition: Al Qa'ida and like-minded organisations seek to radicalise and recruit people using what purports to be a theological argument. Members of Al Qa'ida often also seek specific religious sanction and approval for terrorist operations. That approval is sometimes provided by other members of Al Qa'ida who claim religious credibility, sometimes by members of other organisations and sometimes by people with no direct contact with any terrorist group but who broadly support their ideology, aims and objectives.

10.115 It follows that faith institutions and organisations can play a very important role in preventative activity. They can lead the challenge to an ideology that purports to provide theological justification for terrorism. They will often have authority and credibility not available to Government. They can provide more specific and direct support to those who are being groomed to terrorism by those who claim religious expertise and use what appear to be religious arguments. They can also play a wider and no less vital role in helping create a society which recognises the rights and the contributions of different faith groups, endorses tolerance and the rule of law and encourages participation and interaction. People who subscribe to these values and principles are unlikely to turn to terrorism.

10.116 For almost twenty years, organisations whose views we now associate with Al Qa'ida sought to infiltrate mosques in this country and sometimes even to set up mosques of their own. Where that has not been possible – very often because mosques have resisted their efforts – individual extremist preachers have sought to develop an autonomous role and identity and to develop what amounts to their own 'brand'. Some have created extremist organisations and institutions to better disseminate their views.

10.117 Community resistance has reduced the open operation of radical preachers in this country: this is encouraging. Some extremist preachers have been arrested and prosecuted; others are awaiting deportation or have been refused entry to this country. Few mosques now openly and

knowingly promote extremist or terrorist views. In some areas, groups and individuals continue their attempts to subvert mosques, to use them for extremist purposes or to encourage violence and to raise funds for groups in this country or overseas engaged in terrorist-related activity. Elsewhere, activity has been displaced to areas and venues which are less public and in particular to private study groups which operate in private premises or on the internet.

10.118 The Government will seek a dialogue with faith institutions which are under threat from extremist and terrorist organisations, irrespective of the faith concerned. The Government also needs to have a dialogue with faith institutions who can best address the ideological challenge of terrorism and support people who are lured into terrorist activity. But the dialogue, so vital to *Prevent* work, is clearly sensitive and needs to be handled with care. It cannot be separated from broader issues about the relationship between Government and faith communities.

Activity to date

10.119 At a time when Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups have posed the major threat to our national security, *Prevent* recognised the key importance of working with mosques. Since 2005, the police and local authorities have sought a much closer (albeit lower profile) dialogue with mosques and their governing bodies and in many cases also with the national or regional faith groups of which they are members. The police now talk regularly to mosques in a way that was very rare before 2005, advising about the terrorist threat and taking advice on the perspectives of the local community.

10.120 That dialogue has been complemented by official and Ministerial exchanges with national and local Muslim organisations. This has hitherto been coordinated and run from DCLG in England and by different Departments in Wales and Scotland.

10.121 In 2007, DCLG facilitated the creation of a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), founded by four national Muslim organisations who continue to hold vice-chair positions on an executive board of over fifty people from a wide range of backgrounds. MINAB now has over 600 mosques as members. Its purpose is to improve mosque governance and management and to enable imams to work in this country and with young people in particular. This work was funded by *Prevent* on the basis that better-governed mosques and more capable imams would increase what was then described as 'community resilience' to terrorism (see above, pages 110-111).

10.122 For similar reasons, DCLG also supported the Charity Commission's Faith and Social Cohesion Unit which offered support to mosques in developing their finance and governance structures while enabling them to benefit from charitable status. The Charity Commission has also encouraged mosques to register as charities and has provided advice on how to do so.

10.123 DCLG and DfE have helped to develop lesson materials for madrassahs. The aim of this programme (Islam and Citizenship Education, or ICE) was to provide teachers with the tools to demonstrate to young Muslims that their faith is compatible with wider shared values and that being a Muslim is also compatible with being a good citizen. Using DCLG *Prevent* funding, some local authorities have also supported *Prevent*-related initiatives with mosques. The DCLG 'Community Leadership Fund' (under the auspices of *Prevent*) was intended to support Muslim organisations and communities.

Next steps

10.124 We believe it is essential to work with faith institutions and organisations to deal with the challenge of terrorism in general and *Prevent* in particular. But the work in this area to date has not always been successful and the Government has already made some changes to it.

10.125 As a general principle, responsibility for coordinating the dialogue at a national level on terrorism with faith institutions and groups has been moved from DCLG to the OSCT in the Home Office. The Government has already concluded that it is wrong for a Department whose responsibility is for a broad range of community issues to lead on matters of national security. This increases the risk that the security dialogue becomes dominant and marginalises dialogue on a wide range of other issues. We think this has happened in the last few years and has led to *Prevent* assuming a disproportionate role in exchanges between Government and some faith groups. It also disconnects the Department having the dialogue (in this case DCLG) from the Department with the policy responsibility for terrorism (the Home Office).

10.126 The Home Office will seek a broad dialogue with faith-based groups and institutions covering a range of counter-terrorism and security issues – not just those confined to *Prevent*. It is essential that faith groups – like other organisations – are able not only to identify concerns they may have about security issues but also to discuss how those concerns can be addressed and consider ways in which they can help deal with the security-related challenges which we have. But care is needed to ensure that that this dialogue does not lead the Home Office, holding responsibility for counter-terrorism, to be assuming responsibility for much wider community issues.

10.127 DCLG will continue to have the lead policy responsibility for faith communities in England. The Department will support inter-faith work which we judge can have benefits for *Prevent*. DCLG is also undertaking a series of Ministerial discussions with individual faith communities on developing the Big Society and promoting integration.

10.128 The dialogue on terrorism and security with faith groups and institutions must also continue to take place at a local level. This is vital. Although some national organisations can helpfully coordinate activity, they cannot and do not always reflect the views of their many affiliated members. Local dialogue can better and more quickly resolve local problems. We believe that the police and local authority dialogue with faith groups and organisations has progressed well. As so often with *Prevent*, evaluation has not been sufficiently thorough to give us clear evidence of this but polling on attitudes to policing tends to support the claim (see page 137, below).

10.129 We believe that it will also be vital that given the threats and risks we face, faith leaders (imams in particular, but also other role models) are able to engage with young people and talk to them about the issues they face and concerns they have. We know from our own research that an imam very often has more authority and influence than almost anyone else to stop people being recruited into groups like Al Qa'ida. We also recognise the important part that management committees play in mosques, especially in advising the imam on his priorities and his role.

10.130 We judge that significant progress has been made by communities to equip faith leaders with the skills and the qualifications to reach out to young people vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment. We support that process and want to continue to assist with it where it is appropriate for Government to do so. We believe that MINAB can play a role here alongside many other groups and look to its participating groups to clearly support *Prevent*.

10.131 We are aware that a very small number of faith-based organisations and institutions are overtly – or, more commonly, covertly – supporting terrorism. We will continue to take action against these entities and prosecute them when they have broken the law. A wider number of organisations and groups continue to express views which, though not illegal, are extreme and (as we have argued in the introduction to this review) can provide the building blocks for a fully-fledged terrorist ideology.

10.132 As we have explained above (pages 58-61), we want to continue to take action against these groups consistent with our principles of free speech and expression. We want to ensure that such groups cannot manipulate, mislead and take advantage of young people and that their views are subject to civic challenge and debate.

10.133 During the life-time of the revised strategy we will therefore:

- Seek a dialogue on security issues at local and national level with more faith groups and organisations. That dialogue will be one part of a broader exchange on a range of issues: security is important but it must not dominate;
- Where it is appropriate to do so, support capacity-building proposals that better enable faith organisations to reach people who are vulnerable to grooming by terrorists;
- Encourage faith groups and organisations to play a full role in local *Prevent* coordination groups;
- Continue to support the dialogue between local policing and faith groups that has already significantly improved the handling of counter-terrorism issues. This must continue to be a two-way dialogue and it must not be dominated by a narrow focus only on *Prevent*;
- Take law enforcement action when faith groups or other organisations are supporting terrorism and ensure that when they are expressing views we regard as extremist those views are subject to challenge and debate.

Health

Background

10.134 Healthcare in England includes a range of complex services delivered through many organisations. The National Health Service (NHS) spans primary care, acute hospital care, community and mental health care, dentistry, pharmacy and delivery of services such as prison health. 1.3 million NHS workers have contact with over 315,000 patients daily and some 700,000 workers in private and voluntary healthcare organisations see many thousands more.

10.135 Healthcare professionals may meet and treat people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. People with mental health issues or learning disabilities (such as Nicky Reilly and Andrew Ibrahim, separately convicted in 2009 for terrorist-related offences) may be more easily drawn into terrorism. We also know that people connected to the healthcare sector have taken part in terrorist acts in the past.

10.136 The key challenge for the healthcare sector is to ensure that, where there are signs that someone has been or is being drawn into terrorism, the healthcare worker can interpret those signs correctly, is aware of the support which is available and is confident in referring the person for further support. Preventing someone from becoming a terrorist or from supporting

terrorism is substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including child abuse or domestic violence.

Activity to date

10.137 Until recently, there was no *Prevent* programme in the health sector. Since January 2010, *Prevent* has been piloted in nine Strategic Health Authority regions in England, in areas such as mental health, primary care, drug and alcohol programmes, prison health and school nursing. In these pilot regions, the Department of Health has issued guidance and a toolkit for frontline workers and training for some 700 people.[87] A consultation by the Department in September 2010 showed that health practitioners had little or no prior knowledge of *Prevent*.

10.138 Across the sector, regional *Prevent* coordinators work closely with other local delivery partners to ensure the health contribution to the *Prevent* strategy is coordinated with wider activity. The roll-out of *Prevent* is improving channels of communication between the health sector and the police, as well as other cross-agency links.

10.139 There are some 12,000 students training for health qualifications within universities each year. Work has started to ensure that *Prevent* is included in the undergraduate curriculum. Current activity needs to be extended to cover the premises where university clinical training takes place within the healthcare estate.

10.140 The Department of Health has already made links with the Charity Commission and the National Council of Voluntary Organisations to enable further training. This is important given that the White Papers which outline the future provision of commissioning in the health sector open up opportunities for all private and voluntary health care organisations to deliver NHS care alongside NHS organisations. At the time of writing, these papers were out for consultation.[88]

10.141 Since the launch of the Department of Health's guidance and toolkit in December 2009, there has been an increasing shift in the regional management of *Prevent* towards the safeguarding and nursing areas. This has facilitated take up and familiarisation. Situating *Prevent* within safeguarding will ensure it continues regardless of future changes to NHS organisational structures. It is also in line with wider attempts to mainstream *Prevent* in other sectors.

10.142 The Department of Health has also supported the review of the 'No Secrets' guidance on safeguarding adults.[89] This will embed the principles of *Prevent* within existing processes for safeguarding vulnerable adults and enable healthcare workers across the country to understand the parallels between *Prevent* and existing support and intervention processes.

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87 Department of Health (2009), *Building Partnerships, Staying Safe - Prevent Guidance and Toolkit for Healthcare Organisations and Prevent Guidance and Toolkit for Healthcare Workers.*

88 Department of Health (2010), *Liberating the NHS: Legislative Framework and Next Steps.* London: Department of Health.

89 Department of Health (2000), *No Secrets: Guidance on developing and implementing multi-agency policies and procedures to protects vulnerable adults from abuse*. London: Department of Health. See also Department of Health (2011), *Safeguarding Adults - The Role of NHS Commissioners*. London: Department of Health; Department of Health (2011), *Safeguarding Adults - The Role of Health Service Managers and their Boards.* London: Department of Health; Department of Health (2011), *Safeguarding Adults - The Role of Health Service Practitioners*. London: Department of Health.

Next steps

10.143 Given the very high numbers of people who come into contact with health professionals in this country, the sector is a critical partner in *Prevent*. There are clearly many opportunities for doctors, nurses and other staff to help protect people from radicalisation. The key challenge is to ensure that healthcare workers can identify the signs that someone is vulnerable to radicalisation, interpret those signs correctly and access the relevant support.

10.144 In common with other sectors, uptake of *Prevent* in the health sector has not always been consistent. This has been partly due to the unfamiliarity of the subject matter and partly because early training was not always appropriate. ACPO's internal 2010 review of *Prevent* policing has also identified issues regarding information sharing in the sector.

10.145 The Department of Health will need to ensure that the crucial relationship of trust and confidence between patient and clinician is balanced with the clinician's professional duty of care and their responsibility to protect wider public safety. Where a healthcare worker – be that a speech therapist, community psychiatric nurse or general practitioner – encounters someone who may be in the process of being radicalised towards terrorism, it is critical that the individual is offered the appropriate support. We believe that clear guidelines are needed for all healthcare managers and healthcare workers to ensure that cases of radicalisation whether among staff or patients are given the attention and care they deserve.

10.146 Evaluation of *Prevent* referrals in the health sector is improving but, as with other sectors, is incomplete. The Department of Health is addressing this issue.

10.147 Over the next year, the Department of Health will aim to deliver *Prevent* through those local organisations who manage mental health and offender health, prior to covering wider health communities such as primary care and hospitals. It is key that these organisations address *Prevent* through organisational governance and policies. Over the life-time of this strategy the Department will:

- develop knowledge and carry out awareness raising events for frontline workers in the public, private and voluntary health sectors;
- strengthen work with partners such as BIS, to ensure that *Prevent* principles are properly embedded in university hospital trusts;
- further develop awareness-raising and training products;
- raise awareness of the parallels between *Prevent* and safeguarding guidance and procedures for adults and children to promote gradual mainstreaming of *Prevent*;
- improve guidance of corporate governance policies and procedures to allow referrals and concerns to be raised with confidence; and
- work with regional and local health organisations to expand support to Channel groups and other key partners to ensure that they have access to appropriate advice and support through healthcare interventions.

The criminal justice system

Prisons and probation

Background

10.148 There are 135 public-sector prisons in England and Wales, run through Her Majesty's Prison Service, and 11 prisons operated under contract by private sector organisations. About 85,000 people are held in these prisons at any one time, with 182,000 people received into prisons on remand or as sentenced prisoners each year.[90]

10.149 35 Probation Trusts across England and Wales provide probation services, working with and for the communities in which they are based. The Trusts supervise approximately 240,000 offenders. Some are serving community or other non-custodial sentences; others are under pre-release or post-release supervision from prison.

10.150 Prisons and Probation Trusts are accountable to the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), an Executive Agency of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), for their performance and delivery. NOMS works to protect the public and reduce reoffending by delivering the punishment and orders of the courts and supporting rehabilitation by helping offenders to reform their lives.

10.151 As of 30 September 2010, there were 111 prisoners held in relation to terrorism or extremism. Of these 111, 74 are associated with offences linked to Al Qa'ida or groups influenced by Al Qa'ida. They include high profile and influential people, some with a track record of radicalisation and recruitment.[91] It is important to note that there are a number of other people serving prison sentences for non-terrorism-related offences who, prior to their arrest, are also known to have been engaged in terrorist-related activity.

10.152 Terrorist offenders are located and managed in accordance with their security categorisation, which for many, but not all, is Category A.[92] Given the risks that terrorism and terrorism-related offenders may pose to the public and potentially to national security they are closely managed and supervised. All Category A prisoners are held in one of the eight high security prisons.

10.153 The number of terrorist offenders managed in the community has grown over the past three years as offenders have progressed through the custody into the post-release phase of their sentence. As of February 2011, there were 36 terrorist offenders managed under Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). This statutory system requires probation, prison, police and others to work together in managing the offender. The licence conditions imposed on terrorist offenders on release from prison reflect the particular risks that they may present.

10.154 Over the next four years, 34 terrorism-related prisoners may reach their release dates. It is therefore vital that the transition of these individuals into the community, and their supervision and management, ensures the risks they may post are effectively managed and minimised.

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90 NOMS Business Plan 2011-12.

91 Home Office (2011), *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stop and searches, Quarterly update to September 2010, Great Britain.* London: Home Office. Available from: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/hosb0411/

92 There are four prisoner security categories used to classify every adult prisoner (A-D). The categories are based upon the severity of the crime and the risk posed should the person escape. Category A prisoners are those whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public or national security.

Prisons, probation and Prevent

10.155 We know that some people who have been convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-related offences have sought to radicalise and recruit other prisoners. We also know that some people who have been convicted for non-terrorism-related offences but who have previously been associated with extremist or terrorist networks have engaged in radicalising and recruitment activity while in prison. The extent to which radicalisation which takes place in prison will endure beyond the confines of the prison environment is not yet clear.

10.156 There is a range of research on the issue of managing terrorist prisoners, including on radicalisation and recruitment in prisons, though less so in the probation system.[93] The literature reflects experiences around the world, indicating that this is not a challenge confined to this country or even to western Europe but is faced by all states who have detained or prosecuted people for terrorist offences, notably (but not only) offences relating to terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida.[94]

10.157 Recent research has found that, while radicalisation is a live and important issue to both prisoners and staff, it is rarely witnessed.[95] Radicalisers use a variety of means to persuade and influence, including coercion and intimidation. This is true in prisons as in other environments. In prisons, it is not always clear where observable behaviours are indicative of radicalisation or other prisoner behaviours, such as the formation of alliances as coping mechanisms, bullying or criminal association.[96]

10.158 Careful judgments are therefore required to accurately assess the extent of radicalisation in prisons and then to find ways to mitigate it. As the Chief Inspector of Prisons has commented, there are risks if we view Muslim prisoners principally through a 'security lens'.[97] We know that extremists can play on a sense of grievance to reinforce their messages.

10.159 The experience of a criminal conviction and spending time in prison can lead some people to take a closer interest in religion than they had before.[98] Religion can help them change their lives for the better.[99] However, as people who convert may initially be less well-informed about their faith, they may be vulnerable to overtures from radicalisers who seek to impress a distorted version of theology upon them.[100]

10.160 Prisons also offer an opportunity for disengagement from terrorism and extremism through the severing of links with extremist peers and networks, the opportunity to re-evaluate identity

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93 Disley, E. et al (forthcoming), *Individual disengagement from violent extremist groups - A Rapid Evidence Assessment.* London: Home Office Publications.

94 For an overview, see Neumann P. (2010), *Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and Deradicalisation in 15 Countries*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. pp. 26-31.

95 Liebling, A. (forthcoming), *An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at HMP Whitemoor: Twelve Years On.*

96 Alison Liebling's report highlights the challenge for prison staff of differentiating between outward manifestations of faith on the one hand and indicators of radicalisation on the other.

97 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2010), Muslim prisoners' experiences: A thematic review . London: HMCIP. Available from www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmi-prisons/docs/Muslim_prisoners_2010_rps.pdf

98 Neumann P. (2010), *Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and Deradicalisation in 15 Countries*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. pp. 26-31.

99 The positive effects of conversion are portrayed in Hamm, M. (2009), Prison Islam in the age of Sacred Terror. *The British Journal of Criminology*. 49 (5) Liebling, A. (forthcoming), *An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at HMP Whitemoor: Twelve Years On.*

100 The Liebling research found that prisoners (including recent converts) were ignorant and confused about the Islamic faith and those with extremist views could fill this gap with misinformation and misinterpretation.

and direction and engagement with others (staff and prisoners) which can challenge ideas previously held about terrorism and violence.

Activity to date

10.161 Since 2007, HM Prison Service and latterly NOMS have developed and implemented an extremism programme which contributes to *Prevent*, funded in part by OSCT.

10.162 Significant training has been provided to prison staff about *Prevent* and terrorism-related issues. In some areas (for example, permitted literature and the management of Friday prayers) policy has been amended to reflect *Prevent* risks. Information and intelligence gathering and sharing in prisons is now better able to address the challenges posed by terrorist prisoners, including radicalisation. A network has been established to coordinate, analyse and disseminate information and intelligence. Coordination (including information handling) with probation and policing has substantially improved.

10.163 NOMS have used existing offender management interventions to manage some *Prevent* issues. These interventions address faith, education, resettlement, location in the prison system and specific factors identified as relevant to an individual's behaviour and offending history. Interventions may be delivered by prison or probation staff or other organisations including those from the third sector.

10.164 NOMS has researched what additional provision is required to help staff intervene with radicalised offenders or those who may be susceptible to radicalisation. Some of these programmes involve what is best described as de-radicalisation and address challenges which are very often unique to the post-conviction prison environment. Other programmes more strictly deal with counter-radicalisation and bear some similarity to the programmes set out above.

10.165 Three new interventions developed by NOMS (drawing on their research and existing experience in offender management) target some of the likely drivers for terrorism and are currently running in four prisons and six Probation Trusts. Two are suitable for all types of extremist ideology and also for gang-related offenders. The other is specifically targeted at beliefs and ideology related to Al Qa'ida. Following assessment, national implementation is planned in 2012.

10.166 NOMS also works with OSCT-funded intervention providers (see above, pages 74-81) to whom offenders may be referred, either during the course of the prison phase of their sentence, or as part of their management in the community.

10.167 Chaplains provide important pastoral support in prisons: the number of Muslim chaplains has increased in recent years in response to the growth in the Muslim prisoner population. They are also well placed to play a key role in theological aspects of terrorist ideology. NOMS has piloted and is implementing an educational programme about Islam, which teaches spiritual values and contains modules on topics such as maintaining family ties, forgiveness, and interaction with people of other faiths. The programme is intended to help Muslim prisoners understand their faith and to better enable them to resist extremist arguments and ideology. In some areas, community chaplains also provide support to offenders on probation in the community.

Next steps

10.168 Over the last few years, the NOMS extremism programme has made some progress against key objectives. The *Prevent* strategy is more widely known and understood amongst key groups

of staff, reporting of suspected extremism and radicalisation in prisons is well established and significant work has been undertaken to improve the management of these risks within the offender management system.

10.169 In the key area of interventions – working through bespoke programmes to stop prisoners supporting terrorism – progress has been slower. This is partly because such interventions, in and out of prisons, are still being developed and there is no proven methodology which can be scaled up to manage the risks. Although there has been a great deal of work to understand lessons from other countries, it rarely offers a template for our work here (and in some cases their success may be overstated). But the effect in prisons has been that interventions have only reached a small proportion of the target prison population and have not kept pace with the number of Terrorism Act 2006 (TACT) offenders who have been released. We note that existing programmes and other tactical measures have also been used with those terrorist offenders who have already been released. But there remains a significant risk that prison fails to enable terrorist prisoners to re-evaluate the views which led to their offence and conviction.

10.170 There is also more to do to ensure that *Prevent* is embedded in the work of all prisons and Probation Trusts and *Prevent* concerns are managed seamlessly across prisons and probation.

10.171 Evaluation of impact has been an issue in other areas of *Prevent* and it partly reflects the difficulty of assessing behavioural and cognitive change. Building a knowledge base requires time to assess change and sufficient numbers of cases to draw conclusions. But this will also need to be addressed going forward. Wherever possible, the methods used for evaluation of NOMS interventions need to be coordinated with methods developed for use outside the offender management system (see above, pages 74-81).

10.172 Further research is required by the *Prevent* community to support NOMS' work, in particular on:

- the extent and endurance of radicalising influences experienced in prison after individuals are released; and
- understanding of the impact of both offender management processes and the offender environment, on violent extremism, radicalisation and vulnerable individuals.

10.173 Over the lifetime of this strategy, and in cooperation with partner agencies NOMS will:

- implement screening tools, and the extremist assessment guidance, designed to assist staff to better assess and prevent extremist and terrorist offending and identify suitable interventions and management strategies;
- significantly scale up targeted counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions in prisons and in communities during the licence phase of a sentence;
- establish closer connections between NOMS programmes and wider interventions to support vulnerable people;
- develop research about measures which can mitigate radicalisation, and extremist and terrorist offending;

- update instructions to prisons on managing and reporting on extremist behaviours in custody;
- continue provision of training to prisons and probation staff; and
- replace local prison information and intelligence systems with a national system networked across the prison estate, which will significantly enhance prison information and intelligence management and build a better picture of the extent of radicalisation in prisons.

Young offenders and youth justice

Background

10.174 The Youth Justice Board (YJB) was established by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and has been responsible for oversight of the youth justice system in England and Wales. It has advised Ministers on the operation of, and standards for, the youth justice system; monitored performance, notably of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs); and purchased places for, and placed, children and young people remanded or sentenced to custody.

10.175 YOTs are multi-agency teams involving representatives from the education sector, police and probation, the health sector and Children's Services. YOTs deal with young people from the age of 10-17 both before and after they have offended. In October 2010, the Government announced its intention to abolish the YJB and transfer its key functions into MoJ. YOTs will continue to exist with the YJB's oversight function transferring to the MoJ.

10.176 Young people in the criminal justice system, or on the edge of it, are likely to be the most socially excluded and disadvantaged and can be vulnerable to a number of influences, including radicalisation.

Activity to date

10.177 In 2007, some youth offending practitioners in London, the Midlands and West Yorkshire, and in secure establishments, began to report that some young people were showing signs of extremist behaviour or were already in the process of being radicalised. Some areas requested assistance.

10.178 OSCT subsequently funded 53 projects in YOTs and the secure estate (the institutions where young offenders are housed). The projects aimed to protect vulnerable young people and provided interventions at all stages of the youth offending system from pre-offending through to young people who had been convicted and those that are in custody. Although funding was committed in 2007, most projects did not start until mid-2008 and some of them were not underway until 2009. A substantial amount of training was provided.

10.179 The YJB interventions fell into three categories: universal (those which included a whole community or group, for example, all pupils in a particular school year or all young people in a particular community), prevention (those interventions directed at young people who had not yet offended but were at risk of offending) and targeted (directed at young people already in the criminal justice system who were deemed vulnerable to radicalisation).

10.180 The more targeted work focused on issues of alienation, identity and belonging and provided education (including on faith matters). Projects ranged from targeted mentoring to debates,

large-scale community events and sessions in schools. There was some attempt to include support for parents. Ideology and grievances were covered across the majority of projects.

10.181 Since 2009, young people have accessed the different programmes nearly 17,000 times. Initially, projects were run in areas identified by OSCT, DCLG and the YJB as potential hot-spots. The majority of projects were run by staff in the YOT or the secure estate. Some were run by community organisations.

10.182 In 2008, the YJB, working with OSCT, commissioned the University of Huddersfield to evaluate this work. Early findings suggest the emphasis on Al Qa'ida and, by extension, Muslim communities made project managers and others uneasy and, ultimately, delayed the start of the work. There was also a perceived lack of clarity of what was needed and a strong emphasis on cohesion or integration-type work. However, the research also found that young people who had been through these projects judged them to be helpful against *Prevent* objectives.

10.183 The University of Huddersfield have noted that all of the projects found it difficult to measure impact. We have noted similar problems in other areas of *Prevent*. Practitioners reported that they had difficulty in 'measuring the distance travelled' by young people before and after an intervention had taken place. Many projects relied on participant feedback: this tends not to be a reliable measure. One project sought to develop a psychometric tool for measuring impact but this required considerable resource.

10.184 In October 2010, funding ceased for 33 projects assessed by OSCT and the YJB to be focusing on cohesion-type issues. The remaining 20 projects focused more on de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation. In the future, services of this kind will be made available through YOTs across the country, with a focus on priority areas. YOTs will utilise standardised risk assessment procedures and will have access to community-based support projects and other interventions providers through Channel.

Next steps

10.185 We believe that work to support young offenders and people vulnerable to offending is critical to the long-term success and credibility of *Prevent*. We judge that future work should be focused on ensuring that front-line members of staff are trained to recognise the signs of radicalisation and are aware of the support available to them. This should include a robust understanding of the referral process and the existence and nature of interventions that may be available through a range of providers, including Channel. The YJB and MoJ will work to ensure that any high risk young person that comes to the notice of the youth justice sector will be identified and offered appropriate support.

10.186 In common with many other areas of work, we consider that OSCT should have provided greater clarity on what was required from the outset from the YJB interventions and exercised greater and more consistent levels of oversight and monitoring. Many of the problems identified by the University of Huddersfield could have been overcome with greater clarity from the outset.

10.187 A greater emphasis on localism and a reduction in control from the centre has changed the nature of the youth justice landscape. Future work in this area will therefore need to be focused on supporting YOTs to develop their services locally according to local need. As current YJB

functions become incorporated into MoJ, consideration must be given as to how this strategy can best be implemented.

The charitable sector

Background

10.188 Over 180,000 charities are registered with the Charity Commission in England and Wales. They have an annual income of over £53 billion, assets of a further £52 billion, over 750,000 paid staff and almost 900,000 trustee positions. There are about 80,000 charities which do not have to register because they are very small or because they are 'exempt' or 'excepted'.[101]

10.189 The charitable sector is diverse and ranges from local village halls to national arts organisations to international disaster relief charities. Legitimate charities provide mechanisms for constructive debate and social action to build a strong civil society. Charities can be an important protection against extremism and terrorism.

10.190 The Charity Commission is a non-Ministerial Government Department and the independent regulator with responsibility for overseeing the charitable sector. It has both a compliance and enforcement function intended to protect charities from abuse.

10.191 Charity law (the Charities Act 2006) requires that charities are established and operate for charitable purposes and for the public benefit. Charities by definition are outward-facing and inclusive, not inward-looking or for private benefit. They should not be exclusive 'clubs' that only a few can join. If a charity – such as a student society – runs a debate or education forum that excludes people and is only open to members of a particularly exclusive group this could be judged to be in breach of charity law requirements. Speaker events must have the public benefit in mind.

10.192 Where charities place restrictions on the extent to which the public can benefit from their work, the Commission can take regulatory action to ensure compliance – and can ultimately take action against defaulting trustees.

10.193 Charity law contains provisions about how a charity should raise and use funds. These are important to countering terrorism, and *Prevent* more specifically, because they help ensure that funds are not misused.

10.194 Where a charity is suspected of criminal (including terrorist) activity, it will be referred by the Charity Commission to law enforcement agencies. Any allegations or concerns about abuse of a charity or of charitable funds are dealt with under the Charity Commission's compliance function. The Commission has its own asset freezing powers and regulatory action which can be used to inhibit the flow of funds. Use of these powers must be justified by the evidence to the standards set out in civil law.

[101] Under the Charities Act 2006, only charities with an income of over £5,000 per year must register with the Charity Commission. Certain types of charities are 'excepted' if their income is below £100,000 per year (although this income threshold may be reduced over time). They do not have to register with the Commission but do have to comply with charity law and are regulated by the Commission. This means that the Charity Commission can require them to provide information about their activities and investigate them if they consider that there is cause for concern. 'Exempt' charities are not required to register with the Charity Commission, and the Charity Commission is not their regulator, because they are supervised by another regulator (such as the higher education sector for which the main regulator is HEFCE).

10.195 Trustees play a critical role in monitoring the activities of charities. Charity law places clear obligations on trustees to ensure that finances are used appropriately, prudently, lawfully and in accordance with their purposes. Where trustees are in breach of these obligations, civil and criminal sanctions can follow.

Activity to date

10.196 Charities can be formed to raise funds often under false pretences for terrorist groups, in this country or overseas. More specifically, charities can also raise and move funds for the wider purposes of enabling radicalisation and recruitment activity. Of the Charity Commission's total caseload of 180 investigations in 2009-10, 11 investigations followed allegations or suspicions of terrorist-related activities. Eight of these terrorism-related investigations were completed during the year.

10.197 The Charity Commission has provided support and regulatory guidance which sets out the implications for charities of the UK's counter-terrorism legislation and highlights the Commission's expectations of charity trustees in complying with their obligations under counter-terrorism and charity law.[102]

10.198 But charities can also play a key part in *Prevent*. Some charities can address grievances – such as improving access to basic facilities in developing countries or providing English-language training to facilitate better employment opportunities – which can otherwise be manipulated to draw people towards extremist and terrorist organisations. Civil society, of which charities are a key part, is also a critical place for free exchange of views and the debate which can inhibit the activities of propagandists for extremism and terrorism.

10.199 Charitable status can also provide a basis for the good governance of faith institutions, schools, student unions and (indirectly through HEFCE) universities whose role in *Prevent* can be important.

10.200 In the context of work to build the capacity of mosques, the Charity Commission has worked closely with DCLG and MINAB to help ensure that the finances of UK mosques are transparent and less vulnerable to abuse by terrorists and to encourage mosques to adopt charitable status. In October 2007, 331 mosques were registered with the Charity Commission. In 2009, 650 mosques had registered or had submitted applications to register.

10.201 The Charity Commission has investigated extremist activities, literature and speakers at charity premises and events in both religious organisations and student unions. Its regulatory intervention has, for example, ensured that trustees take greater responsibility for a planned event and decided themselves not to allow a particular speaker to attend. Where necessary, the Commission can use its legal powers to prevent charity money being used to support inappropriate activities and take action against trustees who deliberately ignore their responsibilities under charity law. This action can include suspension.

[102] Charity Commission (2011), *Compliance Toolkit: protecting charities from harm (the 'compliance toolkit')*. London: Charity Commission. See Chapter 1: Charities and Terrorism. Available from: www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Our_regulatory_activity/Counter_terrorism_work/protecting_charities_landing.aspx

Next steps

10.202 As part of the Charity Commission's regulatory work, they will continue to carry out investigations into individual charities including where allegations of terrorist activity or links arise. We believe it is critical that, where criminal behaviour, including terrorism, is suspected, the Charity Commission must refer these cases immediately to the police and, where appropriate, to the Serious Fraud Office.

10.203 It is vital to the Charity Commission's credibility that their relationship with wider law enforcement bodies is seen to be seamless and effective. The Charity Commission must be seen to be capable of taking robust and vigorous action against charities that are involved in terrorist activity or have links to terrorist organisations.

10.204 The wider role of the Charity Commission in *Prevent* is also important. But we do not think it has been fully explored and considered as an issue in its own right, separate from the Charity Commission's role in counter-terrorism more broadly. We need to take this forward as a priority.

Overseas

10.205 We noted above (pages 52-54) that *Prevent* work overseas should wherever possible have the same objectives as *Prevent* work in this country. But we also noted the need for rigorous prioritisation and that projects funded by the FCO should have demonstrable impact on the UK security wherever possible.

10.206 It is clear that some sectors overseas – notably education and faith – can have a significant impact on radicalisation (positive and negative) not only in third countries but also here: a university or a madrassah overseas attended by many UK students would be one example.

10.207 It also seems clear that many of the sectors in this country which we want to support and where radicalisation may be taking place will have their own links overseas.

10.208 But much more work is needed to understand these connections and their relevance to and impact on *Prevent* and then to intervene where it is possible to do so in conjunction with the Government concerned. This work has not been systematically done before. It will now be led by the FCO with input from DfID wherever possible.

10.209 Programmes run overseas by DfID can help to build accountable and legitimate Government institutions with the capacity to deliver the core functions of the state, including security and justice, economic opportunities, and basic services such as education. There is some evidence that institution building of this sort can help *Prevent*.[103] We acknowledge that this is somewhat different from the other work outlined in this objective but recognise the contribution it can make in this area.

[103] Centre for Universal Education (2010) *Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan*. Working Paper No. 2, June 2010. Brookings Institution, Centre for Universal Education.

11. *Prevent* delivery

Summary

This section explains how Prevent *will be implemented in the future.*

It describes the structures that are in place to ensure effective coordination, oversight and accountability and outlines how we will strengthen them. Prevent *will be coordinated from and by OSCT in the Home Office and the Home Secretary will be the lead Minister.*

We explain here the new arrangements and structures that we will put in place for the local delivery of Prevent *and the partnerships which will be the basis for success. In future,* Prevent *will be prioritised according to the risks we face and not (as has been the case in the past) on the basis of demographics. This is a significant development. The 25 priority areas are listed here. We expect these areas to change over time.*

The role of policing has been important in the development of Prevent *to date.* Prevent *is not, however, a police programme and it must not become one: it depends on a wide range of organisations in and out of Government. Some changes to the police role in* Prevent *are essential to enhance confidence in the programme. But we judge that one of the effects of* Prevent *to date has been the improvement in understanding and cooperation between police and communities in this country on a range of issues, including security.*

We anticipate that there will continue to be three main areas of Prevent *funding: local authority work in association with communities; policing; and work overseas. The funding for the first two areas will be provided by the Home Office. The funding for the third will come through the FCO. The balance between funding in these areas will be constantly reviewed.*

It has been a theme in this review that evaluation and performance monitoring have been weak in Prevent *and they must now be improved. Data collection has been inadequate. It has not always been possible to understand what funding has been used for, or what impact projects have had.*

This section also explains how Prevent *has been delivered by devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales.*

Introduction

11.1 In section 6 of this review we considered issues regarding delivery of a new *Prevent* strategy. We said that, as part of our national counter-terrorism strategy, *Prevent* would need to be developed and coordinated by the Home Office in conjunction with other Government Departments but delivered through local authorities, statutory organisations, policing and a wide range of community organisations. We also indicated that *Prevent* funding for local authorities (both posts and projects) would have to be much more tightly defined and directed.

11.2 This section of the review considers delivery issues in more detail.

Governance

11.3 The Home Secretary is responsible for the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. OSCT works to the Home Secretary and is responsible for overall development and evaluation of the strategy. The National Security Council has a key role in assessing the progress and direction of counter-terrorist work in general, including *Prevent* and has approved this strategy.

11.4 OSCT in the Home Office is responsible in particular for developing and coordinating the delivery of *Prevent*. OSCT will: ensure that the objectives and programmes of the strategy are appropriate; coordinate with other central Government Departments engaged in *Prevent*; liaise with local authorities on *Prevent* delivery and funding issues; cooperate with community groups of all kinds with *Prevent* interests; commission *Prevent*-related research, responding to demand by other *Prevent* partners; provide information, training materials and best practice; liaise with international partners; and evaluate *Prevent* progress and performance.

11.5 Other Government Departments will continue to have their own *Prevent* teams responsible for delivery of their contribution to the strategy.

Accountability

11.6 In Parliament, the Home Affairs Committee, the Communities and Local Government Select Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee have all taken a close interest in aspects of *Prevent* in the past.

11.7 Locally, *Prevent* work is accountable to elected councillors and will need to be discussed and considered by the police with new Police and Crime Commissioners. The Government has encouraged Members of Parliament to engage closely with this agenda.

11.8 We believe that *Prevent* would benefit from greater scrutiny and increased levels of independent oversight. For that reason, we intend also to establish a non-executive *Prevent* board to oversee the *Prevent* strategy and its local implementation. There will also be scope to look at DCLG's ongoing work to promote integration and tackle extremism.

11.9 The board will be permanent, with strong, independent membership, but not statutory. Reflecting the importance of local partnerships – and recognising the important connections between *Prevent* and the wider work referred to above – it will be jointly chaired by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Membership of the board is still under consideration.

Local delivery

11.10 The Home Office will fund dedicated *Prevent* coordinators in local areas of particular importance to coordinate local delivery. Funding will be subject to a grant agreement setting out a clear set of focused activities which the post is designed to support. Local authorities will decide how the role should best be integrated into their own organisation structure.

11.11 Under the last strategy, most local authority areas in England developed a partnership structure to facilitate *Prevent* delivery.[104] Some areas created a group specifically focused on *Prevent*, while others used existing crime reduction partnerships or another local multi-agency strategic structure. We expect all local areas to have a partnership tasked to take forward work on *Prevent* using the most appropriate structure in their area and to a level which is proportionate to local risk.

11.12 Wherever possible, the partnership should comprise social services, policing, children's services, youth services, UKBA, representatives from further and higher education, probation services, schools, local prisons, health and others as required by local need. Partnership working should not be restricted by local authority area boundaries. In the past, local authorities have worked together effectively, sometimes sharing and pooling resources. We encourage greater levels of partnership working between local authorities and partners in future.

11.13 We expect partnerships to have in place:

- appropriate accountability, monitoring and evaluation, oversight and commissioning arrangements; and
- an agreed delivery plan based on the three *Prevent* objectives, particularly ensuring that a process is in place to protect vulnerable individuals.

11.14 Local authorities need to be able to draw on information to ensure that they understand the local risks which *Prevent* is intended to address. We continue to believe that CTLPs (drafted by the police) are the right means for distributing information from policing to authorities. Recognising their classified nature, we encourage distribution of these documents to key *Prevent* partners.

Prioritisation

11.15 In future, simple demographics will not be used as the basis for prioritising *Prevent* work. A new prioritisation process will aggregate different information and policing indicators of terrorist activity to understand areas where *Prevent* work needs to be prioritised. We recognise that these indicators are developing and that they do not yet take account of all terrorist risks. Prioritisation will be the responsibility of OSCT and will be regularly reviewed.

11.16 For 2011/12, following an analysis of all local authority areas across the UK, the 25 priority areas are as follows (listed in alphabetical order):

- Barking and Dagenham
- Birmingham
- Blackburn with Darwen

[104] As of September 2010, local *Prevent* progress monitoring collated via the Government Offices indicated that 100% of the 94 local authority funded areas and 85% of the remaining areas had a *Prevent* partnership in place.

- Bradford
- Brent
- Camden
- Derby
- Ealing
- Hackney
- Hammersmith and Fulham
- Haringey
- Kensington and Chelsea
- Lambeth
- Leeds
- Leicester
- Lewisham
- Luton
- Manchester
- Newham
- Redbridge
- Stoke-on-Trent
- Tower Hamlets
- Waltham Forest
- Wandsworth
- Westminster

11.17 Funding will be made available by the Home Office to the 25 priority areas for project work on a grant basis and for activities which address specific local risks and are designed to establish specific Prevent benefits. OSCT will have oversight of funding for projects and will work with local authorities to agree associated evaluation and monitoring procedures. All organisations provided with Prevent money should be able to prove that they are acting in the public interest (see above, pages 49-50).

Policing

11.18 The police have played a central and a vital role in implementing the last *Prevent* strategy. That contribution is reflected throughout this document in work to disrupt people engaged in radicalisation; in support to vulnerable people and the innovative Channel programme; and in work alongside and within key sectors, including education, health, the internet, criminal justice and with faith groups. Policing has played a galvanising role in developing local *Prevent* partnerships and bringing together a wide range of other organisations to support the strategy.

11.19 Central to police work has been a network of *Prevent* coordinators developed in 2008 at both regional and force level. This network has been supported by new *Prevent* Engagement Officers (PEOs) who connect counter-terrorism policing, neighbourhood policing and communities. PEOs have developed community contacts and an understanding of community issues; identified *Prevent*-related risks; generated *Prevent* projects and shared information with *Prevent* partners to support strategic objectives.

11.20 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) form part of Neighbourhood policing teams and work with local communities to provide a visible police presence and build relationships with the public. PCSOs contribute to *Prevent* objectives by helping PEOs to build trust and confidence in policing and create stronger and safer communities.

11.21 In common with other areas of *Prevent*, we have found it hard to assess the overall impact of *Prevent* policing, although for some projects (for example Channel) that is easier than others (for example, support to *Prevent* work in schools). We note polling that indicates that Muslim respondents were more likely than the general population to give a positive appraisal of the police (excellent or good) and least likely to rate the police as 'poor' or 'very poor'.[105] We have seen no evidence that *Prevent* work has damaged police and Muslim community relations. We believe the evidence points in the opposite direction. The police and local communities are now talking to each other about the threat of terrorism – and ways to reduce it – in ways that would have been hard to imagine a few years ago.

11.22 A contributing factor to the trust built in communities has been the extent to which *Prevent* policing officers and staff have represented the communities they have served. In 2010, a staff survey revealed that over 30% of posts were of black or minority ethnicity. This compares to a national average of 4.6% for police officers and 7.4% for police staff.

11.23 On occasions, the police role in *Prevent* has been seen as disproportionate for a programme intended to deal with people who have not yet engaged in illegal activity. There have been allegations – to which we have referred several times in this review – that *Prevent* has been a pretext and means for spying on communities. In the course of this review, some police officers have expressed concern to us that at times they have been left taking responsibility for *Prevent* delivery in some local areas to an extent that they also find unwelcome.

11.24 In the early days of the programme, *Prevent* funding was used by forces to recruit *Prevent* Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) as well as PEOs. Of the 321 new dedicated *Prevent* police officers in 2008, 80 were CTIOs (67 of whom were funded by OSCT), distributed across 42 forces.

[105] Innes, M., Roberts, C. and Innes, H. (2011). *Assessing the effects of Prevent Policing. Cardiff: Universities' Police Science Institute*, Cardiff University. Available from: www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Final%20send%202.pdf

11.25 The role of CTIOs was to work alongside PEOs and neighbourhood policing teams, to inform and guide their community engagement and to determine how local police and partner resources should be focused to deal with any threats.

11.26 Using information in this way is a central, routine element of effective policing. Communities expect local police to act on the information that becomes available to deal with any risks. But the language used to describe this activity encouraged the view that the police may be engaged in covert (rather than overt) activity around *Prevent* which in turn undermined trust. To address these concerns, ACPO and OSCT ceased all future *Prevent* funding of CTIOs from the beginning of the 2011/12 financial year.

11.27 We have noted that funding for *Prevent* policing has been greater than funding for local authorities and that the police have very often been able to recruit more people to deliver *Prevent* than their local authority counterparts. To some degree (but not entirely), that explains the mismatch in burden sharing. It is also true that very often police officers were more familiar with counter-terrorism than others and therefore adapted faster to *Prevent*. We also note that some local authorities have been reluctant to engage in *Prevent*, in some areas reflecting concerns from elected councillors. We believe that this is changing but we are conscious that it remains an issue.

11.28 We regard *Prevent* as a programme which is not owned by policing but in which policing has a central role to play. *Prevent* must be a cross-Government and cross-community programme to meet its objectives. The changes made to this new *Prevent* strategy are intended to address objections to the proportionality of the strategy and the role of the police in it. We have also indicated above that we must keep under close review the balance of investment in policing against local authorities and communities.

11.29 But we are clear that policing has a key role in the delivery of aspects of all three of the objectives set out in this new strategy. We place particular priority on projects to disrupt terrorist and radicalising material on the internet and radicalisers working in this country; the further development of Channel-type projects; and stronger relationships with key sectors, including education, and with faith groups and organisations.

11.30 It is clearly essential that *Prevent* policing develops community trust. We have made clear that the allegations that *Prevent* is a pretext and means of spying undermine that trust. *Prevent* must not be used for this purpose.

11.31 Policing is not devolved in Wales. However, the police operate in a delivery landscape where a number of key delivery organisations are devolved. The Welsh Counter-Terrorism Unit (WECTU) works closely with the Welsh Assembly Government to oversee the implementation of *Prevent*.

Funding

11.32 The bulk of *Prevent* funding hitherto has been spent or distributed by three Government Departments: the Home Office (OSCT), DCLG and the FCO.

11.33 Home Office funding has been broadly divided into three areas: grants to other Government Departments and other related delivery partners (including for training); grants to police forces nationwide to pay for *Prevent* policing; and grants to local organisations for the delivery of

specific interventions work (notably in connection with Channel). Home Office total funding (including funding to the police) was £47 million in 2009/10; and £37 million in 2010/11. In 2011/12, the Home Office has allocated approximately £36 million for *Prevent* activity (including funding to the police).

11.34 In the past, OSCT has funded other Government Departments to deliver a range of different *Prevent* programmes and projects. This will continue. However, OSCT will be looking carefully at where Departments can mainstream *Prevent* into their core business. In many sectors, we are pleased to note that *Prevent* activity is happening without funding from central Government.

The distribution of the £24 million funding for *Prevent* policing in 2010/11 is illustrated below:

Percentage	Activity type	Examples
70%	Police officers and staff in forces and CTUs	*Prevent* Engagement officers working to develop community connections, understand communities, identify risks and share information with partners to support Prevent objectives.
15%	National coordination of *Prevent* by ACPO (TAM)	ACPO (TAM)'s Prevent Delivery Unit supports police forces with their contribution to Prevent by overseeing their delivery of ACPO's Prevent strategy, working with OSCT to allocate resources according to risk, building capability in forces to deliver Prevent activities, developing guidance to instil best practice and rolling out programmes to engage communities in Prevent events..
9%	Channel Coordinators	Channel coordinators lead multi-agency partnerships that evaluate referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and work alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels to provide tailored support.
3%	Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit	A dedicated police unit to assess and investigate terrorism-related illegal internet content and take remedial action.
1%	Development of CTLPs and information sharing	The development of comprehensive assessments of threat, risk and vulnerability in local areas for sharing with police partners.
1%	Training and awareness raising	Developing and delivering police Prevent awareness-raising exercises such as Operation Nicole.
1%	Other activities focusing on engagement with vulnerable individuals	Activity aimed at Muslim communities, enabling discussions with the police and local partners around issues such as radicalisation, supporting vulnerable individuals and terrorism legislation.

11.35 The majority of DCLG funding was provided through the Area Based Grant to local authorities. This comprised £16.55 million in 2009/10 and £17.08 million in 2010/11. In 2009/10, DCLG also established a £3.2 million *Challenge and Innovation Fund* for local authorities not receiving the Area Based Grant. An additional £5.1 million national grant – the *Community Leadership Fund* – was intended to complement work being taken forward by local authorities, supporting leadership capacity within Muslim communities.

11.36 FCO funding for *Prevent* activity overseas was approximately £19 million in 2009/10 and around £17 million in 2010/11. Funding commitments for 2011/12 are currently £10 million.

11.37 DfID does not fund *Prevent* activities directly but its poverty reduction work contributes by tackling the drivers of instability overseas. The recently-completed Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out the Government's commitment to use 30% of Official Development Assistance to support fragile and conflict-affected states and tackle the drivers of instability.

11.38 Changes to funding have been detailed through this paper. We will be looking further at the balance of investment between the three main funding areas (overseas, policing and local authorities). We are providing precisely targeted and dedicated local authority funding for posts and projects.

Performance monitoring, evaluation and value-for-money

11.39 Performance monitoring and evaluation have been a weakness of the *Prevent* strategy. We cannot afford for that to continue.

11.40 In future, before funding is granted, any proposed *Prevent* project will be more rigorously assessed against its ability and likelihood to deliver against *Prevent* objectives. That assessment must generally take into account the extent to which the project can reach the people who are vulnerable to radicalisation: they are a small minority. We will expect clear agreement on what is to be delivered. To better ensure value-for-money we will no longer be contributing to the operating costs of any organisation.

11.41 To justify funding on particular *Prevent* projects, it will be necessary not only to evaluate their likely impact but also to compare the cost and impact of different interventions achieving the same end. This will require additional research resources in support of the *Prevent* programme.

11.42 Progress and performance will be assessed according to the principles of the Government's Public Service Transparency Framework (PSTF). We are developing input and impact indicators across the whole of CONTEST that will help us assess the effect of what we do to reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attack. In line with the spirit of the PSTF to reduce reporting burdens, indicators will be based wherever possible on data which is already collected and used by contributing organisations. For security reasons, not all of these performance assessments will be published, but will be used to report to Ministers on progress and to ensure value for taxpayers' money.

11.43 For *Prevent*, we anticipate indicators around our efforts to challenge ideology and disrupt propagandists for terrorism; the effectiveness of interventions to support vulnerable individuals and work in and with sectors to deal with radicalisation. We will consider 'input' (such as number of individuals within interventions programmes or total expenditure on Prevent in a sector) and 'impact' (such as the number of individuals no longer assessed as being vulnerable or a reduction of risk within a particular geographical area or sector).

11.44 As in criminology, we will commission regular follow-up studies following preliminary evaluation of projects against specific indicators. We will commission research into issues arising from performance assessment.

11.45 Further work is required to quantify benefits from *Prevent*, both direct and indirect. Quantifying direct benefits will (for example) require estimates of the cost of terrorism and the estimated reduction in the probability of a terrorist event following *Prevent* interventions.

11.46 Overseas, the FCO will continue to review its framework for evaluating *Prevent* activity, which includes the capabilities of their DeTECT model, ensuring that it remains fit for purpose in the unpredictable and challenging environments in which the FCO operates.

Prevent delivery in the devolved administrations

Scotland

11.47 The approach to *Prevent* in Scotland has always made a distinction between preventing terrorism and community cohesion and integration. In Scotland, *Prevent* has been more closely aligned to those areas of policy that promote community safety, tackle crime and reduce violence. Agencies in Scotland have defined terrorism on the basis of the rule of Scottish law.

11.48 These first principles of *Prevent* have influenced delivery in Scotland and this has necessarily involved a different style and emphasis. The approach in Scotland could be summarised as follows:

- targeted and intelligence-led, informed by CTLPs with a focus on tackling the primary threats from violent extremists and terrorists;
- deploying mainstreaming approaches to interventions with individuals identified assessed as most vulnerable to violent extremism or terrorism;
- funding of activity rather than staff, by utilising existing organisations and partnership structures, and placing importance on a cost effective, shared services approach;
- focussing on vulnerable institutions like prisons, universities and colleges and community groups in key areas;
- delivering proportionate interventions in schools;
- actively promoting links between *Prevent* and other elements of the CONTEST strategy; and,
- establishing streamlined planning, delivery, monitoring and evaluation structures with a focus on impact and value-for-money.

11.49 The CONTEST Scotland Board, which oversees delivery of *Prevent* in Scotland, has played an active role with regard to the UK Government-led *Prevent* review and it has recently completed its own evaluation of Prevent delivery in Scotland. This review describes good progress made in key areas since 2008 with a number of national and local statutory and voluntary sector partners. It also confirms the need to progress with *Prevent* delivery in Scotland in future years.

Wales

11.50 In 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 was passed, allowing for the creation of the first National Assembly for Wales. Eight years later the Government of Wales Act 2006 was passed giving the Assembly the powers to pass Welsh Laws, known as Assembly Measures.

11.51 On 3 March 2011 a further referendum was held in which 63.7% voted for further law-making powers. In the future, the Welsh Assembly will be able to make laws in all the areas for which the Assembly Government has responsibility. The areas in which the Welsh Assembly will be able to pass its own legislation include several areas critical to *Prevent* delivery such as education, health, housing and local government.

Prevent *in Wales*

11.52 Historically, the Welsh Assembly Government's approach to *Prevent* has been firmly rooted in wider work to promote to community cohesion. Currently, *Prevent* is the responsibility of the Minister for Social Justice and Local Government. Work in this area is directed by the strategy 'Getting on Together: A Community Cohesion Strategy for Wales', which was launched in December 2009.

Governance

11.53 The Wales CONTEST Board was established in March 2008 to coordinate the implementation of all aspects of CONTEST in Wales, and is jointly chaired by ACPO Cymru and the Welsh Assembly Government.

11.54 All 22 Welsh Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) have set up Prevent sub-groups based on local authority boundaries. Their members are from a range of organisations – some of which are not devolved (the police, for example) and some which are (health, for example). Since 2009, the Home Office Crime Team Wales has worked closely with the CSPs to ensure that Prevent was delivered at a local level. In addition, the All Wales Community Safety Forum has undertaken the role of providing oversight of Prevent in Wales, helping to shape and take forward work discussed at the Wales CONTEST Board.

Activity in Wales

11.55 The Welsh Assembly Government has also directly funded in 2010 a number of *Prevent*-related initiatives such as Training and Awareness days, a Foundation course on Muslim thought and ethics for those in regular contact with significant numbers of Muslim young people, Muslim Chaplaincy training, support for the formation of the Council of Mosques and Muslim Organisations in Newport (COMMON) and workshops and conferences exploring extremist rhetoric with young people.

11.56 Wales has also run a Home Office-funded pilot scheme called Faith in the Future which supports Muslim prisoners in prison and on release. Faith in the Future has been established by a steering group consisting of NOMS Cymru, the Welsh Assembly Government and the Muslim Council of Wales.

11.57 In 2009, a grant was awarded to the Muslim Council of Wales to develop a three-year programme of work to build the capacity of mosques, as well as Muslim youth and women's organisations, with the overall aim of increasing the resilience of Muslim communities in Wales.

Funding

11.58 The Community Cohesion Fund (£5 million over three years) supports the implementation of the Community Cohesion Strategy for Wales. It has been allocated to all 22 local authorities in Wales and can be used to support activities that promote community cohesion or in tackling various forms of extremism. A Community Cohesion Grant has also been made available to the four most ethnically diverse local authorities in Wales (Cardiff, Swansea, Newport, and Wrexham) for three years from 2009-10. Each authority receives £150,000 over the three-year period. This money can be spent on cohesion or Prevent projects.

Northern Ireland

11.59 Under the Northern Ireland constitutional settlement, national security remains the sole responsibility of the UK Government. For the most part, UK-wide counter-terrorism legislation applies in Northern Ireland and remains the responsibility of the UK Government. However, following the devolution of policing and justice matters in April 2010, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice is responsible for policing and criminal justice policy matters. In addition, most of the levers which are relevant to the work of *Prevent* are devolved and are the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

11.60 In Northern Ireland, unlike the rest of the United Kingdom, the principal threat from terrorism comes from Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups. While the *Prevent* strategy does not directly apply to Northern Ireland-related terrorism, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland works closely with Ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive to counter the threat posed by these groups..

12. Annex A: Glossary of terms

Introduction

There are many terms and expressions used in discussion and debate about *Prevent*. This glossary sets out what we mean when we use a particular word or phrase. These definitions relate to *Prevent* and are not always authoritative in any wider context. Some of the more contentious, or most heavily-used, terms are listed below. We draw particular attention to the way in which this document uses the terms extremism, radicalisation and terrorism.

Glossary

Counter-radicalisation usually refers to activity aimed at a group of people intended to dissuade them from engaging in terrorism-related activity.

De-radicalisation usually refers to activity aimed at a person who supports terrorism and in some cases has engaged in terrorist related activity, which is intended to effect cognitive and/or behavioural change leading to a new outlook on terrorism and/or disengagement from it.

Disengagement in the context of this document is the process whereby an individual ceases to be involved terrorism.

Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

An **ideology** is a set of beliefs. An **ideologue** is a proponent as well as an adherent of an ideology.

An **insurgent** is an individual who fights against a government or an occupying force with the aim of overthrowing it.

Interventions are projects intended to divert people who are being drawn into terrorist activity. Interventions can include mentoring, counselling, theological support, encouraging civic engagement, developing support networks (family and peer structures) or providing mainstream services (education, employment, health, finance or housing).

Islamism is a philosophy which, in the broadest sense, promotes the application of Islamic values to modern government. There are no commonly agreed definitions of 'Islamism' and 'Islamist', and groups or individuals described as Islamist often have very different aims and views about how those aims might be realised.

Some militant Islamists would endorse violence or terrorism to achieve their aims. Many Islamists do not.

Prevention in the context of this document means reducing or eliminating the risk of individuals becoming involved in terrorism. *Prevent* involves the identification and referral of those susceptible to violent extremism into appropriate interventions. These interventions aim to divert the susceptible from embarking down the path to radicalisation.

Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.

A **radicaliser** is an individual who encourages others to develop or adopt beliefs and views supportive of terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.

Radicalising locations are venues, often unsupervised, where the process of radicalisation takes place. Locations include public spaces, for example university campuses and mosques, as well as private/more concealed locations such as homes, cafes, and bookstores.

Radicalising materials include literature or videos that are used by radicalisers to encourage or reinforce individuals to adopt a violent ideology. Some of this material may explicitly encourage violence. Other materials may take no avowed position on violence but make claims to which violence is subsequently presented as the only solution.

Resilience in the context of this document means the capability of people, groups and communities to rebut and reject proponents of terrorism and the ideology they promote.

Safeguarding is the process of protecting vulnerable people, whether from crime, other forms of abuse or (in the context of this document) from being drawn into terrorism-related.

The term **Single narrative** is sometimes used to refer to the particular interpretation of religion, history and politics that is associated with Al Qa'ida and like minded groups. The narrative connects 'grievances' at a local and/or global level, reinforces the portrayal of Muslims as victims of Western injustice and thereby purports to legitimise terrorism. It combines fact, fiction, emotion and religion and manipulates discontent about local and international issues. The single narrative is also sometimes known as the Al Qa'ida Narrative, the Grand Narrative or the Global Extremist Narrative.

The current UK definition of **terrorism** is given in the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT 2000). In summary this defines terrorism as an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

Vulnerability describes the condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within *Prevent*, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation.

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HM Government

Revised *Prevent* Duty Guidance: for England and Wales

Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

Originally issued on 12th March 2015 and revised on 16th July 2015

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A. Status and Scope of the Duty

Statutory guidance issued under section 29 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

1. Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the Act) places a duty on certain bodies ("specified authorities" listed in Schedule 6 to the Act), in the exercise of their functions, to have "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism". This guidance is issued under section 29 of the Act. The Act states that the authorities subject to the provisions must have regard to this guidance when carrying out the duty.

2. The list of specified authorities subject to the provisions can be found in Schedule 6 to the Act. Further details can be found in the sector-specific sections of this guidance.

3. The duty applies to specified authorities in England and Wales, and Scotland. Counter terrorism is the responsibility of the UK Government. However, many of the local delivery mechanisms in Wales and Scotland, such as health, education and local government, are devolved. We will ensure close cooperation with the Scottish and Welsh Governments in implementing the Prevent duty where there are interdependencies between devolved and non-devolved elements. There is separate guidance for specified authorities in Scotland.

4. The duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority. The term "due regard" as used in the Act means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions. This purpose of this guidance is to assist authorities to decide what this means in practice.

B. Introduction

5. The Prevent strategy, published by the Government in 2011, is part of our overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The aim of the *Prevent* strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. In the Act this has simply been expressed as the need to "prevent people from being drawn into terrorism".

6. The 2011 *Prevent* strategy has three specific strategic objectives:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address.

7. Terrorist groups often draw on extremist ideology, developed by extremist organisations. Some people who join terrorist groups have previously been members of extremist organisations and have been radicalised by them. The Government has defined extremism in the *Prevent* strategy as: "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces".

8. The *Prevent* strategy was explicitly changed in 2011 to deal with all forms of terrorism and with non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists then exploit. It also made clear that preventing people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism requires challenge to extremist ideas where they are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. And the strategy also means intervening to stop people moving from extremist (albeit legal) groups into terrorist-related activity.

9. Our *Prevent* work is intended to deal with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. The most significant of these threats is currently from terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, and Al Qa'ida associated groups. But terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat to our safety and security.

10. Islamist extremists regard Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a 'war with Islam', creating a narrative of 'them'and'us'. Their ideology includes the uncompromising belief that people cannot be both Muslim and British, and that Muslims living here should not participate in our democracy. Islamist extremists specifically attack the principles of civic participation and social cohesion. These extremists purport to identify grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution.

11. The white supremacist ideology of extreme right-wing groups has also provided both the inspiration and justification for people who have committed extreme right-wing terrorist acts.

12. In fulfilling the duty in section 26 of the Act, we expect all specified authorities to participate fully in work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. How they do this, and the extent to which they do this, will depend on many factors, for example, the age of the individual, how much interaction they have with them, etc. The specified authorities in Schedule 6 to the Act are those judged to have a role in protecting vulnerable people and/or our national security. The duty is likely to be relevant to fulfilling other responsibilities such as the duty arising from section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

13. This guidance identifies best practice for each of the main sectors and describes ways in which they can comply with the duty. It includes sources of further advice and provides information on how compliance with the duty will be monitored. Sector-specific guidance for Further Education and Higher Education institutions subject to the Prevent duty has been published separately and should be read alongside this guidance.

C. A risk-based approach to the *Prevent* duty

14. In complying with the duty all specified authorities, as a starting point, should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area, institution or body. This risk will vary greatly and can change rapidly; but no area, institution or body is risk free. Whilst the type and scale of activity that will address the risk will vary, all specified authorities will need to give due consideration to it.

15. There are three themes throughout the sector-specific guidance, set out later in this document: effective leadership, working in partnership and appropriate capabilities.

Leadership

16. For all specified authorities, we expect that those in leadership positions:

- estalish or use existing mechanisms for understanding the risk of radicalisation;
- ensure staff understand the risk and build the capabilities to deal with it;

- communicate and promote the importance of the duty; and
- ensure staff implement the duty effectively.

Working in partnership

17. Prevent work depends on effective partnership. To demonstrate effective compliance with the duty, specified authorities must demonstrate evidence of productive co-operation, in particular with local Prevent co-ordinators, the police and local authorities, and co-ordination through existing multi-agency forums, for example Community Safety Partnerships.

Capabilities

18. Frontline staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to be aware of what we mean by the term "extremism" and the relationship between extremism and terrorism (see section B, above).

19. Staff need to know what measures are available to prevent people from becoming drawn into terrorism and how to challenge the extremist ideology that can be associated with it. They need to understand how to obtain support for people who may be being exploited by radicalising influences.

20. All specified authorities subject to the duty will need to ensure they provide appropriate training for staff involved in the implementation of this duty. Such training is now widely available.

Sharing information

21. The *Prevent* programme must not involve any covert activity against people or communities. But specified authorities may need to share personal information to ensure, for example, that a person at risk of radicalisation is given appropriate support (for example on the Channel programme). Information sharing must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and is governed by legislation. To ensure the rights of individuals are fully protected, it is important that information sharing agreements are in place at a local level. When considering sharing personal information, the specified authority should take account of the following:

- necessity and proportionality: personal information should only be shared where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public;
- consent: wherever possible the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before sharing any information about them;
- power to share: the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998;
- Data Protection Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality: in engaging with non-public bodies, the specified authority should ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act and any confidentiality obligations that exist.

22. There may be some circumstances where specified authorities, in the course of *Prevent*-related work, identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal terrorist-related activity. People suspected of being involved in such activity must be referred to the police.

D. Monitoring and enforcement

23. All specified authorities must comply with this duty and will be expected to maintain appropriate records to show compliance with their responsibilities and provide reports when requested.

Central support and monitoring

24. The Home Office currently oversees *Prevent* activity in local areas which have been identified as priorities for this programme, and will provide central monitoring for the new duty. The Home Office shares management (with local authorities) of local *Prevent* co-ordinator teams.

25. The Home Office will:

- draw together data about implementation of Prevent from local and regional Prevent co-ordinators (including those in health, further and higher education), the police, intelligence agencies and other departments and inspection bodies where appropriate;
- monitor and assess Prevent delivery in up to 50 Prevent priority areas;
- maintain contact with relevant departments and escalate issues to them and inspectorates where appropriate;
- support the *Prevent* Oversight Board, chaired by the Minister for Immigration and Security, which may agree on further action to support implementation of the duty.

26. Where a specified body is not complying with the duty, the *Prevent* Oversight Board may recommend that the Secretary of State use the power of direction under section 30 of the Act. This power would only be used when other options for engagement and improvement had been exhausted. The power would be used only to ensure the implementation and delivery of the *Prevent* duty. It is also capable of being exercised in respect of Welsh specified authorities, and would be used following consultation with Welsh Ministers.

Inspection regime in individual sectors

27. Central support and monitoring will be supported by existing inspection regimes in specific sectors. Not every specified authority has a suitable inspection regime and in some areas it may be necessary to create or enhance existing regimes.

28. We will work with the Welsh Government on *Prevent* monitoring arrangements and provide support to Welsh inspection regimes as required.

E. Sector-specific guidance

Local authorities

29. With their wide-ranging responsibilities, and democratic accountability to their electorate, local authorities are vital to *Prevent* work. Effective local authorities will be working with their local partners to protect the public, prevent crime and to promote strong, integrated communities.

Specified local authorities

30. The local authorities that are subject to the duty are listed in Schedule 6 to the Act. They are:

- a county council or district council in England;
- the Greater London Authority;
- a London borough council;
- the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority;
- the Council of the Isles of Scilly;
- a county council or county borough council in Wales; and
- a person carrying out a function of an authority mentioned in section 1 (2) of the Local Government Act 1999 by virtue of a direction made under section 15 of that Act.

31. Other local authorities, including stand-alone fire and rescue authorities, are not listed in the Act and are not subject to the duty, but it is anticipated, considering their wider prevention role, that in many areas they will be partners in local efforts to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

32. In fulfilling the new duty, local authorities, including elected members and senior officers should be carrying out activity in the following areas.

Partnership

33. Local authorities should establish or make use of an existing local multi-agency group to agree risk and co-ordinate *Prevent* activity. Many local authorities use Community Safety Partnerships but other multi-agency forums may be appropriate.

34. It is likely that links will need to be made to other statutory partnerships such as Local Safeguarding Children Boards Safeguarding Adults Boards, Channel panels and Youth Offending Teams.

35. It will be important that local or regional *Prevent* co-ordinators have access to senior local authority leadership to give advice and support.

36. We expect local multi-agency arrangements to be put in place to effectively monitor the impact of *Prevent* work.

37. *Prevent* work conducted through local authorities will often directly involve, as well as have an impact on local communities. Effective dialogue and coordination with community-based organisations will continue to be essential.

Risk assessment

38. We expect local authorities to use the existing counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs), produced for every region by the police, to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism. This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit. Guidance on CTLPs is available here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118203/counter-terrorism-local-profiles.pdf

39. This risk assessment should also be informed by engagement with Prevent co-ordinators, schools, registered childcare providers, universities, colleges, local prisons, probation services, health, immigration enforcement Youth Offending Teams and others, as well as by a local authority's own knowledge of its area.

40. We would expect local authorities to incorporate the duty into existing policies and procedures, so it becomes part of the day-to-day work of the authority. The duty is likely to be relevant to fulfilling safeguarding responsibilities in that local authorities should ensure that there are clear and robust safeguarding policies to identify children at risk. This guidance should be read in conjunction with other relevant safeguarding guidance, in particular Working Together to Safeguard Children (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguard-children).

Action plan

41. With the support of co-ordinators and others as necessary, any local authority that assesses, through the multi-agency group, that there is a risk should develop a Prevent action plan. This will enable the local authority to comply with the duty and address whatever risks have been identified.

42. These local action plans will identify, prioritise and facilitate delivery of projects, activities or specific interventions to reduce the risk of people being drawn into terrorism in each local authority. Many of these projects and activities will be community based.

Staff training

43. Local authorities will be expected to ensure appropriate frontline staff, including those of it's contractors, have a good understanding of Prevent are trained to recognise vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism and are aware of available programmes to deal with this issue.

44. Local authority staff will be expected to make appropriate referrals to Channel (a programme which provides support to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism which is put on a statutory footing by Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) and ensure that Channel is supported by the appropriate organisation and expertise. Guidance on the Channel programme can be found here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance

Use of local authority resources

45. In complying with the duty we expect local authorities to ensure that publicly-owned venues and resources do not provide a platform for extremists and are not used to disseminate extremist views. This includes considering whether IT equipment available to the general public should use filtering solutions that limit access to terrorist and extremist material.

46. We expect local authorities to ensure that organisations who work with the local authority on Prevent are not engaged in any extremist activity or espouse extremist views.

47. Where appropriate, we also expect local authorities to take the opportunity when new contracts for the delivery of their services are being made to ensure that the principles of the duty are written in to those contracts in a suitable form.

Collaboration between areas

48. In two-tier areas, county and district councils will need to agree proportionate arrangements for sharing the assessment of risk and for agreeing local *Prevent* action plans. It is expected that neighbouring areas will also agree proportionate arrangements for sharing the assessment of risk and for agreeing local *Prevent* action plans as appropriate.

Prevent priority areas

49. The Home Office will continue to identify priority areas for *Prevent*-related activity. Priority areas will, as now, be funded to employ a local *Prevent* co-ordinator to give additional support and expertise and additional Home Office grant funding is available for Prevent projects and activities. The Home Office will continue to have oversight of local *Prevent* co-ordinators and the funding, evaluation and monitoring of these projects.

Other agencies and organisations supporting children

50. A range of private and voluntary agencies and organisations provide services or, in some cases, exercise functions in relation to children. The duty applies to those bodies, which include, for example, children's homes and independent fostering agencies and bodies exercising local authority functions whether under voluntary delegation arrangements or via the use of statutory intervention powers. These bodies should ensure they are part of their local authorities' safeguarding arrangements and that staff are aware of and know how to contribute to *Prevent*-related activity in their area where appropriate.

Out-of-school settings supporting children

51. Many children attend a range of out-of-school settings other than childcare including supplementary schools, and tuition centres to support home education. These settings are not regulated under education law. Local authorities should take steps to understand the range of activity and settings in their areas and take appropriate and proportionate steps to ensure that children attending such settings are properly safeguarded (which should include considering whether children attending such settings are at risk of being drawn into extremism or terrorism). In assessing the risks associated with such settings, local authorities should have regard to whether the settings subscribe to voluntary accreditation schemes and any other evidence about the extent to which the providers are taking steps to safeguard the children in their care. Where safeguarding concerns arise, local authorities should actively consider how to make use of the full range of powers available to them to reduce the risks to children, including relevant planning and health and safety powers.

Monitoring and enforcement

52. In fulfilling its central monitoring role (section D above) the Home Office can (and already does) scrutinise local *Prevent* action plans, project impact and overall performance. It will also consider work with local authority 'peers' to provide targeted assistance and help authorities develop good practice.

53. The Government anticipates that local authorities will comply with this duty and work effectively with local partners to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Where there are concerns about compliance, the Government may need to consider the appropriateness of using existing mechanisms such as section 10 of the Local Government Act 1999. This allows the Secretary of State to appoint an inspector to assess an authority's compliance with its statutory "best value" duty in relation to one or more of the specified functions.

54. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a council in England has failed to discharge its "best value" duty in relation to the new *Prevent* duty, it would be open to him to use his powers under Section 15 of the Local Government Act 1999 to intervene. This could include requiring the council to undertake specific actions, appointing Commissioners and transferring some of the council's functions to them. The Secretary of State must consult the council before issuing a direction. The Secretary of State may also direct a local inquiry to be held into the exercise by the authority of specified functions. Welsh Ministers' powers of intervention in relation to a Welsh council that has failed to discharge its "improvement" duties are set out in the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2009.

55. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a local authority is failing to perform any function relating to education, childcare or children's social care to an adequate standard he may use his powers under section 497A or the Education Act 1996 (applied to childcare under section 15(3) of the Children's Act, and children's social care under section 50(1) of the Children Act 2004) to take whatever action is deemed expedient to achieve necessary improvement. In Wales, Welsh Ministers have the power to intervene under the School Standards and Organisation (Wales) Act 2013. These intervention measures are considered in cases where Ofsted inspections (or Estyn in Wales) identify inadequate practice and serious concerns about practice in relation to safeguarding, adoption and looked-after children. The Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales (CSSIW) has a role here in terms of care settings and standards.

56. In addition to the powers above, the Act provides the Secretary of State with the power to issue a direction where a local authority has failed to discharge the duty (see paragraph 26, above).

Schools and registered childcare providers (excluding higher and further education).

57. In England about eight million children are educated in some 23,000 publicly-funded and around 2,400 independent schools. The publicly-funded English school system comprises maintained schools (funded by local authorities), and academies (directly funded by central government. In Wales, over 450,000 children attend Local Authority maintained schools, and there are 70 independent schools.[1]

58. All publicly-funded schools in England are required by law to teach a broad and balanced curriculum which promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils and prepares them for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of life. They must also promote community cohesion. Independent schools set their own curriculum but must comply with the Independent School Standards, which include an explicit requirement to promote fundamental British values as part of broader requirements relating to the quality of education and to promoting the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils. These standards also apply to academies (other than 16-19 academies), including free schools, as they are independent schools. 16-19 academies may have these standards imposed on them by the provisions of their funding agreement with the Secretary of State.

59. In Wales, independent schools set their own curriculum, but must comply with Independent Schools Standards made by the Welsh Ministers. These Standards also include a requirement to promote the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils.

60. Early years providers serve arguably the most vulnerable and impressionable members of society. The Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) accordingly places clear duties on providers to keep children safe and promote their welfare. It makes clear that to protect children in their care, providers must be alert to any safeguarding and child protection issues in the child's life at home or elsewhere (paragraph 3.4 EYFS). Early years providers must take action to protect children from harm and should be alert to harmful behaviour by other adults in the child's life.

61. Early years providers already focus on children's personal, social and emotional development The Early Years Foundation Stage framework supports early years providers to do this in an age appropriate way, through ensuring children learn right from wrong, mix and share with other children and value other's views, know about similarities and differences between themselves and others, and challenge negative attitudes and stereotypes.

62. This guidance should be read in conjunction with other relevant guidance. In England, this includes Working Together to Safeguard Children, Keeping Children Safe in Education and Information Sharing: Her Majesty's Government advice for professionals providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguard-children;

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/keeping-children-safe-in-education;

63. In Wales it should be read alongside Keeping learners safe[2]:

http://wales.gov.uk/docs/dcells/publications/150114-keeping-learners-safe.pdf.

64. The authorities specified in paragraph 65 below are subject to the duty to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an

[1] Schools Census results on Wales.gov.uk

[2] Keeping Learners Safe includes advice on radicalisation on page 51

atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit. Schools should be safe spaces in which children and young people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas. The Prevent duty is not intended to limit discussion of these issues. Schools should, however, be mindful of their existing duties to forbid political indoctrination and secure a balanced presentation of political issues. These duties are imposed on maintained schools by sections 406 and 407 of the Education Act 1996. Similar duties are placed on the proprietors of independent schools, including academies (but not 16-19 academies) by the Independent School Standards.

Education and childcare specified authorities

65. The education and childcare specified authorities in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- the proprietors[3] of maintained schools, non-maintained special schools, maintained nursery schools, independent schools (including academies and free schools) and alternative provision academies[4]
- pupil referral units
- registered early years childcare providers[5]
- registered later years childcare providers[6]
- providers of holiday schemes for disabled children
- persons exercising local authority functions under a direction of the Secretary of State when the local authority is performing inadequately; and
- persons authorised by virtue of an order made under section 70 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 to exercise a function specified in Schedule 36A to the Education Act 1996.

66. In fulfilling the new duty, we would expect the specified authorities listed above to demonstrate activity in the following areas.

Risk assessment

67. Specified authorities are expected to assess the risk of children being drawn into terrorism, including support for extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology. This should be based on an understanding, shared with partners, of the potential risk in the local area.

68. Specified authorities will need to demonstrate that they are protecting children and young people from being drawn into terrorism by having robust safeguarding policies in place to identify children at risk, and intervening as appropriate. Institutions will need to consider the level of risk to identify the most appropriate referral, which could include Channel or Children's Social Care, for example. These policies should set out clear protocols for ensuring that any visiting speakers – whether invited by staff or by children themselves – are suitable and appropriately supervised.

Working in partnership

69. In England, governing bodies and proprietors of all schools and registered childcare providers should ensure that their safeguarding arrangements take into account the policies and procedures of the Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB). In Wales, Local Service Boards provide strategic oversight.

[3] Reference in this guidance to the 'proprietor' in the case of a maintained school, maintained nursery school and non-maintained special school is a reference to the governing body of the school.

[4] Including early years and later years childcare provision in schools that is exempt from registration under the Childcare Act 2006

[5] Those registered under Chapter 2or 2a of Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006, including childminders

[6] Those registered under Chapter 3 or 2a of Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006, including childminders

Staff training

70. Specified authorities should make sure that staff have training that gives them the knowledge and confidence to identify children at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and to challenge extremist ideas which can be used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. They should know where and how to refer children and young people for further help. *Prevent* awareness training will be a key part of this.

IT policies

71. Specified authorities will be expected to ensure children are safe from terrorist and extremist material when accessing the internet in school, including by establishing appropriate levels of filtering.

Monitoring and enforcement

72. The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) inspects the specified authorities in England listed above, with the exception of some privately funded independent schools. When assessing the effectiveness of schools, Ofsted inspectors already have regard to the school's approach to keeping pupils safe from the dangers of radicalisation and extremism, and what is done when it is suspected that pupils are vulnerable to these. Maintained schools are subject to intervention, and academies and free schools may be subject to termination of their funding agreement, if they are judged by Ofsted to require significant improvement or special measures, or if they fail to take the steps required by their local authority, or for academies or free schools by the Secretary of State pursuant to their funding agreement, as applicable, to address unacceptably low standards, serious breakdowns of management or governance or if the safety of pupils or staff is threatened. In Wales, all publicly funded schools are inspected by Estyn.

73. Ofsted inspects 16-19 academies under the Common Inspection Framework for further education and skills.

74. Privately funded independent schools in England are inspected by Ofsted or one of three independent inspectorates. In Wales, Estyn inspects independent schools.If they fail to meet the Independent School Standards, they must remedy the problem or be subject to regulatory action by the Department for Education or the Welsh Government, which could include de-registration (which would make their continued operation unlawful).

75. Early education funding regulations in England have been amended to ensure that providers who fail to promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance for those with different faiths and beliefs do not receive funding from local authorities for the free early years entitlement.

76. Ofsted's current inspection framework for early years provision reflects the requirements in the Statutory Framework for the Early Years Foundation Stage.

The health sector

77. Healthcare professionals will meet and treat people who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit.

78. The key challenge for the healthcare sector is to ensure that, where there are signs that someone has been or is being drawn into terrorism, the healthcare worker is trained to recognise those signs correctly and is aware of and can locate available support, including the Channel programme where necessary. Preventing someone from being drawn into terrorism is substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including child abuse or domestic violence.

79. There are already established arrangements in place, which we would expect to be built on in response to the statutory duty.

Health specified authorities

80. The health specified authorities in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- NHS Trusts
- NHS Foundation Trusts

81. NHS England has incorporated *Prevent* into its safeguarding arrangements, so that *Prevent* awareness and other relevant training is delivered to all staff who provide services to NHS patients. These arrangements have been effective and should continue.

82. The Chief Nursing Officer in NHS England has responsibility for all safeguarding, and a safeguarding lead, working to the Director of Nursing, is responsible for the overview and management of embedding the *Prevent* programme into safeguarding procedures across the NHS.

83. Each regional team in the NHS has a Head of Patient Experience who leads on safeguarding in their region. They are responsible for delivery of the *Prevent* strategy within their region and the health regional *Prevent* co-ordinators (RPCs).

84. These RPCs are expected to have regular contact with *Prevent* leads in NHS organisations to offer advice and guidance.

85. In Wales, NHS Trusts and Health Boards have CONTEST Prevent leads and part of multi-agency structures where these are in place. This guidance should be read in conjunction with *Building Partnerships-Staying Safe* issued by the Department of Health and Social Services, which provides advice to healthcare organisations on their role in preventing radicalisation of vulnerable people as part of their safeguarding responsibilities.

86. In fulfilling the duty, we would expect health bodies to demonstrate effective action in the following areas.

Partnership

87. All Sub Regions within the NHS should, under the NHS England Accountability and Assurance Framework, have in place local Safeguarding Forums, including local commissioners and providers of NHS Services. These forums have oversight of compliance with the duty, and ensure effective delivery. Within each area, the RPCs are responsible for promoting *Prevent* to providers and commissioners of NHS services, supporting organisations to embed *Prevent* into their policies and procedures, and delivering training.

88. We would expect there to be mechanisms for reporting issues to the National Prevent sub board.

89. We would also expect the *Prevent* lead to have networks in place for their own advice and support to make referrals to the Channel programme.

90. Since April 2013 commissioners have used the NHS Standard Contract for all commissioned services excluding Primary Care, including private and voluntary organisations. Since that time, the Safeguarding section of the contract

has required providers to embed *Prevent* into their delivery of services, policies and training. This should now be bolstered by the statutory duty.

Risk Assessment

91. All NHS Trusts in England have a *Prevent* lead who acts as a single point of contact for the health regional *Prevent* co-ordinators, and is responsible for implementing *Prevent* within their organisation. To comply with the duty, staff are expected, as a result of their training, to recognise and refer those at risk of being drawn into terrorism to the *Prevent* lead who may make a referral to the Channel programme. Regional health Prevent co-ordinators are able to provide advice and support to staff as required. In Wales, Health is a member of the Wales Contest Board and similar arrangements are in place.

Staff Training

92. The intercollegiate guidance, S*afeguarding Children and Young people: roles and competences for health care staff* includes *Prevent* information and identifies competencies for all healthcare staff against six levels.

93. The training should allow all relevant staff to recognise vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism, (which includes someone with extremist ideas that are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups), including extremist ideas which can be used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups, and be aware of what action to take in response, including local processes and policies that will enable them to make referrals to the Channel programme and how to receive additional advice and support.

94. It is important that staff understand how to balance patient confidentiality with the duty. They should also be made aware of the information sharing agreements in place for sharing information with other sectors, and get advice and support on confidentiality issues when responding to potential evidence that someone is being drawn into terrorism, either during informal contact or consultation and treatment.

95. We would therefore expect providers to have in place:

- Policies that include the principles of the *Prevent* NHS guidance and toolkit, which are set out in *Building Partnerships, Staying Safe: guidance for healthcare organisations,* which can be found here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/215253/dh_131912.pdf

- A programme to deliver Prevent training, resourced with accredited facilitators;
- Processes in place to ensure that using the intercollegiate guidance, staff receive Prevent awareness training appropriate to their role; and
- Procedures to comply with the Prevent Training and Competencies Framework.

Monitoring and enforcement

96.Within the NHS, we expect local safeguarding forums, including local commissioners and providers of NHS Services to have oversight of fulfilling the duty and ensuring effective delivery.

97. Externally, Monitor is the sector regulator for health services in England ensuring that independent NHS Foundation Trusts are well led so that they can provide quality care on a sustainable basis. The Trust Development Authority is responsible for overseeing the performance of NHS Trusts and the Care Quality Commission is the independent health and adult social care regulator that ensures these services provide people with safe, effective and high quality care. In Wales, the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, and the Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales could be considered to provide monitoring arrangements. We will work with the Welsh Government to consider the arrangements in Wales.

98. We are considering whether these internal arrangements are robust enough to effectively monitor compliance with the duty or whether the duty should be incorporated into the remit and inspection regimes of one of the existing health regulatory bodies, or another body.

Prisons and probation

99. As an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) is responsible for protecting the public and reducing re-offending through delivery of prison and probation services.

100. There are 122 prisons in England and Wales including 14 prisons operated under contract by private sector organisations. There are around 85,000 prisoners in custody at any one time
and 150,000 individuals in custody during a 12 month period.

101. Probation services are delivered by the National Probation Service (NPS), which supervises high-risk and other serious offenders, and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs), which supervise low and medium-risk offenders. NOMS is currently responsible for around 220,000 offenders under probation supervision, subject either to community sentences or to licence conditions after release from custody.

102. This responsibility for public protection and reducing re-offending gives both prisons and probation services a clear and important role both in working with offenders convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offences and in preventing other offenders from being drawn into terrorism and the extremist ideas that are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups.

Criminal justice specified authorities

103. The criminal justice specified authorities listed in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- prisons and Young Offender Institutions (YOI), including those that are contracted out;
- the under-18 secure estate (under-18 YOI, Secure training centres and Secure care homes;
- secure training centres;
- the National Probation Service; and
- Community Rehabilitation Companies.

Prisons

104. NOMS manages the risk of offenders being drawn into, or reverting to, any form of offending as part of its core business (identifying and managing the risks presented by offenders).

105. To comply with the duty we would expect public and contracted out prisons to carry out activity in the following areas.

Preliminary risk assessment

106. Prisons should perform initial risk assessments on reception, including cell-sharing risk assessments, and initial reception and induction interviews to establish concerns in relation to any form of extremism, be that faith based, animal rights, environmental, far right, far left extremism or any new emerging trends.

107. Contact with prisons chaplaincy should take place, as an integral part of the induction process. Any concerns raised as a result of chaplaincy contact with prisoners, including any concerns about extremism, should be reported throughout the sentence.

108. Prisoners should have regular contact with trained staff who will report on behaviours of concern.

109. Appropriate information and intelligence sharing should take place, for example with law enforcement partners, to understand whether extremism is an issue and to identify and manage any behaviours of concern.

Assessing ongoing risk and interventions

110. For offenders convicted of terrorist or terrorist-related offences, mainstream offender management processes will be used to determine whether interventions are necessary. These are intended to challenge the index offence and can include, where appropriate, intervention disruption and relocation.

111. Where concerns around someone being drawn into terrorism (which includes someone with extremist ideas that are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups) are identified, either during the early days in custody or later, prison staff should report accordingly, through the intelligence reporting system. All such reporting should be regularly assessed by specialist staff in conjunction with the police.

112. Where such concerns are identified an establishment should look to support that individual. This could take the form of moving them away from a negative influence or providing them with mentoring from the relevant chaplain providing religious classes or guidance.

113. Management actions could also include a reduction in privilege level, anti-bullying intervention, adjudication or segregation. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to provide theological, motivational and behavioural interventions.

114. Intelligence and briefing packages targeted at staff working with terrorist and extremist prisoners and those at risk of being drawn into terrorism should continue to be made available and delivered. These should continue to be jointly delivered by appropriately trained prison staff and police, and will be updated as required. In complying with this duty, extremism awareness training provided to new staff should be increased.

Transition from custody to supervision in the community

115. Pre-release planning should take place for all prisoners, including those subject to sentences less than 12 months, who will now receive some level of post-release supervision. Prisons, probation providers and the police should consider what risks need to be managed in the community including those that have arisen whilst in custody and indicate a vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism. Where this is the case, a Channel referral will be considered as part of the risk management plans and a referral to Channel made at the earliest opportunity where appropriate.

116. For offenders already convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offences, prisons will complete appropriate pre-release processes such as Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) with relevant agencies including the police and the NPS. These processes ensure that the requirements of the duty are met in the management of terrorist offenders in the community with the NPS the lead agency in MAPPA for such cases.

117. For all prisoners, where sufficient remaining sentence time permits, a formal multi-agency meeting which includes the police and the probation counter terrorism lead, should take place to inform decisions after release. This will ensure that partner agencies work together to share relevant information and put provision in place to manage the risk or any outstanding concerns This can apply to periods of Release on Temporary Licence, Home Detention Curfew as well as eventual release on licence.

118. Where insufficient time remains, police and probation staff should be given fast time briefing by prison counter-terrorism staff as above and the National Probation Service CT lead will ensure the probation provider in the community is aware of the information, the risks and relevant personnel within partner agencies.

Staff training

119. In complying with the duty, we would expect all new prison staff to receive Prevent awareness training (tailored specifically to the prison environment). For staff already in post, this should be provided through specialist training and briefing packages that cover working with extremist behaviour. This training can be delivered in partnership with the police and be available to those members of staff who work most closely with terrorist and identified extremist prisoners. All staff should have an understanding of general intelligence systems, reporting and procedures to enable them to report on extremist prisoners and those vulnerable to extremist messaging.

Under-18 secure estate

120. The under-18 secure estate differs in terms of governance and service provision to that of the prisons and probation services for adults.

121. The Youth Justice Board (YJB) has a statutory responsibility to commission secure services for children and young people under the age of 18 and has a statutory duty to place children and young people sentenced or remanded by the courts into secure establishments.

The under -18 secure estates consists of:

- **Secure Children's Homes (SCHs)**
  Secure children's homes are run by local authority children's services, overseen by the Department of Health and the Department for Education. They have a high ratio of staff to young people and are generally small facilities, ranging in size from six to forty beds.

- **Secure Training Centres (STC)**
  Secure training centres are purpose-built centres for young offenders up to and including the age of 17. They are run by private operators under contracts, which set out detailed operational requirements. There are currently three STCs in England.

- **Young Offender Institutions (YOI)**
  Young offender institutions are facilities run by both the Prison Service and the private sector and can accommodate 15 to 21-year-old male offenders.

122. We would expect that staff at each secure estate and Youth Offending Teams (YOT) overseeing the care of the child or young person would receive appropriate training in identifying and managing those at risk of being drawn into terrorism.

123. As part of the ongoing care and monitoring of each child or young person, any indication of risk should be identified and a referral made to Channel if appropriate

Probation

124. To comply with the duty we would expect all providers of probation services, particularly the National Probation Service (NPS) and Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) to demonstrate that they are delivering activities under all of the following categories.

Leadership

125. We would expect every NPS division to have a designated probation counter-terrorism lead (PCTL) to provide the leadership necessary at a regional level to ensure processes for identifying, assessing and managing high-risk terrorist offenders are followed. We would expect PCTLs to provide a consultative role to CRCs.

Partnerships

126. In all partnership working we would expect that all providers of probation services will comply with the duty; for example both the NPS and CRCs are partners in local Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs). Active participation in CSPs will enable all probation providers to work together with other partners to share information and develop joint referrals and interventions.

Risk assessment

127. We would expect probation staff to adopt an investigative stance in undertaking risk assessments as they should in all cases. Where there are concerns, albeit these may be intelligence led, about someone being at risk of being drawn into terrorism this should initially be recorded in the core risk assessment.

128. Additionally, we would expect existing risk assessment processes to be supplemented by specialist assessments, for example, extremism risk screening. We would expect PCTLs to provide a consultative role to CRCs in doing this, where appropriate.

129. For offenders already convicted of terrorist or terrorist-related offences we would expect the NPS to work in partnership with other agencies, including prisons and the police, to manage any risks identified via MAPPA and to provide bespoke interventions where relevant. For offenders who have not been convicted

of a terrorism-related offence and may not be MAPPA eligible, but who are subsequently at risk of being drawn into terrorism, we would expect probation providers to have processes in place to escalate these cases to other agencies or otherwise refer the offender for appropriate interventions – for example to the Channel programme.

Staff training

130. We would expect probation providers to ensure that all staff receive appropriate training in identifying and managing those at risk of being drawn into terrorism including those with extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. *Prevent* awareness training has already been given to probation staff in recent years. In complying with the duty, we expect this and other relevant *Prevent* training to continue.

131. In the future, we expect *Prevent* awareness training to be included within the Probation Qualification Framework, which is completed by all newly qualified probation staff in both the NPS and CRCs. In addition PCTLs should lead the development of, for example, faith awareness or Extremism Risk Screening training of local training and staff development to supplement the Prevent awareness training. This should focus on emerging issues and any new support and interventions that become available.

Monitoring and enforcement for prisons and probation

132. Within prisons, we would expect compliance with the duty to be monitored and enforced internally by:

- mandatory compliance with Prison Service Instructions and Orders which define policy and best practice; and
- regular assessment of levels and risk of extremism and radicalisation internally via regional counter-terrorism co-ordinators.

133. Externally, our preference is to use existing inspection regimes where appropriate to do so. We consider that a thematic inspection by HM Inspector of Prisons could be a useful addition to the monitoring arrangements outlined above.

134. For probation providers, internally, we would expect compliance with the duty to be reinforced by detailed operational guidance set out in Probation Instructions. CRCs are contractually required to comply with the mandatory actions in relevant Probation Instructions and a similar requirement exists for the NPS in Service Level Agreements. Compliance with Probation Instructions is monitored and assured internally by contract management and audit functions within NOMS and the Ministry of Justice

135. Externally, we consider that a thematic inspection by HM Inspector of Probation could be a useful addition to the monitoring arrangement outlined above.

136. The YJB monitors the flow of young people through the Youth Justice system identifying the needs and behaviours of young offenders working closely with local partners to improve the support available.

The police

137. The police play an essential role in most aspects of *Prevent* work alongside other agencies and partners. They hold information which can help assess the risk of radicalisation and disrupt people engaged in drawing others into terrorism (which includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit). The Police work alongside other sectors in this document to play a galvanising role in developing local *Prevent* partnerships and bring together a wide range of other organisations to support local delivery of *Prevent*.

138. The police are uniquely placed to tackle terrorism and whilst it is acknowledged that the Police Service will designate dedicated *Prevent* roles within Policing, a key objective for the police is to ensure that *Prevent* is embedded into all aspects of policing including patrol, neighbourhood and safeguarding functions. In fulfilment of their duties consideration must be given to the use of all suitable police resources, not just those specifically designed as *Prevent*.

Police specified authorities

139. The police specified authorities listed in Schedule 6 to the Act are as follows:

- police forces in England and Wales;
- Police and Crime Commissioners;
- the British Transport Police;
- port police forces; and
- the Civil Nuclear Police Authority

140. In fulfilling the new duty we would expect the police to take action in the following areas.

Prosecute, disrupt and deter extremists

141. In complying with the duty, police should engage and where appropriate disrupt extremist activity, in partnership with other agencies. We expect the police to prioritise projects to disrupt terrorist and extremist material on the internet and extremists working in this country. Officers should consider the full range of investigative and prosecution options when it comes to disrupting extremist behaviour, including the use of public order powers where appropriate. This may include:

- Enforcing terrorist proscription and public order legislation;
- Working with local authorities to consider municipal powers, including local highways and leafleting by-laws, using safeguarding of young people legislation;
- Advising other specified authorities, for example local authorities or universities, to develop venue booking processes and good practice;
- Lawfully disrupting or attending events involving extremist speakers in both private and municipal establishments;
- Providing high visibility police presence at relevant events in public places.

Supporting vulnerable individuals

142. Prevent requires a multi-agency approach to protect people at risk from radicalisation. When vulnerable individuals are identified the police will undertake the following:

- In partnership with other agencies including the local authority, consider appropriate interventions, including the Channel programme, to support vulnerable individuals;
- Work in partnership with and support Channel Panels chaired by local authorities to co-ordinate Channel partners and Channel actions;
- Support existing, and identify potential new Intervention Providers.

Partnership and risk assessment

143. The police should:

- Engage fully with the local multi-agency groups that will assess the risk of people being drawn into terrorism, providing (where appropriate) details of the police counter-terrorism local profile (CTLP);
- Support the development and implementation by the multi agency group of a Prevent action plan to address that risk;
- Support local authority Prevent co-ordinators, regional further and higher education co-ordinators, regional health Prevent leads and regional NOMS Prevent co-ordinators in carrying out their work;
- Co-ordinate the delivery of the Channel programme by accepting referrals, including acting as a conduit for Channel referrals with partners; and
- Ensure Prevent considerations are fully embedded into counter-terrorism investigations.

144. The success of Prevent work relies on communities supporting efforts to prevent people being drawn into terrorism and challenging the extremist ideas that are also part of terrorist ideology. The police have a critical role in helping communities do this. To comply with the duty, we would expect the police, to support others including local authorities, to build community resilience by:

- Supporting local authority Prevent Coordinators in developing Prevent-related projects and action plans;
- Supporting the Charity Commission in providing guidance to avoid money being inadvertently given to organisations which may endorse extremism or terrorism and enforcing legislation where fraud offences are identified.
- Supporting opportunities to develop community challenges to extremists; and
- Collate and analyse community tension reporting across the UK that enables police and partners to identify and respond to emerging concerns.

Monitoring and enforcement

145. The Strategic Policing Requirement makes clear that Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Chief Constables must demonstrate that they have contributed to the government's counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST). This includes the Prevent programme, where they are required to take into account the need to identify and divert those involved in or vulnerable to radicalisation. The Home Secretary can direct a PCC to take specific action to address a specific failure.

146. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is the statutory body for inspecting the police. They can carry out thematic inspections and can be asked to inspect a particular force or theme by the Home Secretary.

F. Glossary of terms

'Having due regard' means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions.

'Extremism' is defined in the 2011 Prevent strategy as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

'Interventions' are projects intended to divert people who are being drawn into terrorist activity. Interventions can include mentoring, counselling, theological support, encouraging civic engagement, developing support networks (family and peer structures) or providing mainstream services (education, employment, health, finance or housing).

'Non-violent extremism' is extremism, as defined above, which is not accompanied by violence.

'Prevention' in the context of this document means reducing or eliminating the risk of individuals becoming involved in terrorism. Prevent includes but is not confined to the identification and referral of those at risk of being drawn into terrorism into appropriate interventions. These interventions aim to divert vulnerable people from radicalisation.

'Radicalisation' refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.

'Safeguarding' is the process of protecting vulnerable people, whether from crime, other forms of abuse or (in the context of this document) from being drawn into terrorist-related activity.

The current UK definition of **'terrorism'** is given in the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT 2000). In summary this defines terrorism as an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

'Terrorist-related offences' are those (such as murder) which are not offences in terrorist legislation, but which are judged to be committed in relation to terrorism.

'Vulnerability' describes the condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within Prevent, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation.

HM Government

Channel Duty Guidance

Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism

Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels

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Channel duty guidance

Guidance for members of a panel and partners of local panels in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to provide support for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

Status and Scope of the Duty

1. This guidance has been issued under sections 36(7) and 38(6) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the CT&S Act) to support panel members and partners of local panels.

2. Sections 36 to 41 of the CT&S Act 2015 sets out the duty on local authorities and partners of local panels to provide support for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. In England and Wales this duty is the Channel programme. For the purpose of this guidance, the term 'Channel' or 'Channel programme' refers to the duty to as set out in the CT&S Act 2015.

3. This guidance is specifically aimed at members and partners of local panels involved in the Channel process. The list of partners of local panels subject to the provision can be found in Schedule 7 of the CT&S Act (also replicated in within Annex B of this guidance). The Channel Police Practitioner and the Local Authority Chair are key participants in the Channel process; developing a strong working relationship between partners is vital to the success of Channel.

4. The purpose of this document is to:

a. provide guidance for Channel panels;

b. provide guidance for panel partners on Channel delivery (that is, those authorities listed in Schedule 7 to the CT&S Act who are required to co-operate with Channel panels and the police in the carrying out of their respective functions in Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the CT&S Act – the list is also replicated in Annex B of this guidance);

c. explain why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and describe indicators which may suggest so; and

d. provide guidance on the support that can be provided to safeguard those at risk of being drawn into terrorism.

Section 1: Prevent

1. The Prevent strategy [1], published by the Government in 2011, is part of our overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The aim of the Prevent strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

2. The Prevent strategy addresses all forms of terrorism and we continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security; the allocation of resources will be proportionate to the threats we face. The most significant of these threats is currently from terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, and Al Qa'ida associated groups. But terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat to our safety and security.

3. The Prevent strategy has three specific strategic objectives:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address.

4. The Government remains absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in England and Wales. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also mean intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity.

5. We define 'extremism' as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

6. Section 26 of the CT&S Act 2015 places a duty on certain bodies in the exercise of their functions to have 'due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism'. Separate guidance has been issued on the *Prevent* duty[2].

7. Channel forms a key part of the *Prevent* strategy. The process is a multi-agency approach to identify and provide support to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism.

1 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance

Section 2: Safeguarding

8. Safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, young people and adults is everyone's responsibility. Local authorities have a statutory duty to safeguard children, young people and adults in relation to their social services functions. Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 places duties on a range of organisations and individuals[3] to ensure their functions (including any that are contracted out) to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

9. In England, the Working Together to Safeguard Children[4] is relevant; it sets out the legislative requirements and expectations in individual services to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. In Wales, the Keeping learners safe[5] guidance should be referred to which includes advice on radicalisation. All local authorities in England and Wales are required to have Local Safeguarding Children Boards for their area with an equivalent strategic leadership role in relation to partners involved in safeguarding children locally.

10. Safeguarding adults is also a key role for local authorities. Under the Care Act 2014[6], from April 2015 local authorities are required to have Safeguarding Adults Boards[7] in their area. These boards provide strategic leadership to the work of the local authority, and partner agencies, on the development of policy and practice in relation to safeguarding adults at risk. Guidance on safeguarding adults[8], is relevant in England in this context.

11. Under the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, from April 2016, there will be a new duty on relevant partners to report suspected cases of adults at risk and a complementary duty for the local authority to make enquiries into whether that adult is at risk, and to determine if any action needs to be taken in response. A new Adult Protection and Support Order is introduced by section 127 of the 2014 Act: this supports professionals by allowing them to gain access to premises in order to determine whether an adult alleged to be at risk is making decisions freely and if any action is required. There will also be new structures for Safeguarding Boards: the statutory Local Safeguarding Children Boards (established under the Children Act 2004) and non-statutory Area Adult Protection Committees will be re-established on the public services footprint. They will become six Safeguarding Children Boards and six Safeguarding Adults Boards in accordance with Part 7 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014.

12. It is essential that Channel panel members, partners to local panels and other professionals ensure that children, young people and adults are protected from harm. Whilst the Channel provisions in Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the CT&S Act are counter-terrorism measures (since their ultimate objective is to prevent terrorism), the way in which Channel will be delivered may often overlap with the implementation of the wider safeguarding duty, especially where vulnerabilities have been identified that require intervention from social services, or where the individual is already known to social services.

13. It is imperative that Channel referrals are considered by the local authority and panel

3 Local authorities (including children's and adult social care services), NHS organisations, the police, the Probation Service,Governors/Directors of Prisons and Young Offender Institutions, Directors of Secure Training Centres, Youth Offending Teams. Analogous provision is made in relation to Wales in section 28 of the 2004 Act.

4 Working together to Safeguard Children: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguard-children

5 Safeguarding children: Working together under the Children Act 2004 information for Wales has been supplemented in: http://www.wales.gov.uk/docs/dcells/publications/150114-keeping-learners-safe.pdf which includes advice on radicalisation.

6 Care Act 2014: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/23/contents/enacted

7 Adult Safeguarding Factsheet: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/care-act-2014-part-1-factsheets/care-act-factsheets--2#factsheet-7-protecting-adults-from-abuse-or-neglect

8 Care Act Factsheets: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/care-act-2014-part-1-factsheets/care-act-factsheets--2

partners alongside their work to safeguard vulnerable individuals. Key links should be established with social services and other panel partners to ensure that an individual receives the most appropriate support available.

Section 3: Channel

14. Channel was first piloted in 2007 and rolled out across England and Wales in April 2012. Channel is a programme which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by:

a. identifying individuals at risk;

b. assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and

c. developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.

15. Channel may be appropriate for anyone who is vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism. Channel is about ensuring that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism, and before they become involved in criminal terrorist related activity.

16. Success of the programme is very much dependent on the co-operation and co-ordinated activity of partners. It works best when the individuals and their families fully engage with the programme and are supported in a consistent manner.

17. Individuals and organisations holding extremist views or supporting terrorist-related activity of any kind, in this country or overseas, have no place in delivering Channel and will not be given public funding to do so. This applies irrespective of the source of the funding: central government, local government, policing or other publicly-funded bodies.

18. The police co-ordinate activity by requesting relevant information from panel partners about a referred individual. They will use this information to make an initial assessment of the nature and extent of the vulnerability which the person has. The information will then be presented to a panel.

19. The CT&S Act is intended to secure effective local co-operation and delivery of Channel in all areas and to build on the good practice already operating in many areas. In practice, the legislation requires:

a. local authorities to ensure that a multi-agency panel exists in their area;

b. the local authority to chair the panel;

c. the panel to develop a support plan for individuals accepted as Channel cases;

d. the panel to consider alternative forms of support, including health and social services, where Channel is not appropriate; and

e. all partners of a panel (as specified in Schedule 7), so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable, to cooperate with the police and the panel in the carrying out of their functions.

20. The diagram below outlines the different stages within the Channel process:



Section 4: Channel Panels & Partners of a Panel

Requirements for panels

21. Section 37(5) of the CT&S Act requires Channel panels to be chaired by the responsible local authority (that is, the authority responsible for ensuring a panel is in place). Members of the panel must include the responsible local authority and the police for the relevant local authority area under section 37(1) of the CT&S Act, and they have principal responsibility for Channel in their areas. Under the CT&S Act, the definition of a local authority is:

a. a county council in England;

b. a district council in England, other than a council for a district in a county for which there is a county council;

c. a London Borough Council;

d. the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority;

e. the Council of the Isles of Scilly;

f. a county council or county borough council in Wales; or

g. a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994.

22. In the case of two tier authorities, it is the responsibility of the county council to chair the panel and take on all the responsibilities as detailed in Section 5 - Channel Panel Roles below.

23. Section 38 of the CT&S Act places a duty to co-operate on all partners of a panel to assist the police and the panel in carrying out their functions under the CT&S Act. Schedule 7 to the CT&S Act lists the partners that are required to co-operate with the panel (see Annex B). The Local Authority Chair and the police will be present at each panel alongside other members, as determined by the panel (section 37(4)). The other members might include children and adults social care services and the NHS in particular. Each local authority panel can determine other members as appropriate which will be dependent on the referrals to be discussed. If the panel chooses one of the Schedule 7 partners to be a member, there is an expectation that the partner will agree to sit on the panel if requested to do so.

24. Depending on the nature of the referral, the panel may also include, but not limited to, representatives from the following groups:

- NHS;
- Social workers;
- Schools, further education colleges and universities;
- Youth offending services;
- Directors of children's and adult's services;
- Chairs of Local Safeguarding Children Boards and Safeguarding Adult Boards;
- Local authority safeguarding managers (adult and/or children);
- Local authority Troubled Families Teams;
- Home Office Immigration (Immigration Enforcement, UK Visas & Immigration);
- Border Force;
- Housing;
- Prisons; and
- Probation.

Channel and Children's Social Services

25. If the individual to be discussed is a child known to social services, or if there is a concern that a child might be at risk of significant harm[9], then the social worker relevant to that local authority should be present at the panel, and be involved in all decisions about the child.

26. Local authorities in England have a duty to make arrangements to ensure that their functions are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children under section 11 of the Children Act

9 As defined by the Children Act 1989.

2004 (the same duty applies to local authorities in Wales under section 28 of the Children Act 2004). Further information on safeguarding children can be found in the Working Together to Safeguard Children guidance [10]. In Wales, the Keeping learners safe guidance should be referred to [11] which includes advice on radicalisation.

Combined Panels

27. Local authorities may decide to run panels in conjunction with more than one other local authority. In such cases, the authorities can determine between them who should chair the meeting. Section 41(3) of the CT&S Act informs that two or more local authorities may have a panel in place for a combined area.

28. Panel members and the Chair must be satisfied that the combined panel is fit for purpose and that it will effectively manage the vulnerability and risks associated with cases supported through the Channel programme. If a case involves two or more local authority areas, for instance the individual resides in one authority, but works or attends school in another, or in the case of a looked-after child being the responsibility of one authority, but housed in another, then both local authorities must attend the panel. The lead authority is always the authority in which the individual resides.

29. Combined panels must have the following members:

- representation from each local authority relevant to the referrals and cases to be discussed;
- police representation for each of the local authorities relevant to the referrals and cases; and
- other panel members as referrals and cases dictate, which may also include partners listed in paragraph 24.

10 Working together to Safeguard Children: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguard-children

11 Safeguarding children: Working together under the Children Act 2004 information for Wales has been supplemented in: http://wales.gov.uk/docs/dcells/publications/150114-keeping-learners-safe.pdf which includes advice on radicalisation.

Section 5: Channel Panel Roles

The Channel Police Practitioner & Regional Channel Coordinators

30. The Channel Police Practitioner (CPP) is responsible for co-ordinating Channel in their area. Some areas have a dedicated police Channel co-ordinator. In other areas, this role is carried out by a police officer or member of staff as part of an individual's responsibilities, for example, by a *Prevent* Officer (PO) or Single Point of Contact (SPOC) within the police force. POs and SPOCs have access to the support and expertise of the Channel co-ordinators within their region. For the purpose of this guidance, any reference to CPP, unless otherwise specified, also refers to the PO and SPOC.

31. All CPPs are responsible for:

a. managing referrals and cases through the Channel process in accordance with the Channel guidance and case management principles;

b. ensuring that referrals that are dealt with swiftly, and where appropriate, brought to the attention of the Channel panel as soon as possible;

c. increasing understanding of Channel amongst panel partners and others;

d. establishing effective relationships with panel partners, individuals and organisations who can deliver support; and

e. managing any risk associated with the individual's potential involvement in terroriat-related activity.

32. In addition, Regional Channel Co-ordinators are responsible for providing support and expert advice to all police forces and local authorities across the region.

The Local Authority Chair

33. The Channel Panel Chair is responsible for:

a. having oversight of all Channel cases in their area;

b. ensuring that the appropriate representatives are invited to each meeting as panel members;

c. establishing effective relationships across statutory agencies to ensure effective co-operation over information sharing and attendance at panel meetings;

d. establishing the appropriate support plan for identified individuals by using the expertise of the panel;

e. ensuring that risks of persons being drawn into terrorism are identified and are referred to the appropriate agencies for action;

f. ensuring an effective support plan is put in place, and that consent is sought from the individual before that plan is put in place; and

g. ensuring individuals and/or organisations on the panel carry out their elements of the support plan so that an effective support package is delivered.

34. The Chair should be fully briefed by the CPP on every referral discussed at panel so that they can assess all aspects of the case with rigour and agree the most effective support plan.

Panel members

35. The multi-agency involvement in the Channel process is essential to ensure that vulnerable individuals have access to a wide range of support, from access to specific services provided by local authorities to diversionary activities. Information sharing is an essential part of the process to determine whether an individual requires support, and if so, what that should consist of. Panel members identified by the chair may also be partners of local panels who can provide the most relevant support to address identified needs and vulnerabilities.

Section 6: Channel Process

Identifying Vulnerable Individuals

36. There is no single way of identifying who is likely to be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Factors that may have a bearing on someone becoming vulnerable may include: peer pressure, influence from other people or via the internet, bullying, crime against them or their involvement in crime, anti social behaviour, family tensions, race/hate crime, lack of self esteem or identity and personal or political grievances.

37. All CPPs and local authorities should develop effective links between those coming into contact with vulnerable individuals, such as those working in the education sector, social services, health, children's and youth services, offender management services and credible community organisations. CPPs and local authorities should use their networks to highlight the importance of protecting those who are susceptible to being drawn into terrorism and to raise awareness about how Channel can offer support. In broad terms, panel members are not expected to become experts in countering radicalisation which may lead people to being drawn into terrorism, but should have completed the Channel General Awareness eLearning and Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training (see paragraphs 92-98) in order that they are equipped to recognise some of the signs that someone may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

Referral Stage

38. Referrals are often likely to be made in the first instance by individuals who come into contact with vulnerable people. WRAP training outlines the process by which they do this (see paragraphs 92-95). When the initial referral is received, the CPP will assess whether or not the case is potentially appropriate for Channel. Part of the CPP's role is to filter out any inappropriate referrrals.

Screening and Information Gathering Stage

39. If the initial information received through the referral shows a vulnerability that is not terrorist related then the case is not suitable for Channel; the CPP will refer the individual to other more appropriate support services. This will ensure that only those cases where there is a genuine vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism are processed through Channel.

40. All referrals that progress through to the Channel process will be subject to a thorough assessment of vulnerabilities by the Channel panel. The preliminary assessment is led by the CPP and will include their line manager and, if appropriate, senior personnel of panel partners. If necessary and appropriate, those listed in paragraph 24 may also be included.

Co-operation by partners of a panel

41. Partners of a panel may be requested to provide information about an individual to the CPP during the information gathering stage. It is considered good practice for the panel to draft a local information sharing agreement in order to expedite the appropriate sharing of information. The information could be shared using existing protocols established through Community Safety Partnerships or Safeguarding Boards, for example, or a bespoke one created for the purposes of Channel.

42. Section 38 of the CT&S Act requires the partners listed in Schedule 7 (repeated in Annex B to this guidance) to co-operate with the panel and the police in providing any relevant information so that it can effectively carry out their functions to determine whether an individual is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. It is good practice for partners to respond to the police within five to 10 working days.

43. The partners of a panel must act in co-operation with the panel and the police in carrying out their functions for Channel. The duty to co-operate extends as far as is compatible with the partner's legal responsibilities in respect of their functions; compliance with the duty does not require or authorise the making of a disclosure that would contravene the Data Protection Act 1998 or the disclosure of any sensitive information. The CPP will provide advice on handling on a case-by-case assessment of necessity, proportionality and lawfulness.

44. If a panel partner has any concerns about the appropriateness of sharing the requested information, they should consult with the CPP, the local authority Channel Panel Chair, and their own data policy officials to ensure all are satisfied that the information requested is lawful, proportionate and necessary.

45. As a panel partner, if you have provided information for the Channel panel, it is highly likely that you will be invited to attend the meeting to discuss the individual case. Panel partners invited to meetings should attend to ensure that the full range of an individual's vulnerabilities can be discussed and expert advice sought from attendees.

Consent Prior to Information Sharing

46. The default for panel partners when determining what information can be shared should be to consider seeking the consent of the individual (or their parent/guardian). In some circumstances, consent from the individual will not be sought at this early stage. This will be dependent on the circumstances of the case but may relate to issues such as the health of the individual, law enforcement or protection of the public. Where consent cannot be sought, information sharing may take place if any of the exemptions to the various legislative provisions restricting information sharing applies, and it will need to be made explicit in the record of the case by a panel partner which exemption or gateway is being relied upon. A non-exhaustive list of Acts relating to information sharing is attached at Annex A to this guidance.

Vulnerability Assessment Framework

47. Channel assesses vulnerability using a consistently applied vulnerability assessment framework built around three criteria. The three criteria are:

a. ***Engagement*** with a group, cause or ideology;

b. ***Intent*** to cause harm; and

c. ***Capability*** to cause harm.

48. The criteria are considered separately as experience has shown that it is possible to be engaged without intending to cause harm and that it is possible to intend to cause harm without being particularly engaged. Experience has also shown that it is possible to desist (stop intending to cause harm) without fully disengaging (remaining sympathetic to the cause); though losing sympathy with the cause (disengaging) will invariably result in desistance (loss of intent).

49. The three criteria are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, six that relate to intent and three for capability). These factors taken together form a holistic view of the vulnerability of an individual that will inform decisions on whether an individual needs support and what kind of support package may be appropriate. These factors can also be added to and are not considered an exhaustive list. By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment.

50. Completing a full assessment for all 22 factors requires thorough knowledge of the individual that may not be available at the point of the initial referral. However, there are a number of behaviours and other indicators that may indicate the presence of these factors.

51. Example indicators that an individual is ***engaged*** with an extremist group, cause or ideology include:

a. spending increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists;

b. changing their style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group;

c. day-to-day behaviour becoming increasingly centred around an extremist ideology, group or cause;

d. loss of interest in other friends and activities not associated with the extremist ideology, group or cause;

e. possession of material or symbols associated with an extremist cause (e.g. the swastika for far right groups);

f. attempts to recruit others to the group/cause/ideology; or

g. communications with others that suggest identification with a group/cause/ideology.

52. Example indicators that an individual has an ***intention*** to cause harm, use violence or other illegal means include:

a. clearly identifying another group as threatening what they stand for and blaming that group for all social or political ills;

b. using insulting or derogatory names or labels for another group;

c. speaking about the imminence of harm from the other group and the importance of action now;

d. expressing attitudes that justify offending on behalf of the group, cause or ideology;

e. condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others; or

f. plotting or conspiring with others.

53. Example indicators that an individual is ***capable*** of causing harm or contributing directly or indirectly to an act of terrorism include:

a. having a history of violence;

b. being criminally versatile and using criminal networks to support extremist goals;

c. having occupational skills that can enable acts of terrorism (such as civil engineering, pharmacology or construction); or

d. having technical expertise that can be deployed (e.g. IT skills, knowledge of chemicals, military training or survival skills).

54. The examples above are not exhaustive and vulnerability may manifest itself in other ways. There is no single route to terrorism nor is there a simple profile of those who become involved. For this reason, any attempt to derive a 'profile' can be misleading. It must not be assumed that these characteristics and experiences will necessarily lead to individuals becoming terrorists, or that these indicators are the only source of information required to make an appropriate assessment about vulnerability. Outward expression of faith, in the absence of any other indicator of vulnerability, is not a reason to make a referral to Channel.

Links with extremist groups

55. The Prevent strategy 2011[12] makes clear that Channel is about stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, and that this will mean intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity. Where people holding extremist views appear to be attracted to or moving towards terrorism they clearly become relevant to Channel.

56. Association with organisations that are not proscribed [13] and that espouse extremist ideology as defined in the Prevent strategy is not, on its own, reason enough to justify a referral to the Channel process. If professionals at a local level determine that someone attracted to the ideology of such groups also exhibits additional behavioural indicators that

12 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

13 The Terrorism Act 2000 makes it a criminal offence to belong to, support, or display support for a proscribed organisation. A list of proscribed groups can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2

suggest they are moving towards terrorism then it would be appropriate to make a referral to Channel. It would be the presence of additional behavioural indicators that would determine the suitability of the Channel process and not the fact they are associating with or attracted to a group that manifests extremist ideologies.

57. Association or support for a proscribed group is a criminal offence. It may be appropriate in some cases for individuals believed to be on the periphery of proscribed organisations to be referred to Channel. Professionals at a local level must consider whether a proscription offence has been committed before doing so. If there is evidence that a proscription offence has been committed this should be passed to the police.

58. The vulnerability assessment should initially be completed by the CPP and then be circulated in full to panel members in advance of meetings so that all relevant panel members can contribute their knowledge, experience and expertise to the case.

59. The vulnerability assessment should complement and inform rather than replace professional judgement and/or other assessments such as the Common Assessment Framework (or local equivalent) when deciding on the most appropriate types of support at panel meetings.

60. Further detail on the Vulnerability Assessment Framework is available at Annex C to this guidance.

Channel and offender management

Prisons

61. Channel can be used where appropriate to provide support to individuals vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of radicalisation and who are serving custodial sentences. This can be in cases where they are coming up to release from prison and there is a need to put in place some form of intervention or support prior to or following release.

62. The decision to refer an offender to Channel should be agreed in close consultation with Prison staff and the National Probation Service.

Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements

63. Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) are reserved for those who present the highest risk of harm in their local community. Most people are managed within MAPPA because of the nature of their offending. In some cases agencies may determine that an individual's vulnerability is such that it is best managed through the MAPPA process. Where this is the case, the multi-agency public protection panel can, if necessary, seek the advice of the Channel police practitioner. However, the case will remain subject to MAPPA and will not be adopted under Channel.

64. However, where an offender is MAPPA eligible and managed by a single agency, and is deemed to be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of radicalisation, there may be certain circumstances where a Channel referral may be appropriate. It will then be for the single agency to liaise with the local Channel panel to determine how this risk should best be managed.

Probation

65. Where an offender is supervised in the community by a provider of probation services, and they are at risk of being radicalised and drawn into terrorism, the individual may be managed by either the appropriate offender manager or in some circumstances via a referral to Channel. This will be determined in close liaison between the offender manager and the CPP.

Section 7: The Channel Panel

Requirement to establish a Channel panel

66. Section 36 of the CT&S Act places a duty on local authorities to ensure that Channel panels are in place for their areas. It is not prescriptive on how these panels take place in practice and it is acknowledged that a separate and bespoke Channel panel would be a disproportionate use of resources in some areas. However, in all areas it would be useful to meet regularly to establish relationships and create an information sharing agreement. The local authority chair and panel members must have confidence that their arrangements are appropriate to cater for the unique vulnerabilities associated with those who may be drawn into or support terrorism. As a minimum, the local authority Channel Panel Chair must have the appropriate contact details of local partners within their areas and the ability to call meetings at short notice if required.

67. In areas with a high number of referrals it is good practice to meet on a monthly basis. However, the composition of the panel and the frequency with which it meets is a decision which should be made based upon the number of referrals put forward to the panel; the specifics of individual cases; and specific time bound actions that may be required. This decision will ultimately lie with the Channel Panel Chair.

Panel meetings

68. The completed Vulnerability Assessment should be circulated in full to panel members by the CPP in advance of meetings so that all relevant panel members can contribute their knowledge, experience and expertise. The CPP will present the referral to the Channel panel based on the information gathered from panel partners and the outcome of the vulnerability assessment.

69. At this point, panel members in attendance at a meeting should collectively assess the risk and decide whether the person:

a. is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and, therefore, appropriate for Channel;

b. should be referred to a different support mechanism; or

c. should exit the process.

70. In assessing the risk, consideration should be given to:

a. the risk the individual faces of being drawn into terrorism; and

b. the risk the individual poses to society if they get drawn into terrorism.

71. The panel must fully consider all the information available to them to make an objective decision on the support provided, without discriminating against the individual's race, religion or background [14]. It is important that a record of decisions and actions are kept. The Chair should be provided with a copy following each meeting. An audit trail of decisions should be kept as decisions may need to be referred to at a later date. The records should be retained whilst the case is live and for the appropriate data retention period thereafter.

Support plan

72. Each case is handled separately; people deemed appropriate to receive support will have a tailored package developed for them, according to their identified vulnerabilities. Using the initial vulnerability assessment and their professional expertise, the panel should develop a package to support the needs of the individual and use the information to inform the assessment and mitigation of any risk posed to potential support providers.

14 The Equality Act 2010 puts a responsibility on public authorities to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and promote equality of opportunity. This applies to the process of need and risk faced by the individual and the process of assessment.

73. Section 36(4) of CT&S Act requires panels to:

a. prepare a plan for an individual whom the panel considers appropriate to be offered support;

b. make arrangements for support to be provided as described in the plan where consent is given;

c. keep the support given under review;

d. revise or withdraw a support plan if considered appropriate;

e. carry out further assessments, after such periods as the panel considers appropriate, of an individual's vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism

   - where the necessary consent to the provision of support is refused or withdrawn
   - the panel has determined that support should be withdrawn; and

f. prepare a further support plan if considered appropriate.

74. Risk is a theme that runs through the entire Channel process, i.e risk to the individual; risk to the public; and risk to partners or organisations providing support to the individual, including any intervention providers. The panel is responsible for managing the risk in relation to the vulnerable individual.

75. Support offered for some individuals could span several agencies and each agency involved will own the element of risk they are responsible for addressing through the support plan.

76. The risk of involvement in terrorism lies with the police. This is the risk posed by the individual to themselves and society through their potential active involvement in criminality associated with terrorism. The police are the most appropriate agency throughout the entire life of each Channel case to assess and manage this risk.

Consent prior to support

77. As participation in Channel remains voluntary, section 36(4)(b) of the CT&S Act requires consent to be given by the individual (or their parent/guardian in the case of a child[15]) in advance of support measures being put in place. All individuals who receive support through Channel must be made aware that they are receiving this as part of a programme to protect people from being drawn into terrorism; what the aims of the process are; and what to expect. Where someone does not wish to continue with the process, it may be appropriate to provide alternative support through other mainstream services, such as Children or Adult Social Care Services.

78. As part of the programme, information about an individual will be shared with multi-agency partners, including the police. Individuals (or their parent/guardian) must give their consent prior to this information being shared for that purpose.

When parental consent cannot be obtained

79. In the case of a child, there may be certain circumstances when a parent/guardian does not give consent for their child to be supported through Channel, particularly if some of the vulnerabilities present are in the home environment. If the child is thought to be at risk from significant harm [16], whether that is physical, emotional, mental, intellectual, social or behavioural harm (as defined by section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989), then social services for the relevant local authority area must be involved in decisions made about the child. There may be circumstances where the Channel panel and social services determine that a child is in need as defined by section 17 of the Children Act 1989 [17]. In such a case, statutory assessments may need to be carried

15 A child is defined as anyone who has not yet reached their 18th birthday.

16 As defined by the Children Act 1989.

17 From 1 April 2016, section 17 of the Children Act 1989 will no longer apply in relation to Wales. A child's needs for care and support will be assessed in accordance with section 21 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 and eligible needs will be met in accordance with sections 37 or 38 of that Act.

out by a social worker under section 17, or section 47 if the child is thought to be at risk from significant harm. More information on safeguarding children, and in particular in relation to the assessments under sections 17 and 47 of the Children Act 1989, can be found in the Working Together to Safeguard Children guidance[18]. In Wales, the Keeping learners safe guidance is relevant[19] which includes advice on radicalisation.

Support to address identified vulnerabilities

80. The involvement of the correct panel partners ensures that those at risk have access to a wide range of support ranging from mainstream services, such as health and education, through to specialist mentoring or guidance to increase theological understanding and/or challenge the claims of violent ideologies. It can also include wider diversionary activities such as appropriate training courses. The partners involved should be tailored to the vulnerabilities of the person getting support. In England and Wales, Channel intervention providers engaging with these vulnerable individuals must first have been approved by the Home Office.

81. As part of agreeing a full wrap-around package of support, the panel must decide how to connect the vulnerable individual with the support providers. All decision-making should be clearly documented and in line with the guidance on the sharing of information, which is set out in Annex A.

82. The type of activities that are included in a support package will depend on risk, vulnerability and local resource. To illustrate, a diversionary activity may be sufficient for someone who is in the early stages of being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of radicalisation, whereas a more focussed and structured one-on-one mentoring programme may be required for those who are further along the path towards embracing terrorism. The following kinds of support might be considered appropriate:

a. **Mentoring support contact** – work with a suitable adult as a role model or providing personal guidance, including guidance addressing extremist ideologies;

b. **Life skills** – work on life skills or social skills generally, such as dealing with peer pressure;

c. **Anger management session** – formal or informal work dealing with anger;

d. **Cognitive/behavioural contact** – cognitive behavioural therapies and general work on attitudes and behaviours;

e. **Constructive pursuits** – supervised or managed constructive leisure activities;

f. **Education skills contact** – activities focused on education or training;

g. **Careers contact** – activities focused on employment;

h. **Family support contact** – activities aimed at supporting family and personal relationships, including formal parenting programmes;

i. **Health awareness contact** – work aimed at assessing or addressing any physical or mental health issues;

j. **Housing support contact** – activities addressing living arrangements, accommodation provision or neighbourhood; and

k. **Drugs and alcohol awareness** – substance misuse interventions.

83. Where the individual has a need for theological/ideological support, Home Office approved intervention providers must be commissioned to mentor them. The mentoring aims to increase theological understanding and challenge extremist ideas where they are used to legitimise terrorism.

18 Working together to Safeguard Children: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguard-children

19 Safeguarding children: Working together under the Children Act 2004 information for Wales has been supplemented in: http://wales.gov.uk/docs/dcells/publications/150114-keeping-learners-safe.pdf which includes advice on radicalisation

Funding Support Plans

84. The panel is collectively responsible for ensuring delivery of the overall package of support, but not for managing or funding the support providers. Where support is provided by a panel partner they should be represented at the panel meeting and are responsible for the delivery of that element of the overall support package; funding for any support offered should be met from their existing budgets. Where support is provided by a person other than a panel partner, the CPP is responsible for liaison with the support provider and for funding and monitoring the delivery of that element of the support package.

85. Providers of support to vulnerable people (particular providers who are not specified as panel partners) need to be credible with the vulnerable individual concerned and to understand the local community. They have an important role and their reliability, suitability to work with vulnerable people, and commitment to shared values needs to be established. CPPs must ensure that a number of background checks have been made, and satisfy themselves that the potential support provider is suitable, and does not pose a risk, before commissioning them. Any concerns raised by panel members should be discussed with the CPP.

Monitoring Channel Support

86. The CPP is responsible for regularly liaising with the support provider(s), updating the vulnerability assessment and for assessing progress made with the Channel Panel. Individuals receiving support should be reassessed at least every three months to ensure that the progress being made in supporting the individual is being captured. If necessary, they can be reassessed more frequently to inform a key panel meeting or because the provision of support has reached a particular milestone.

87. If the panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed they should recommend that the case then exits the process. A closing report should be completed as soon as possible setting out the reason for the panel's recommendations. The recommendations will need to be endorsed by the Channel Panel Chair and the CPP.

88. If the panel is not satisfied that the risk has been reduced or managed the case should be reconsidered. A new action plan should be developed and alternative support put in place. If the risk of criminality relating to terrorism has increased, the CPP must consider escalating the case through existing police mechanisms and determine whether the case remains suitable for Channel.

Referral to alternative forms of support

89. Information sharing between partners will sometimes reveal no evidence that the individual is at risk of being drawn into terrorism. It may identify other personal vulnerabilities, which need to be addressed, such as substance misuse or mental health issues. Under section 36(6) of the CT&S Act, where it is determined that support via Channel is not appropriate, the panel must consider whether an individual should be referred to other more appropriate forms of support, which may include support from health providers or social care services, and, if so, make such arrangements as the panel considers necessary. It is good practice for the Channel Panel Chair to consider inviting these partners to panel meetings. Once a decision on managing the case has been reached by the panel, the Channel Panel Chair should confirm the recommendation and ensure that the decision is properly recorded, and that arrangements are made to refer the individual.

Reviewing Channel cases

90. All cases exiting Channel, whether they are referred elsewhere or offered support under Channel, should be reviewed by the panel at six months and again at 12 months from the point at which an individual exits the process.

Sharing good practice

91. Local authorities and the police may find it

useful to form regional or local networks to facilitate the sharing of good practice in running Channel panels. This will help local authority areas that have very few Channel cases to learn from more experienced areas. Channel Panel Chairs will also have the opportunity to attend regular national forums to share good practice more widely.

Section 8: Training

Workshop to raise awareness of Prevent

92. The successful delivery of Prevent is dependent on the engagement of national, regional and local partners across multiple sectors including the community and voluntary sector. Public sector frontline staff have been identified as a key group that can make an important contribution to the identification and referral of individuals who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of radicalisation. This has created a significant training need as awareness and understanding of Prevent amongst the public sector and into the community should be improved. See the Prevent duty guidance for details of the various training available for different sectors.

93. Alongside sector specific training, public sector frontline workers, including panel members and partners, can attend the Home Office developed Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training. WRAP is an hour long DVD-led interactive workshop. It is aimed at frontline staff (such as police, social services, probation, education and health staff) as well as the community.

94. The workshop is an introduction to Prevent aimed at objective two of the Prevent strategy[20], supporting vulnerable people. It has been built to raise awareness of Prevent in a non-alarmist way, relating support to wider safeguarding initiatives.

20 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

95. Attendees should leave WRAP sessions with the ability to understand what may make individuals susceptible to radicalisation, as well as the confidence and ability to raise their concern when someone may be at risk.

Channel e-learning package

96. The National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ), in conjunction with the College of Policing, have developed a general awareness e-learning package for Channel. The package includes information on how Channel links to the Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) through the Prevent strategy, guidance on how to identify people who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, and how to refer them into the Channel process.

97. Case studies are included to increase understanding of Channel, which consist of identifying and referring vulnerable individuals to the process. Additionally, information is provided on how to identify appropriate support for the individual concerned.

98. The training can be accessed at the following URL: http://course.ncalt.com/Channel_General_Awareness

Other local training

99. There may be other training available within your local authority or your region. Details of

this should be sought in the first instance from your local or regional Police Prevent Co-ordinator. Panel members and panel partners are not expected to become experts in countering radicalisation that draws people into terrorism. However, all should have undertaken the relevant training detailed above to ensure they understand Prevent, Channel, the radicalisation process and how to intervene to prevent someone from being drawn into terrorism.

Section 9: Information Requests

Freedom of Information Requests

100. All recorded information held by a public authority is covered by the right to information under the FOI Act. Within the FOI Act, there is a presumption in favour of disclosure to enhance greater openness in the public sector and thus enable members of the public to better understand the decisions of public authorities, and ensure that services provided by the public sector are seen to be efficiently and properly delivered. We want, as far as possible, to be open and transparent about the Channel process.

101. The CT&S Act recommends that it is good practice to consider the implications of the release of the information on third parties when complying with FOI legislation. In the context of Channel, third parties may include local and national delivery partners and referred individuals. The section 45 Code of Practice of the FOI Act facilitates consideration by public authorities of the interests of third parties and stakeholders who may be affected by any decision to disclose information by setting standards for consultation. All public authority partners involved in Channel may receive FOI requests. If an FOI request is made all information will need to be assessed against FOI legislation to see if it is disclosable or not. All requests for the release of information held must be assessed on a case- by-case basis.

102. To achieve a consistent approach in responding to FOI requests relevant to Channel panels and assessments of individuals, and to protect third parties, all local partners who receive such an FOI request should bring it to the attention of their local panel. The Chair should notify the CPP and the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism in the Home Office, who will advise if any further consultation is necessary, for instance with other central government departments.

Subject Access Requests

103. Under Section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998, individuals can also make a Subject Access Request to see data held about them, or children they have parental responsibility for. The individual can request information on any paper and computer records held about them. As with FOI, any organisation holding personal data can be subject to these requests.

104. There are a limited number of exemptions, and not all personal information needs to be released in all circumstances. For more information on Subject Access Requests, please refer to the Information Commissioner's Office guidance[21]. As with FOI requests, to achieve consistency in responses, any requests for Subject Access Requests should be brought to the attention of the Channel Panel Chair.

21 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1065/subject-access-code-of-practice.pdf

Enquiries

105. Please note that national, international and specialist media queries about Channel are managed by the Home Office Press Office and should be referred to directly on the following number:

Home Office Press Office

020 7035 3535

106. It is also helpful if you can make the Home Office Press Office aware, at an early stage, of any local media interest you receive.

ANNEX A

Sharing information with partners

Principles of Information Sharing

1. Effective information sharing is key to the delivery of Prevent, so that partners are able to take appropriately informed action. This will sometimes require the sharing of personal information between partners; this is particularly the case for Objective 2 of the Prevent strategy, supporting vulnerable people, where sharing of information will be central to providing the best support to vulnerable individuals.

Key Principle:

Partners may consider sharing personal information with each other for *Prevent* purposes, subject to a case-by-case basis assessment which considers whether the informed consent of the individual can be obtained and the proposed sharing being necessary, proportionate and lawful.

2. Any sharing of personal or sensitive personal data should be considered carefully, particularly where the consent of the individual is not to be obtained. The legal framework within which public sector data sharing takes place is often complex, although there is a significant amount of guidance available. It is considered good practice to have an Information Sharing Agreement in place at a local level to facilitate the sharing of information. In addition to satisfying the legal and policy requirements (see below), there are some principles which should guide Prevent information sharing.

Necessary and proportionate

3. The overriding principles are necessity and proportionality. It should be confirmed by those holding information that to conduct the work in question it is necessary to share the information they hold. Only the information required to have the desired outcome should be shared, and only to those partners with whom it is necessary to share it to achieve the objective. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public. Consideration should also be given to whether discussion of a case is possible with anonymised information, for example, referring to "the young person" without the need to give the individual's name, address or any other information which might identify them.

4. Each case should be judged on its own merit, and the following questions should be considered when sharing information:

- what information you are intending to pass;
- to whom you are intending to pass the information;
- why you are intending to pass the information (i.e. with what expected outcome); and
- the legal basis on which the information is to be passed.

Consent

5. The default should be to consider seeking the consent of the individual to share information. There will, of course, be circumstances in which seeking the consent of the individual will not be possible, because it will prejudice delivery of the intended outcome, and there may be gateways or exemptions which permit sharing to take place without consent. If you cannot seek or obtain consent, or consent is refused, you cannot share personal information without satisfying one of the gateway or exemption conditions. Compliance with the Data Protection Act (DPA) and Human Rights Act (HRA) are significantly simplified by having the subject's consent. The Information Commissioner has indicated that consent should

be informed and unambiguous, particularly in the case of sensitive personal information. If consent is sought, the individual should understand how their information will be used, and for what purpose.

Power to share

6. The sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the DPA, the HRA and the common law duty of confidentiality. Some statutes confer an express power to share information for a particular purpose (such as section 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998). More often, however, it will be possible to imply a power to share information because it is necessary for the fulfilment of an organisation's statutory functions. The power to share information arises only as a consequence of an organisation having the power to carry out an action which is dependent on the sharing of information.

7. Having established a power to share information, it should be confirmed that there are no bars to sharing information, either because of a duty of confidentiality or because of the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, it will also be necessary to ensure compliance with the DPA, either by meeting the processing conditions in Schedules 2 and 3, or by relying on one of the exemptions (such as section 29 for the prevention of crime). Further details of the overarching legislation and some potentially relevant gateways are set out below.

8. Where non-public bodies (such as community organisations) are involved in delivery of *Prevent* work, there may be a need to pass personal and sensitive information to them and the approach to information sharing should be the same – that it is necessary, proportionate and lawful. In engaging with non-public bodies to the extent of providing personal information, it is good practice to ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the DPA.

Legislation and Guidance Relevant to Information Sharing

9. Although not an exhaustive list, the following acts and statutory instruments may be relevant. The original legislation can be found at the Legislation Database (http://legislation.gov.uk/).

Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998

10. The DPA is the principal legislation governing the process (including collection, storage and disclosure) of data relating to individuals. The Act defines personal data (as information by which an individual can be identified (either on its own or with other information)) and sensitive personal data (including information about an individual's health, criminal record, and political or religious views), and the circumstances in and extent to which they can be processed. The Act also details the rights of data subjects.

11. All of the eight Data Protection Principles (which are listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Act) must be complied with when sharing personal data but the first data protection principle is particularly relevant. The first data protection principle states that personal data shall be processed: (1) fairly, (2) lawfully (meaning that there is the power to share and other statutory and common law obligations must be complied with), and (3) only if a condition in Schedule 2 and, if sensitive personal data is involved, Schedule 3 is met. All three of these requirements must be met to comply with the first data protection principle. The DPA cannot render lawful any processing which would otherwise be unlawful. If compliance with the Data Protection Principles is not possible, then one of the exemptions (such as the prevention of crime under section 29 of the DPA) may apply.

Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000

12. This statutory instrument (SI 2000/417) specifies further conditions under which sensitive personal information can be processed, including

conditions where the processing must necessarily be carried out without the explicit consent of the data subject. Of particular relevance to Prevent are paragraph 1 of this annex (for the purposes of prevention or detection of crime), and paragraph 4 of this annex (for the discharge of any function which is designed for the provision of confidential counselling, advice, support or any other service).

13. The first data principle states that personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully, meaning that other statutory and common law obligations must be complied with, and that the DPA cannot render lawful any processing which would otherwise be unlawful. Schedules 2 and 3 of the Act provide the conditions necessary to fulfil the requirements of the first principle.

Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998

14. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (which is given effect by the HRA) provides that "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence", and that public authorities shall not interfere with "the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

Common Law Duty of Confidentiality

15. The key principle built up from case law is that information confided should not be used or disclosed further, except as originally understood by the confider, or with their subsequent permission. Case law has established that exceptions can exist "in the public interest"; confidentiality can also be overridden or set aside by legislation.

16. The Department of Health have produced a code of conduct concerning confidentiality, which is required practice for those working within or under contract to NHS organisations.

Gateways, exemptions and explicit powers

Crime and Disorder Act 1998

17. Section 115 confers a power to disclose information to a "relevant authority" on any person who would not otherwise have such a power, where the disclosure is necessary or expedient for the purposes of any provision of the Act. The "relevant authority" includes a chief officer of police in England, Wales or Scotland, a police authority, a local authority, a health authority, a social landlord or a probation board in England and Wales. It also includes an individual acting on behalf of the relevant authority. The purposes of the Crime and Disorder Act include, under section 17, a duty for the relevant authorities to do all that they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in their area.

Common Law Powers

18. Because the range of partners with whom the police deal has grown – including the public, private and voluntary sectors, there may not be either an implied or explicit statutory power to share information in every circumstance. This does not necessarily mean that police cannot share the information, because it is often possible to use the Common Law. The decision to share using Common Law powers will be based on establishing a policing purpose for the activity that the information sharing will support, as well as an assessment of any risk.

19. The Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information (MOPI) defines policing purposes as: protecting life and property, preserving order, preventing the commission of offences, bringing offenders to justice, and any duty or responsibility of the police arising from common or statute law.

Local Government Act 1972

20. Section 111 provides for local authorities to

have "power to do any thing…which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions".

Local Government Act 2000

21. Section 2(1) provides that every local authority shall have the power to do anything which they consider is likely to achieve the promotion or improvement of the economic, social or environmental wellbeing of the area.

National Health Service Act (NHSA) 2006 and Health and Social Care Act (HCSA) 2001

22. Section 251 of the NHSA and Section 60 of the HSCA provides a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the processing of patient information.

Offender Management Act (OMA) 2007

23. Section 14 of the OMA enables disclosure of information to or from providers of probation services, by or to Government departments, local authorities, Youth Justice Board, Parole Board, chief officers of police and relevant contractors, where the disclosure is for the probation purposes (as defined in section 1 of the Act) or other purposes connected with the management of offenders.

Information Sharing: Advice for practitioners providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers

24. This advice details how information sharing is vital to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children and young people. A key factor identified in many Serious Case Reviews (SCRs) have been a failure by practitioners to record information, to share it, to understand its significance and then take appropriate action. The guidance includes principles and a myth-busting guide to dispel common myths and encourage effective information sharing. The guidance is for all frontline practitioners and senior managers working with children, young people and adults who have to make decisions about sharing personal information on a case by case basis.

ANNEX B

Partners required to co-operate with local panels

(Schedule 7 of the Act – Partners of local panels)

Ministers of the Crown and government departments

- A Minister of the Crown.
- A government department other than an intelligence service.

Local government

- A local authority (other than a local authority that is a member of the panel in question).
- A person carrying out a function of a local authority by virtue of a direction made under section 15 of the Local Government Act 1999.

Criminal justice

- The governor of a prison in England and Wales (or, in the case of a contracted out prison, its director).
- The governor of a young offender institution or secure training centre (or, in the case of a contracted out young offender institution or secure training centre, its director).
- The principal of a secure college.
- A youth offending team established under section 39 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
- A provider of probation services within the meaning given by section 3(6) of the Offender Management Act 2007.

Education, child care etc

- A sixth form college corporation within the meaning given by section 90(1) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992.
- The governing body of an institution within the further education sector within the meaning given by section 91(3) of that Act.
- A person who is authorised by virtue of an order made under section 70 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 to exercise a function specified in Schedule 36A to the Education Act 1996.
- A person with whom arrangements have been made for the provision of education under section 19 of the Education Act 1996 or section 100 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006 (cases of illness, exclusion etc).
- The proprietor of—

a) a school that has been approved under section 342 of the Education Act 1996,

b) a maintained school within the meaning given by section 20(7) of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998,

c) a maintained nursery school within the meaning given by section 22(9) of that Act,

d) an independent school registered under section 158 of the Education Act 2002,

e) an independent educational institution registered under section 95(1) of the Education and Skills Act 2008,

f) a 16 to 19 Academy within the meaning given by section 1B of the Academies Act 2010,

g) an alternative provision Academy within the meaning given by section 1C of that Act, or

h) a special post-16 institution within the meaning given by section 83(2) of the Children and Families Act 2014.

- A person who is specified or nominated in a direction made in relation to the exercise of a local authority's functions given by the Secretary of State under section 497A of the Education Act 1996 (including that section as applied by section 50 of the Children Act

2004 or section 15 of the Childcare Act 2006).

- A person registered under Part 2 of the Care Standards Act 2000 in respect of –

  (a) a children's home as defined in section 1 of that Act,

  (b) a residential family centre as defined in section 4 of that Act,

  (c) a fostering agency as defined in that section, or

  (d) a holiday scheme for disabled children, within the meaning of the Registered Holiday Schemes for Disabled Children (England) Regulations 2013 (S.I. 2013/1394).

- The governing body of a qualifying institution within the meaning given by section 11 of the Higher Education Act 2004.
- A person registered under Chapter 2, 2A, 3 or 3A of Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006 or under section 20 of the Children and Families (Wales) Measure 2010 (nawm 1).
- A body corporate with which a local authority has entered into arrangements under Part 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 2008.
- A person who is specified in a direction made in relation to the exercise of a local authority's functions given by the Welsh Ministers under section 25 of the School Standards and Organisation (Wales) Act 2013 (anaw 1) (including that section as applied by section 50A of the Children Act 2004 or section 29 of the Childcare Act 2006).
- The governing body of an educational establishment maintained by a local authority in Wales.
- The governing body or proprietor of an institution (not otherwise listed) at which more than 250 students, excluding students undertaking distance learning courses, are undertaking –

  a) courses in preparation for examinations related to qualifications regulated by the Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation or the Welsh Government;

  b) courses of a description mentioned in Schedule 6 to the Education Reform Act 1988 (higher education courses).

Health and social care

- A clinical commissioning group established under section 14D of the National Health Service Act 2006.
- An NHS Trust established under section 25 of the National Health Service Act 2006.
- An NHS foundation trust within the meaning given by section 30 of the National Health Service Act 2006.
- A Local Health Board established under section 11 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006.
- An NHS trust established under section 18 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006.

Police

- A chief officer of police for a police area in England and Wales (other than a chief officer who is a member of the panel in question).

ANNEX C

The Vulnerability Assessment Framework

This annex provides a description of the vulnerability assessment framework used by Channel to guide decisions about whether an individual needs support to address their vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of radicalisation and the kind of support t that they need.

It should not be assumed that the characteristics set out below necessarily indicate that a person is either committed to terrorism or may become a terrorist. The assessment framework involves three dimensions: engagement, intent and capability, which are considered separately.

1. Engagement with a group, cause or ideology

Engagement factors are sometimes referred to as "psychological hooks". They include needs, susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences and together map the individual pathway into terrorism. They can include:

- Feelings of grievance and injustice
- Feeling under threat
- A need for identity, meaning and belonging
- A desire for status
- A desire for excitement and adventure
- A need to dominate and control others
- Susceptibility to indoctrination
- A desire for political or moral change
- Oppor tunistic involvement
- Family or friends involvement in extremism
- Being at a transitional time of life
- Being influenced or controlled by a group
- Relevant mental health issues

2. Intent to cause harm

Not all those who become engaged by a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, so this dimension is considered separately. Intent factors describe the mindset that is associated with a readiness to use violence and address what the individual would do and to what end. They can include:

- Over-identification with a group or ideology
- Them and Us' thinking
- Dehumanisation of the enemy
- Attitudes that justify offending
- Harmful means to an end
- Harmful objectives

3. Capability to cause harm

Not all those who have a wish to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to cause widespread damage take a high level of personal capability, resources and networking to be successful. What the individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration when assessing risk of harm to the public. Factors can include:

- Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
- Access to networks, funding or equipment
- Criminal Capability

ANNEX D

Other useful guidance

1. The Prevent Strategy, 2011

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

2. CONTEST: the United Kingdom's strategy for countering terrorism

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest

3. Prevent duty guidance

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance

England:

4. Working together to Safeguard Children

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/working-together-to-safeguard-children

5. Keeping Children Safe in Education

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/keeping-children-safe-in-education;

6. Care Act 2014:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/23/contents/enacted

7. Care Act Factsheets

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/care-act-2014-part-1-factsheets/care-act-factsheets--2

8. Public Sector Data Sharing – Guidance on the Law

http://www.dca.gov.uk/foi/sharing/toolkit/lawguide.pdf

9. Information Commissioner's Office Guidance on Interpretation of the DPA

http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide.aspx

10. Confidentiality Code of Practice

http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4069253

11. Caldicott Guardian Manual

http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_114509

12. Information Sharing: Advice for practitioners providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-practitioner-information-sharing-advice

Wales:

13. Safeguarding Children: Working together under the Children Act 2004, for Wales

Safeguarding children: Working together under the Children Act 2004:

14. Keeping learners safe provides advice on radicalisation and supplements the above welsh guidance on safeguarding children

http://wales.gov.uk/docs/dcells/publications/150114-keeping-learners-safe.pdf

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Brent

Inspection of services for children in need of help and protection, children looked after and care leavers

and

Review of the effectiveness of the Local Safeguarding Children Board[1]

Inspection date: 14 September 2015 – 8 October 2015

Report published: 30 November 2015

Children's services in Brent require improvement to be good

1. Children who need help and protection		Requires improvement
2. Children looked after and achieving permanence		Requires improvement
	2.1 Adoption performance	Good
	2.2 Experiences and progress of care leavers	Requires improvement
3. Leadership, management and governance		Requires improvement

[1] Ofsted produces this report under its power to combine reports in accordance with section 152 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006. This report includes the report of the inspection of local authority functions carried out under section 136 of the Education and Inspection Act 2006 and the report of the review of the Local Safeguarding Children Board carried out under the Local Safeguarding Children Boards (Review) Regulations 2013.

Executive summary

Children's services in Brent require improvement to be good. Although strong and focused leadership has led to the achievement of a number of important improvements in the quality of services, the local authority is not yet delivering consistently good services for children and young people. Inspectors found no serious or widespread concerns but significant areas for development remain.

Improvements achieved since the last inspections of child protection services and safeguarding and children looked after services in 2012 and 2011 include: improved assessments and a stronger focus on the voice of the child; manageable caseloads, increasing the amount of time social workers spend with children; a significantly improved focus on assessing and meeting the health needs of children looked after; and a strengthened adoption service.

The Brent Family Front Door effectively assesses and responds to risk for children who may be in need, or at risk of significant harm. Some children who may benefit from early help services experience delay in having their needs assessed and met. Not all agencies are fully engaged in this process. When the Signs of Safety approach is used, assessments are mostly good. Where it is not used, they lack full information, analysis and a clear focus on children's wishes and feelings. The local authority has a range of assessment tools to assess risk in specific circumstances, such as domestic violence or risk of sexual exploitation, but these are not routinely used to inform understanding of the risk for individual children. The impact of diversity factors such as culture, religion and language is not always well considered in assessments where this may have a bearing on children's needs.

Services for disabled children in Brent are effective. Good integration between children's and adult's services ensures that disabled young people experience a well-managed transition to adult services. The local authority's Ade Adepitan short breaks centre for disabled children and young people has been judged outstanding in a recent inspection.

Progress has been made to tackle child sexual exploitation. Extensive training and awareness raising have taken place including the presentation of the drama 'Chelsea's Choice' in schools. There has been training to raise awareness for over 100 licenced drivers and briefing visits to all local hotels. Good work with the police has included the identification of local 'hot spots' and the issuing of abduction notices in cases of concern. The authority recognises that further work is required. Agencies have agreed funding for a data analyst, although the post is not yet filled. A planned contract for therapeutic support is not yet in place and work is ongoing to embed the use of the child sexual exploitation assessment tool. Work with children and young people who have been missing from home or care is not good enough and is not well integrated with work to tackle child sexual exploitation.

Decisions to take children into care in Brent are appropriate. The local authority has achieved significant and sustained improvements in the duration of care proceedings, which have more than halved in length over the last year. This means that children

and young people can move into permanent homes with carers or return to their families more quickly. Similar improvements have been achieved in adoption timescales. Adoption is considered early for all children who may benefit from it.

Although the stability of placements for children looked after in Brent is improving, it is still below the average for similar councils. There is insufficient capacity across the range of placement options to ensure that the needs of all children and young people are met. Initial decisions to place children out of area are not always made at the right level of seniority.

The quality of plans is not yet consistently good. A minority of care plans and pathway plans and a majority of personal education plans lack clarity, detail or timescales. Actions implemented by the head of the virtual school have improved attainment at Key Stage 1 in 2013–14 and at Key Stage 2 in 2014–15 but are yet to improve attainment across all key stages.

While aspects of provision to care leavers are well developed, and the number entering higher education is relatively high, too few take up high-quality apprenticeships.

Performance management and quality assurance systems are under-developed. They are not well joined up or used effectively to drive up performance. The local authority scrutiny committee lacks sufficient focus on children's social care. It has not identified areas for development and does not drive or track service improvement.

Although there are good individual examples of the local authority listening to and acting on the views of children and young people, for example by involving young people in the re-commissioning of semi-independent accommodation for care leavers, they do not systematically gather or analyse feedback from children and young people. Information from complaints, return home interviews, advocacy and other sources is not collated, analysed and used alongside performance and quality assurance information to help understand how services could be improved. This is a missed opportunity.

The local authority has worked hard over the last year to improve communication and support to schools. Similarly, close working with the police ensures that work to counter the risks posed to young people by radicalisation is effective and integrated into the broader range of services for families. However, there is a lack of strategic cohesion between agencies. The Joint Strategic Needs Analysis lacks focus on the social care needs of children. The Health and Wellbeing Board has not provided effective coordination and there is no current shared plan or framework that sets out how agencies will provide services against agreed priorities or how impact will be measured. The new Children's Trust, although developing fast and increasingly providing a focus for agencies to discuss services for children and young people, is still at too early a stage to have had a significant impact on improving the targeting, coordination and effectiveness of services for children, young people and their families.

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The local authority

Information about this local authority area[2]

Previous Ofsted inspections

- The local authority operates one children's home. This was judged to be outstanding at its most recent Ofsted inspection.
- The previous inspection of the local authority's safeguarding arrangements was in October 2012. The local authority was judged to be adequate.
- The previous inspection of the local authority's services for children looked after was in October 2011. The local authority was judged to be adequate.

Local leadership

- The Director of Children's Services (DCS) has been in post since April 2014.
- The chair of the LSCB has been in post since June 2015.

Children living in this area

- Approximately 70,000 children and young people under the age of 18 years live in Brent. This is 23% of the total population in the area.
- Approximately 29% of the local authority's children are living in poverty.
- The proportion of children entitled to free school meals:
  - in primary schools is 16% (the national average is 16%)
  - in secondary schools is 14% (the national average is 14%)
- Children and young people from minority ethnic groups account for 75% of all children living in the area compared with 22% in the country as a whole.
- The largest minority ethnic groups of children and young people in the area are Asian/Asian British and Black African.
- The proportion of children and young people with English as an additional language:
  - in primary schools is 68% (the national average is 19%).
  - in secondary schools is 57% (the national average is 15%).

[2] The local authority was given the opportunity to review this section of the report and has updated it with local unvalidated data where this was available.

Child protection in this area

- At 31 March 2015, 1,934 children had been identified through assessment as being formally in need of a specialist children's service. This is an increase from 1,413 at 31 March 2014.
- At 31 March 2015, 226 children and young people were the subject of a child protection plan. This is a reduction from 229 at 31 March 2014.
- At 31 March 2015, eight children lived in a privately arranged fostering placement. This is the same number of children as at 31 March 2014.
- Since the last inspection, five serious incident notifications have been submitted to Ofsted and three serious case reviews have been completed or were ongoing at the time of the inspection.

Children looked after in this area

- At 31 March 2015, 323 children were being looked after by the local authority (a rate of 46 per 10,000 children). This is a reduction from 350 (50 per 10,000 children) at 31 March 2014. Of this number:
  - 190 (or 59%) live outside the local authority area
  - 25 live in residential children's homes, of whom 88% live out of the authority area
  - five live in residential special schools,[3] all of whom live out of the authority area
  - 244 live with foster families, of whom 53% live out of the authority area
  - nine live with parents, of whom 22% live out of the authority area
  - 46 children are unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
- In the last 12 months:
  - there have been 12 adoptions
  - 30 children became subject of special guardianship orders
  - 265 children ceased to be looked after, of whom 3% subsequently returned to be looked after
  - 29 children and young people ceased to be looked after and moved on to independent living
  - 23 children and young people ceased to be looked after and are now living in houses of multiple occupation.

[3] These are residential special schools that look after children for 295 days or less per year.

Recommendations

1. Improve performance management and quality assurance mechanisms so that they are better aligned with each other, informed by feedback from children and families and used more effectively to improve the quality of services (paragraphs 102, 103).

2. Improve governance arrangements so that the local authority's scrutiny committee focuses more closely on children's social care and provides robust challenge that contributes to service improvement (paragraph 93).

3. Work with schools and other partners to ensure that children and their families do not experience delays in receiving early help (paragraph 13).

4. Take action to improve assessments, including those using specialist tools, so that they consistently meet the good standards seen in some, with good analysis and an understanding of the child's identity, wishes and feelings (paragraphs 18, 19, 23, 27, 28, 30).

5. Ensure that children's plans, including personal education plans and pathway plans, contain clear and specific actions with timescales for completion (paragraphs 32, 37, 48, 62, 79).

6. Ensure that children's assessments and plans are regularly revised to reflect changing circumstances so that interventions are in line with current needs (paragraphs 18, 62).

7. Ensure that approvals of out of borough placements for children by senior managers are taken in line with statutory guidance and that timely and sufficient consideration and scrutiny is given to the making of such placements (paragraph 55).

8. Strengthen consideration of the culture, religion and language of children and their families and of other factors that reflect the diverse nature of the community in Brent. This includes ensuring that translators are available when needed to avoid delay in assessing children's needs (paragraphs 28, 65).

9. Ensure that children who go missing are offered an interview with an independent person on their return; that information from these interviews is analysed to inform responses for individual children and the child population of Brent; and that this work is integrated with work to protect children at risk of sexual exploitation (paragraphs 45,100).

10. Concentrate the work of the virtual school on measures to narrow the attainment gap across all key stages to build on the success achieved at Key Stage 1 in 2013–14 and at Key Stage 2 in 2014–15 (paragraph 48).

11. Work closely with training providers and careers advice and guidance workers to increase care leaver progression into apprenticeships and other vocational further education (paragraph 85).

Summary for children and young people

- The council has made improvements to services for children but is still not meeting the needs of all children in Brent well enough. Managers in the council understand what they are already doing well and what they need to do better. They are working hard to improve further.
- Most children get help from social workers quickly, particularly if it is urgent. For a few children it takes a little longer and inspectors have told the council that they need to get help to all children quickly.
- Managers make sure that social workers in Brent have enough time to spend talking to children and young people so they understand what they need to do to help.
- There have been improvements in the services for children who need to be looked after but some children and young people still have several changes in their social worker. Inspectors found that some plans did not properly explain what needed to happen to make things better for the children and young people who are in care.
- The local authority does not yet make sure that all children and young people who go missing have a return interview by someone who is independent. The information from these interviews is not always used to make sure children and young people receive the support they need and to make it less likely they will go missing again.
- Managers have worked hard to develop ways to help understand risks to children and young people, for example if they are involved with gangs or at risk of sexual exploitation. Social workers do not always use these ways and so children and young people's plans are not as helpful as they could be in protecting them from harm.
- Care leavers receive regular support but not all of them find their plans useful. Managers know they need to do better at this. Personal advisers work hard to make sure care leavers have suitable accommodation. Many go on to higher education but not enough have opportunities to train through apprenticeships.
- There are not always enough council approved foster carers in Brent to help and support children with brothers and sisters who may need to be in care together or for older children.
- Social workers work hard to find adoptive families for children who need them and, because of this, there are no children waiting to be adopted in Brent.
- The Local Children Safeguarding Board is made up of organisations who work together to organise the protection of children in Brent. The Board needs to be better at finding out which services are improving things for children. It can then help organisations to work together in a better way and ensure that children are protected.

The experiences and progress of children who need help and protection	Requires improvement

Summary

Brent Family Solutions Service (BFSS) provides a wide range of coordinated early help services. There is, however, a lack of timeliness in completing and reviewing assessments using the Common Assessment Framework (CAF). This, coupled with a historic reluctance from some agencies to fully engage in the process, means that some children's needs are not met at the first opportunity.

The Brent Family Front Door (BFFD) is a multi-agency safeguarding hub that is effective in identifying, assessing and responding to risk. The robust prioritisation of referrals ensures that children who are most at risk receive a timely and appropriate response. Accordingly, children and young people are protected well. Partner agencies understand the thresholds within the borough and this leads to appropriate and timely referrals.

The quality and timeliness of completion of child and family assessments (CFAs) is variable, with too many requiring improvement. Poorer assessments lack a thorough consideration of the individual needs of all children. In such cases the quality of plans and planning is inconsistent with some lacking clarity or timescales for the completion of actions.

In the better assessments seen by inspectors, the Signs of Safety (SoS) approach is having a positive impact. In such assessments the child's voice is strongly evident and their wishes and feelings captured to inform assessments and planning. The introduction and use of the SoS approach has led to professionals across agencies working more effectively with children and their families.

The impact of the culture, religion and language of children and their families, or of other characteristics that reflect the diverse nature of the community in Brent, is often not considered well enough in assessments where this would be relevant.

The local authority has a number of assessment tools designed to assess specific concerns, including domestic abuse and child sexual exploitation. However, the use of these tools is not yet well embedded and social workers do not routinely use them to inform assessments of risk.

Manageable caseloads allow social workers to spend more time with children and are starting to support stronger relationships with children and families, leading to more effective interventions. Good management oversight of cases, including mid-way reviews, identifies progress against actions in most cases. This is not routinely followed through in all subsequent case management supervision so progress is not always effectively captured.

Inspection findings

12. Integrated early help services sit in locality teams, with some co-located within children's centres. An aligned services team, funded by partner agencies, co-work children's cases providing additional support, for example an independent domestic violence advocate (IDVA). The early help team receives referrals through the BFFD. This results in the majority of families receiving the appropriate level of intervention.

13. Despite work to engage partners in the CAF process and in undertaking the role of lead professional, the number of CAFs undertaken by partner agencies remains low, with schools only completing 9% of CAFs in 2014–15. As a result, children do not benefit consistently from timely CAF assessments and reviews and this means they do not always receive the services they need to meet their needs when they need them.

14. The Troubled Families programme sits within the package of early help services but staff work with families at all levels of need. Brent improved outcomes for all 810 of its identified families between April 2012 and May 2015, demonstrating improved employment, reduced criminal activity, improved educational engagement and reduced anti-social behaviour.

15. There is good involvement by families in early help services offered by children's centres, which provide a comprehensive range of services to meet identified needs. Children's centres family support workers receive case supervision from the early help team using the SoS model. Established partnerships with health deliver a good range of early help services.

16. The BFFD effectively assesses and responds to risk. Multi-agency information sharing ensures that risk analysis is appropriate and decisions robust. Clearly understood thresholds of need, applied by partners, lead to appropriate referrals. Properly prioritised work ensures that children most at risk receive a timely and appropriate response.

17. Brent is one of 10 local authorities implementing the SoS approach as part of the government's 'Innovations programme'. Where this approach is being used in the BFFD, improved information gathering is leading to a better quality of assessments and engagement with children and families. For disabled children, referrals routed via the BFFD are managed by an effective duty rota system. This ensures that children and their families benefit from a robust, responsive child centred service from appropriately experienced social workers. Disabled young people aged over 14 years, who transfer to adult services, continue to receive robust interventions.

18. Child protection enquiries are thorough, timely and informed by decisions in child protection strategy discussions. All child protection conferences lead to a plan to address children's identified needs, whether or not a child or young person becomes the subject of a formal child protection plan. CFAs are

increasingly timely and most are completed within a timescale that is right for each individual child's needs. Chronologies of significant events that have happened in children's lives are kept up to date and, in the main, children's histories are considered and used to inform assessments of risk. However, these assessments are not routinely updated to reflect such changes and despite the positive impact of the introduction of SoS, there remains some variation in the quality and use of the information gathered.

19. In good assessments, the signs of SoS approach is strongly evident and the wishes and feelings of children are actively explored. This informs the assessments and is reflected in plans. Safety goals, although broad, result in clear specific measurable actions leading to improved outcomes for children. No CFAs seen by inspectors were inadequate. Most were good, but some lacked a thorough consideration of the individual needs of children, particularly those with brothers and sisters.

20. Children are seen alone where appropriate. There is effective use of child-centred techniques in direct work with children, for example 'feeling's monopoly' with teenagers and 'happy/sad house' and 'worry tree' for younger children. The recently introduced 'Outcomes star' used by workers in BFSS effectively captures the wishes and feelings of children but is not yet being consistently used. The use of independent advocates for children who are not looked after is not routinely considered. Where it has been used, for example in the cases of two pregnant teenagers, for whom it was effective in supporting them to make their views and wishes for their unborn babies clear, it has had a positive impact on ensuring that the voices of children and young people are heard. The work of the disabled children's team is creative; the voices of children are sought and brought out using a range of non-verbal techniques.

21. Multi-agency engagement, in particular from health, in the assessment of risk and contribution to child protection plans is good. Participating in SoS results in partners being more effectively engaged and demonstrating greater responsibility and accountability for children's progress.

22. Young people at risk of radicalisation, forced marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM) are protected. In the majority of cases, early identification of risks leads to proactive and immediate safeguarding of young people supported by a well-organised multi-agency response. Proactive work by the police and the use of legal orders has effectively responded to immediate concerns and reduced the risk of radicalisation and forced marriage by ensuring that families remain in this country and that their activities are appropriately monitored. Maternity services provided by the London North West Healthcare NHS Trust include a specific clinic for women subjected to FGM. Their policy of referring to BFFD if women fail to attend two appointments has resulted in the early identification of risk to children.

23. The local authority has a number of specialist risk assessment tools designed to help social workers assess the risk to children from some particular concerns,

including child sexual exploitation, gang affiliation and domestic abuse. However, their use is inconsistent and their impact variable. Some are used as a tick box exercise and have little impact, while others are used more fully, resulting in effective risk reduction and support to children and young people. In relation to domestic abuse, a comprehensive risk assessment tool and extensive guidance are available for use with perpetrators but are rarely used. Risks are being identified and addressed in assessments but the use of these specialist assessment tools is not consistent and their impact is limited.

24. Since the Ofsted child sexual exploitation thematic inspection in November 2014, in which Brent participated, inspectors found improvements in safeguarding children from the risks associated with going missing and sexual exploitation. There are increasing numbers of appropriate referrals to the missing and multi-agency sexual exploitation (MASE) panels both in and out of the borough. Practice is not yet consistent for return home interviews. Where children are receiving an early intervention service, the lack of timeliness in completing CAFs means that their return interviews, when carried out, are not always fully informing plans for children and therefore there is delay in addressing risk.

25. The monitoring of children missing education is thorough. Educational welfare officers work closely with schools, visiting weekly or bi-weekly, to monitor attendance and support schools to implement their behaviour and attendance strategies. The local authority provides schools and parents with a good range of leaflets and guidance covering aspects such as elective home education, unauthorised absence from schools, school attendance, exclusion and education penalty notices. School attendance is closely monitored and showing a three year improving trend from 90% in 2012/13 to 92% in 2014/15.

26. A domestic abuse prevention service, newly commissioned in December 2014, has appointed an IDVA and a multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) coordinator. The IDVA screens all referrals and, as a result, children are receiving a more timely service, normally within four weeks. The MARAC coordinator is providing consistent representation at the steering group and provides training to social workers about the use of the risk assessment checklist, criteria for referral and basic awareness raising. The impact of these new initiatives is not yet evident. Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) work well.

27. Research and theory based methodology do not underpin analysis strongly enough, particularly where neglect is an important feature. Of the 232 children on child protection plans, neglect is the main risk for 132 (57%) of them. Effective and consistent consideration of the impact of the 'toxic trio' of domestic abuse, drug, alcohol and substance abuse and parental mental ill health in presenting need is not prominent enough in assessments.

28. Brent has one of the highest proportions of ethnic minority residents in London. Children and young people from minority ethnic groups account for 75% of all

children living in the area compared with 22% in the country as a whole. The proportion of children and young people with English as an additional language in primary schools is 68% (the national average is 19%) and in secondary schools is 57% (the national average is 15%). Despite this, consideration of how these elements of diversity may have an impact on children's needs is not always present in assessments where this should be considered. Social workers spoken to by inspectors could usually explain how this was part of their thinking and analysis but their case recording does not routinely show this.

29. At the time of the inspection, the local authority's data recorded that they were working with 555 children in need, which is significantly lower than the 1,413 reported as at 31 March 2014. This recording of low numbers of children in need is due to the practice of only counting the electronic case files of the youngest, or most in need child in a family, rather than those of all the children in the family that the local authority is working with. This practice followed a change of electronic case recording system. This has resulted in the local authority being unable to assure themselves that the individual needs and risks of all brothers or sisters in a family are consistently met. Changes to the electronic case recording system to address this problem are planned but not yet in place.

30. Escalation of concern generally leads to an appropriate and proportionate response to risk when cases are 'stepped up' from child in need to child protection. However, in a minority of cases, the rationale for moving from child in need to child protection is not clearly recorded. Without a clear identification of the main presenting concerns it is more difficult for assessments to consider the main risks to a child and to identify the actions most likely to make a positive difference for them.

31. At the time of the inspection, 232 children were subject of child protection plans, of which 38 (16%) were second or subsequent plans. In all of the cases seen by inspectors, decisions to make children the subject of child protection plan were appropriate. Effective review mechanisms and oversight by the head of service has resulted in no children or young people being subject to a child protection plan for over two years.

32. The step down from child protection to child in need is both timely and appropriate for almost all children and young people. However, the robustness of plans is not consistent, actions are not always clear, specific and given a timescale for completion. This means that in most cases it is difficult to evidence what progress has been made. In some cases, where there has been a step down to early help, active co-working between social workers and BFFS provides continuity of relationships for families.

33. SoS is used in core groups and case conferences. This enables children and family members to engage better with professionals and understand the seriousness of concerns. In one example of best practice, good support and engagement by the social worker and a specialist teenage pregnancy midwife

enabled a very young mother to express her wishes and plan for her unborn baby to have a permanent family through adoption as soon as possible. However, this is not a consistent picture across the service: not all children, young people or parents benefit from such a focussed approach to understanding their wishes and feelings. The local authority does well at making sure it works with fathers, stepfathers, and wider family members and not just mothers. This means that social workers do better at understanding both the strengths and the difficulties within a family that make a difference to how quickly and successfully a child's welfare can be improved.

34. Children and young people are not routinely invited to conferences or reviews. The chairs of child protection case conferences report that social workers appropriately prepare children before meetings but that attendance should be better. Feedback from young people does not sufficiently inform the development of practice, as a process for systematically collecting their views is not in place.

35. Recent changes in the commissioning of interpreting services have affected the reliability of interpreters attending conferences. This has resulted in delay because some conferences have to be re-arranged to ensure effective communication with children and family members.

36. There is good management oversight of child protection work, for example through timely progress reviews during child protection investigations. This identifies progress against actions but a lack of systematic follow through in subsequent case management supervision means progress is not always effectively captured. SoS supervision on cases clearly demonstrates effective challenge to professional assumptions and analysis in most cases sampled. In more recently opened cases, this is leading to stronger and more robust actions that drive effective change.

37. A new multi-agency steering group has oversight of private fostering in Brent. This group is not fully established and has not yet had an impact on improving either the timeliness or quality of assessments or awareness levels and notification numbers. Plans are in place to undertake more awareness raising. However, the number of known private fostering arrangements remains low. There is drift in carrying out visits and assessments and, when children's cases are co-worked, poor liaison results in delay in developing plans to meet children's needs.

38. The Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO) service is insufficiently resourced which limits awareness raising work needed with faith groups and partner agencies. Referrals from partner agencies are consequently low. The LADO annual report highlights necessary improvement actions. However, it does not set clear expectations for their completion and, as a result, it is difficult to track the progress and impact of planned actions. Strategy discussions are timely but it is not always clear how quickly agreed actions are carried out or what impact they have had.

The experiences and progress of children looked after and achieving permanence	Requires improvement

Summary

Outcomes for children looked after in Brent are not yet good because services are not consistently meeting the needs of all children.

Social workers and personal advisers do not regularly update assessments and plans to reflect young people's current circumstances. The wishes and feelings of children are not always used to inform their plans, or collated and analysed strategically to help shape services.

Changes to services for children in care who go missing and those at risk of child sexual exploitation are not yet demonstrating sustained improvements. Children who have been missing do not consistently get offered, or receive, a return interview from an independent adult.

Strategies to ensure that there is a sufficient range and number of placement options for children and young people have not yet provided enough capacity to meet the needs of all children. Decisions to place children out of the local authority area are approved retrospectively and this means that their care plans do not receive enough consideration before they move into new placements.

When decisions are made to take children into care, these are appropriate. Care proceedings, which took an average of 66 weeks between April 2014 and March 2015 now average 29 weeks, quicker than the 35 week average for similar councils. This means that children move into permanent homes with carers or return to their families much more quickly.

A decrease in the number of temporary agency social workers and an increase in permanent staff is a positive for the longer term stability of the workforce but in the short term has meant that a minority of children have continued to experience frequent changes of social worker. Life story work is not yet consistently supporting all children to make sense of their identities; some materials provided for very young children are more suitable for older children.

Measures aimed at improving educational attainment for children looked after are not yet improving outcomes across all key stages.

Adoption performance is good. The local authority has given significant focus to improving the timeliness of adoption work. As a result, at the time of the inspection, no children were waiting to be placed with adopters where legal orders had been made to allow this to happen.

Care leavers receive appropriate support to help them make the transition to independence including moving into suitable accommodation. A high proportion progress to higher education but progression to apprenticeships is too low.

Inspection findings

39. At the time of the inspection, there were 318 children looked after by Brent. In the vast majority of cases, decisions to look after children are timely, appropriate and in the best interests of children. Decision makers record a clear rationale for taking children into care and parental consent when this is appropriate.

40. The duration of care proceedings has significantly improved from an average of 66 weeks between April 2014 and March 2015 to 29 weeks at present, which is better than the 35 week average for similar councils. The local authority has effective mechanisms in place to track the timeliness of work both leading up to and during court. The appointment of a case-tracking officer to share good practice, support and mentor social workers, and track individual cases has supported improvements in the quality of social work evidence and received positive feedback from the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service and court partners.

41. Processes for monitoring the quality of work before court proceedings, under the Public Law Outline (PLO), are not as robust as the processes for monitoring work in the court arena and inspectors found variability in the quality of PLO letters to parents. In a minority of cases, letters use complex legal language, which may result in families not being able to understand what is being said, or what is expected of them.

42. In the six months prior to the inspection, 53% of children who ceased to be looked after, returned to live with parents, relatives or other persons with parental responsibility. Support to these children is variable. Most of them receive regular visits from social workers, who also provide support to their parents but many of them do not have a plan that clearly lays out the support they will receive or provides targets for further progress.

43. Management oversight and scrutiny through the children looked after tracking panel, ensures good consideration is given to 'connected person' assessments for children looked after being placed with members of their extended families. Linked to this is a significant increase in the use of special guardianship orders from 10 in 2012–13 to 30 in 2014–15. Special guardianship arrangements in Brent are based on good quality assessments and carers benefit from thorough support plans.

44. Where children have a consistent social worker, who has been able to develop a positive relationship with them, there is evidence that they feel well understood and are actively engaged in shaping their plans. However, a minority of children continue to experience frequent changes of social worker. In these situations some children become tired of repeatedly telling their story and do not engage as well with their workers. This has also had a negative impact on the willingness of some young people to accept the offer of an advocate; only seven children looked after received an advocacy service

between April 2014 and March 2015. While inspectors found that most children looked after and young people they spoke to were not aware of the formal complaints procedures, they said that they had access to adults they trusted with their views.

45. Since the time of Ofsted's thematic inspection of services for children and young people at risk of child sexual exploitation, published in November 2014, in which Brent took part, there have been improvements in services to protect children from the risks associated with going missing and child sexual exploitation. There are increasing numbers of appropriate referrals to the missing and MASE panels. There is evidence of appropriate training provided to foster carers, residential workers and schools. This is part of a wider programme of safeguarding training, which also covers, bullying, e-safety, sexual health and diversity. Inspectors found that although an increasing number of young people who go missing are offered return home interviews, they are still not being offered to all young people for who they would be relevant. Those undertaking the interviews are not always appropriately independent individuals and the content of interviews is not routinely used to inform safety planning for young people.

46. Following recommendations from the Ofsted inspection of services for children looked after in 2011 and as noted by the Care Quality Commission's Review of health services for children looked after and safeguarding in 2014 there have been significant improvements in health services to children looked after in Brent. Performance on the completion of health assessments and of strength and difficulty questionnaires (SDQs), which young people fill in to help identify health needs and assess their wellbeing, shows significant improvement over the last year. Six monthly health assessments for children under six years of age, improved from 88% completion in 2013–14 to 100% in 2014–15. SDQ completion increased from 42% in 2013–14 to 74% in 2014–15, with progress being sustained into this current year.

47. The health team for children looked after undertake effective assessments of the health needs of all children in Brent as well as within a 20-mile radius. This can be extended where host authorities are unable to undertake assessments within timescales. This thorough approach is good practice because it helps ensure children's health needs can be met quickly because they are assessed in a timely manner. The secondment of a dedicated sexual health worker, offering sexual health advice and information to young people has contributed to low teenage pregnancy rates for children looked after. Robust quality assurance takes place of all health assessments whether children live in or out borough. This robust monitoring ensures that children's health needs are identified when they first arise and that they are effectively addressed.

48. The head of the virtual school has implemented a wide range of actions to improve the educational attainment of children looked after. Attainment gaps have narrowed at Key Stage 1 over the last three years and at Key Stage 2 in 2014–15 but despite initiatives to address them, they have continued to widen

at Key Stage 4. The virtual school is targeting additional help and tracking children's progress, but the quality of personal education plans is too variable and too many children are underachieving, limiting their options for future education, employment and economic well-being. Previous problems with low completion rates for personal education plans have been resolved. However, while a minority are completed well, the majority require improvement. Typically those less than good do not show children's progress over different years, do not have input from the child or do not include targets and actions that are detailed, sufficiently specific and measurable for children to reach their potential. The very large majority (87%) of children looked after attend good or outstanding schools. For those not doing so, the virtual school closely monitors the support provided and progression made by those children.

49. The proportions of children looked after at Key Stage 1 achieving at least level two in reading (71%), writing (71%) and mathematics (71%) improved in 2013–14 and remained in-line with national averages. In 2014–15, the proportion of children looked after at Key Stage 2 achieving at least Level 4 in reading (100%), writing (100%) and mathematics (100%) is very positive and represents a significant improvement on the 46%, 23% and 54% achieved in these subjects, respectively, in 2013–14. Those achieving five GCSEs grades A* to C, including English and mathematics, in 2014–15 is low at only 5%.

50. Inspectors found a good range of alternative educational provision provided through local and commissioned services. At the time of the inspection, 47 children were in alternative provision with all children offered at least 25 hours education per week. In 2015, GCSE outcomes were low with only one pupil (out of 14 Year 11 pupils sitting GCSEs) in commissioned alternative provision achieving five GCSEs grades A* to C. While opportunities to achieve vocational qualifications are in place, progression to employment, education and training was also low, at 32% for 2013–14. The provisional September 2015 guarantee figure of employment, education and training of 84% is a positive sign but at present only represents the guaranteed offer rather than what has actually been achieved for young people.

51. The monitoring of children missing education is thorough. The children-missing panel, a multi-agency panel, frequently monitor those children who are risk assessed as high priority, sharing information and coordinating strategies. The 147 children currently home educated are closely monitored by a dedicated educational welfare officer for elective home education, who also provides guidance to families considering this approach and annual updating visits.

52. Monitoring of placements by the children looked after panel has shown improvements in placement stability in Brent. In 2013–14, 17% of children had three or more placements during the year and by 2014–15, this had reduced to 13%. This is nearer to the levels of stability in similar councils and gives more children and young people the opportunity to form positive relationships with their carers.

53. The local authority's fostering strategy is not meeting its own objective to ensure that Brent has enough foster carers with the right skills to meet the needs of all of its children looked after. There was a net loss of nine carers in 2014–15, with this loss continuing into 2015–16. Strategic leaders are prioritising sufficiency and proactively target foster carer recruitment. The current number of potential foster carers under assessment is showing an improvement and the duration of assessments is closely monitored to ensure timely approvals but this has not yet been translated into more approved foster carers.

54. The local authority commissions a range of foster placements through independent fostering agencies, as part of the West London Alliance, a consortia arrangement with other London local authorities. These placements are of a good standard. The reasons foster carers leave the fostering service are not yet collated and analysed to inform the fostering strategy. The majority of semi-independent accommodation for care leavers is individually purchased and ongoing work to formalise commissioning of a framework through the West London Alliance is not yet in place.

55. Decisions for children to be placed out of authority are approved retrospectively by a senior manager. This practice does not give sufficient scrutiny to these arrangements and is not meeting care planning guidance and regulations in ensuring the needs of children are met. In a minority of cases, children placed out of the authority do not have appropriate educational placements identified for them at the time of placement.

56. Inspectors found appropriate placements of children with providers who have achieved 'good' ratings. Where re-inspections judged them to be below good, case recording showed that thorough risk assessments are done to decide if it is in a child's best interests to stay put or to move to another placement.

57. The fostering and adoption service is proactive in family finding for all children. Decisions made in permanence planning meetings and reviews are underpinned by research and thorough assessments of children's needs. These meetings consider adoption for older children when this is appropriate. Family finding for older children also considers the use of long-term foster care, including the use of externally commissioned placements. Inspectors found timely formal matching and good use of connected person's assessments.

58. Foster carer assessments presented to panel are variable in quality with most requiring some additional information or further analysis to fully support good decision making by panel. The panel adviser and panel chair provide robust quality assurance and challenge. Improvements since the recent appointment of the fostering development coordinator have seen a refocusing on the training agenda, to ensure a skilled workforce to meet the needs of children and help build stability. Recent improvements are well thought through but are not yet ensuring that all foster carers are encouraged by supervising social workers to engage fully in developing their skills and taking up available training. Foster

carers are very positive about one recent introduction, social pedagogy training; they say that it helps them to develop strategies for managing difficult behaviours and so reduces the chances of placements breaking down and children or young people having to move to new carers. Foster carers say that they feel well supported by the fostering service and inspectors found annual foster carer reviews to be of a high standard.

59. Inspectors observed sound arrangements in place for children to have contact with their family and friends. These arrangements are risk assessed and undertaken at the local family centre or in the community and are monitored regularly.

60. The stable, longstanding, independent reviewing officer (IRO) service, which is commissioned from an independent provider, has continued to support children and has provided them with some stability during a period where there has been a significant turnover in social workers. Ninety-three per cent of children attended or contributed to their reviews in 2014–15. However, in a minority of cases, recording of reviews and decisions lacked sufficient clarity or relevant timescales for completion. This makes it difficult for young people to understand or engage with plans for their future and for social workers and IROs to track if progress is being achieved.

61. Quality assurance, undertaken jointly between the director of the provider organisation for the IRO service and the local authority IRO team manager, is acknowledged by the local authority to have focused primarily on a small range of quantitative measures such as timescales and not enough on the quality and impact on children of the IRO's work. A well-attended, regular quarterly meeting looks at themes and joint training. However, some local authority performance data, such as current placement stability figures, are not shared with the IRO service and so cannot inform this consideration. Inspectors saw evidence of appropriate use of the dispute resolution process with 65 escalations recorded in 2014–15. Themes at that time included frequent changes of social worker, a lack of rigour in management oversight in ensuring case progression, and social workers not fulfilling some statutory duties such as regular visits.

62. The recording of work with children and their families does not always show all of the work done; statutory visits, case supervisions and updated plans are not consistently recorded. Such omissions were often the result of changes in social worker. Where inspectors saw SoS templates used, case recording much more clearly shows actions to be undertaken, their outcomes and the voices of children and young people themselves.

63. The Brent Children in Care council, Care in Action (CIA), regularly meets with senior managers and the corporate parenting committee to discuss things that the young people want to raise with the committee. This has resulted in a number of positive actions relating to specific issues, such as young people's involvement in a re-tender for semi-independent accommodation for care

leavers and their involvement in developing consultation leaflets. However, Brent does not systematically gather feedback from the children looked after population to inform service development, nor does it have a communication strategy, such as a 'you said we did' update to show children and young people the difference their voices can make.

64. Children looked after in Brent have good access to a range of leisure services with free tickets to most events at Wembley stadium and appropriate financial support for educational trips and leisure activities as part of their individual plans.

65. The ethnic, cultural and religious mix of the local authority's foster carers matches that of the borough and almost all children and young people are well matched with foster carers in this respect. Social workers' case recording shows appropriate consideration given to identifying children's diversity needs in a majority of cases. However, in a minority of cases where a translator was needed, problems with their availability have resulted in delayed or cancelled meetings for children and their families. This in turn leads to delay in children's needs being assessed and met.

The graded judgement for adoption performance is that it is good

66. Adoption is considered early for all children. A well-reasoned rationale is clearly recorded to explain decisions where adoption is not the most appropriate plan to meet children's needs. These decisions are supported by research findings and often informed by consultation with Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) and professionals who know children well.

67. Regular permanence planning meetings are routinely attended by the placements service, ensuring that key staff are aware of all children who may require adoption. Parallel planning is well established. This allows for early family finding and ensures that adoptive placements are identified quickly for children who need them. Currently, there are no children with a placement order waiting to be placed with adopters and family finding has identified potential families for two children pending court decisions.

68. At the conclusion of legal proceedings, when children are made subject to a Placement Order, the case responsibility transfers from care planning teams to the adoption and post permanence support team. Although this increases the number of social workers a child experiences it does ensure that urgency and focus is given to family finding and securing an adoption placement for children. Regular scrutiny is given to the cases of children where the plan for adoption has not been achieved. This has contributed to the timely and appropriate rescinding of adoption decisions after family finding has not found a suitable match. The decisions for three children have been rescinded in the 12

months prior to inspection. Parallel planning has successfully identified alternative long term permanent arrangements for these children.

69. Timeliness of adoption work has significantly improved and this trend is continuing in 2015–16. From the time a child enters care to moving to an adoptive placement the Brent three-year average for 2012–15 is 544 days. While not meeting the government threshold of 487 days this performance is better than the England average of 628 days and the Brent 2011–14 average of 652 days. Similarly, from when the court makes the order enabling the local authority to place a child with adopters until the child is placed, the time children wait in Brent has reduced from 306 days in 2011–14 to 197 days in 2012–15. Again, this performance is better than the national average of 217 days but does not yet meet the government threshold of 121 days.

70. The quality of child permanence reports has improved over time. The large majority provide comprehensive information about the child, their identified needs, birth family history and clearly articulate why the child is unable to remain with their parents or within their family. When new information in relation to the child's development or parental health is identified, the child's permanence report is updated up until the point when a suitable match is identified for the child. This allows prospective adopters to have the most up to date information available about the child.

71. Recruitment and assessment of adopters are now aligned to national recruitment and assessment arrangements. Regional partnership working has increased the regularity of the mandatory preparation training for adopters, enabling adopter recruitment to conclude more quickly. Adopter assessments are of good quality, identifying the strengths and vulnerabilities of adopters, which assists in the matching of children with adopters. The local authority is currently targeting its recruitment of adopters to increase the pool of adopters who are able to offer placements to older children, those with complex needs and those which enable brothers and sisters to remain together. The local authority does consider and encourage fostering to adopt and concurrent adoption arrangements. However, the number of adopters who choose this option remains very low.

72. The number of children requiring adoption in Brent has reduced, in line with the national picture. In addition, many of these children are very young. As a result, for many children a choice of adopters is available. Careful matching with prospective adopters takes place at selection meetings. These meetings rigorously consider which prospective adopters would best meet individual children's needs. Decisions made at these meetings are well recorded and clearly articulate the reasons why specific adopters are chosen. The right balance is given to securing the best placement that will meet the holistic needs of the child and seeking an exact ethnicity match. When no in-house adopters are available to meet the needs of children this is identified at an early stage. Family finding is then extended to the regional consortium and, when necessary, national family finding takes place.

73. The local authority currently has 13 adopter households waiting to be matched with children. These adopters have been recruited in the last two years and their profiles reflect a national drive in adopter recruitment. For a small number of these adopters, their circumstances have changed which makes them temporarily unavailable. The large majority have narrow requirements which are limiting the children with which they can be matched. All these adopters have had timely referral to the national adoption register and profiles shared within the regional consortium. Good efforts are made to continue to family find for these adopters both locally and nationally. The next steps support group has been established to ensure continued support to these adopters while family finding continues.

74. The adoption and permanence panel has a suitably independent chair with a sufficiently wide range of members who are knowledgeable about adoption and permanence. This includes adopted adults, adopters and consistent elected member attendance. Panel administration is effective. The agency adviser provides robust quality assurance on the papers presented to panel, identifying deficits early, so that these can be rectified before panel and avoid delay. Panel members carefully consider all applications, making sound recommendations to the agency decision maker. They also provide feedback to the agency on the quality of each report, the verbal presentation of social workers and the timeliness of assessments. This contributes to improving practice. Decisions by the agency decision maker are timely and carefully considered.

75. Adopters are well supported by social workers when children first move to their care with careful consideration given to the transition arrangements. Foster carers are an integral part of these arrangements and help prepare children well for the move to their new family. Many children moving to adopters in Brent are very young. While life story books are provided, they do not assist direct work between adopters and the child in the early days of placement as they are not age appropriate. Good quality 'later life' letters are provided to help children when they are older to understand the plans that have been made for them. Inspectors found 'Wish You Well' contact between children and their birth families sensitively managed, and direct and indirect letterbox contact arrangements supported.

76. Adoption and post-permanence support is provided to all those who have had experience of adoption. During 2014–15, 47 families were provided with adoption support. This included services to birth parents and adopted adults as well as children and their adopters. Almost all adoption support plans appropriately identify children's needs, including the support needed in the short, medium and long term and how these will be met. The service offer ongoing support and adopters speak positively about adoption fun days and regular communications from the team. Detailed and analytical adoption support assessments underpin applications to the Adoption Support Fund which is increasingly used by adopters to access specialised therapeutic support for children.

The graded judgement about the experience and progress of care leavers is that it requires improvement

77. Care leavers reported to inspectors that communication between personal advisers and themselves is frequent and that they feel well supported. The proportion of care leavers that personal advisers are not in touch with is low at 6%. Where young people are disabled, in need of supported housing, or for those in need of mental health support, personal advisers work closely with partners to ensure a smooth transition to adult services. Where appropriate the existing social worker will remain the key contact with the young person when they leave care to provide continuity of support. Personal advisers strongly encourage young people to stay in care until their 18th birthday and consequently the proportion doing so improved from 57% in 2013–14 to 61% in 2014–15, although this is still lower than the average for similar councils or for England, of 67%.

78. Appropriate use is made of drug and alcohol services to support young people with drug and alcohol misuse problems. Dedicated nurses for children looked after provide advice for young people with sexual health concerns. A strong relationship between the youth offending team and the family adolescent support team ensures a proactive response to meeting the educational needs and providing intensive support for young people being released from custody. Safeguarding needs are considered when young people are arranging accommodation. For example, one young person took up a tenancy outside the borough due to previous involvement with gangs.

79. Pathway plans vary too much in quality. This is rightly identified by local authority managers as an area for further improvement. In the best cases, plans clearly reflect the views and needs of the individual young person and are written in the first person to give greater ownership. However, in a quarter of cases considered by inspectors, the reviews of pathway plans were not undertaken within appropriate timeframes. This variation in quality and timeliness was reflected in the views of young people when they talked to inspectors about how helpful they found their plans.

80. The support for care leavers' transition to independence has improved through the development of a 'Preparation for Independence' booklet and checklist in consultation with care leavers. The booklet is designed to develop young peoples' skills and knowledge for independent living and provide support and guidance in the preparation of pathway plans. One social worker enthusiastically talked through how she uses it with young people on an ongoing basis and how the information supports the preparation of pathway plans. She said it supports active engagement with the young person because it encourages dialogue and an increased ownership of the pathway plan as a result. However, the booklet and checklist are not yet being systematically used

with all young people and there are no plans to catch up with any recent care leavers who have not had this booklet.

81. A housing panel meets monthly to track the 'move on plans' of young people over the age of 17 and care leavers, who are supported to move into a range of accommodation appropriate to their needs. Care leavers receive a £2000 moving on allowance. The proportion of 19–21 year-old-care leavers in suitable accommodation increased from 70% in 2013–14 to 80% in 2014–15 and at the time of the inspection all care leaver were judged to be in suitable accommodation by the local authority. The appropriateness of multiple occupancy dwellings is now checked as part of the commissioning process and the quality of semi-independent accommodation has much improved in last 12 months.

82. The local authority has a policy not to use bed and breakfast accommodation for young people, and incidents of its use have only occurred in rare and exceptional circumstances. Tenancy breakdown rates for care leavers are very low with only two in the last 12 months. The proportion of care leavers who choose staying put arrangements with foster carers is also improving. In 2013-14 only 37% of young people who turned 18 remained in foster care. In 2014-15 this had improved to 52%. When a 16- or 17-year-old young person presents themselves as homeless, swift action is taken to ensure that appropriate accommodation is found. Housing staff and social workers work well together and when it is in a young person's interest for them to become a looked after child, these decisions are made swiftly.

83. The personal and educational achievements of care leavers and children looked after are recognised at an annual celebration evening and young people are proud of their achievements. Care leavers also have good opportunities to become role models for other care leavers or for those entering the care system. The Brent pledge and care leavers' charter sets out the Brent local authority promises for children in care and care leavers. However, care leavers met during the inspection had little understanding of the pledge or its relevance for them. The CIA group includes care leavers and it has been effective in instigating improvements. For example, concerns raised by care leavers about the quality of semi-independent housing led to their subsequent involvement in the commissioning process for new providers.

84. Care leavers have good access to careers advice and guidance, producing curriculum vitae, and preparing for interviews. The proportion of care leavers in higher education is excellent. In 2013–14, the percentage in higher education was 30% against an 18% average in similar councils and a 6% England average. Brent is currently supporting 35 care leavers in higher education. However, low and declining GCSE achievement is resulting in the number progressing to higher education reducing. A university panel provides a detailed analysis of care leavers in university, closely monitoring progress and achievement, and identifying any additional support required.

85. The analysis of the progress and achievement of care leavers in further education and of those on apprenticeships is not sufficiently well developed. Although the local authority has six ring-fenced apprenticeships for care leavers, current local authority figures show that progression into apprenticeships, at 4%, is low. Although this low figure is not out of line with other councils, the local authority has taken the positive step of identifying this as a service priority. Hard to reach young people are supported by a dedicated mentor commissioned through the virtual school but although better than the national average, around one-quarter of care leavers are not in education, employment or training.

86. The children looked after nurse meets regularly with young people to go through their health information and also completes exit health assessments, as young people leave care, to consider wider health aspects with them. Care leavers receive an appropriate health passport which has been recently revised. Discharge letters for disabled children are written by the designated doctor to the child's general practitioner at the point of transition to adult services. This is good practice because it ensures that relevant information is available to professionals to help meet the needs of the young person.

87. Access to mental health support for care leavers under the age of 18 matches that provided to children looked after and young people and contains some specific services, over and above mainstream CAMHS provision. There are not, however, any care leaver-specific services for those over 18, which means that the particular needs of these care leavers may not be as swiftly recognised or met as for those under 18 years of age.

Leadership, management and governance	Requires improvement

Summary

The local authority, with strong leadership provided by the director of children's services and the chief executive, has been successful in making a number of important improvements in the quality of services children receive and the outcomes they achieve. The SoS approach has made a significant difference to how well social workers work with children. The health needs of children looked after are much better considered and met than they were a year ago. Care proceedings and adoption are much timelier. The local authority has also been successful in ensuring that it has a more stable workforce and is less reliant on temporary agency staff. Social workers have manageable caseloads that afford them the time necessary to see children regularly.

However, overall the local authority is not yet providing a good service for children and young people because some developments are too new to have made a positive difference and others are not yet in place. Some planned improvements to services for children at risk of child sexual exploitation, such as the appointment of a data analyst and the commissioning of a contracted service to provide therapeutic support, are not yet in place and the specialist risk assessment tool is not yet sufficiently informing work with young people. Work with children and young people who are missing from home or care is not good enough and is not well integrated with work to tackle child sexual exploitation.

As a corporate parent and in its wider work with children, the local authority does not systematically collect and analyse feedback from children and young people to help it understand the difference it is making to influence and improve service delivery. The number of placement changes experienced by children and young people looked after, although reducing, is higher than the average for similar local authorities. The local authority has not yet managed to ensure that it has enough foster carers with the right skills and that they are consistently well enough matched with children and young people.

Performance management and quality assurance systems are under-developed. They are not well joined up or used effectively to drive up performance. The local authority scrutiny committee lacks sufficient focus on the safeguarding and social care needs of children and young people. It is not possible to see how it has identified any areas of poor practice or supported any service improvements for children and young people in this area of service provision.

The majority of social workers receive regular supervision and management oversight of their work. When informed by the SoS approach there is sharper analysis and a strong focus on the wishes and feelings of children. However, gaps in the supervision and case direction received by a minority of social workers has led to delays in progressing work to improve outcomes for some children.

Inspection findings

88. The director of children's services and her senior team of managers are focused and energetic in driving improvements in key areas of the local authority's work. A child or young person in Brent is more likely than a year ago to receive effective help if they are at risk of child sexual exploitation and more likely to have the chance of building a good relationship with a single social worker who does not change during the time they and their family are receiving help from the department. A child or young person in the care of the local authority is also more likely to report good wellbeing and to have their health needs effectively met. Improvements such as these are making a positive difference for children.

89. Despite improvements such as those mentioned above, the overall quality of services provided to children and young people in Brent requires improvement to be good. This is because the pace and impact of these changes is not consistent across the full range of services provided by the local authority. Some changes are already making a positive difference to children, while others are yet to have an impact or have not yet commenced.

90. The local authority's introduction of the SoS approach, although not yet fully embedded in all practice, is a significant development. Where social workers and other professionals use this approach, assessments of children's needs contain fuller information, better analysis and a stronger focus on children's wishes and feelings. This leads to plans and the services that meet children's needs.

91. The local authority is implementing a new electronic case recording system to improve their ability to access and use information and data. This new system is not yet fully operational and the current system contains flaws. This means that the local authority cannot assure themselves that the individual needs of all children in need are being consistently identified and met. Data produced about the number of children in need who the local authority is working with present as a significant under-reporting of the actual number.

92. At a senior level, the former chief executive, who has only very recently left the post, has taken an active role in monitoring the work of children's services, and instigated effective action to address identified problems. In addition to regular meetings with the director of children's services, she has met bi-monthly with the director, the leader and deputy leader of the council, lead member for children and the independent chair of the LSCB. As a result of this meeting an additional £500,000 of funding was directed to support the recruitment of additional social workers. This has led to reduced caseloads. It also provided funding to ensure the roll-out across Brent schools of the drama production 'Chelsea's Choice', to provide information and guidance to young people about child sexual exploitation.

93. The local authority scrutiny committee has considered the education, health and early years needs of children but has given too little consideration to the welfare and safeguarding needs of children. When these needs have been looked at, for example in the committee's consideration of the annual report of the LSCB, there has been little urgency in addressing identified deficits and it is not possible to see what impact the committee has had.

94. As a corporate parent, the local authority has worked closely and effectively with health agencies to achieve significant improvements in meeting the health needs of children looked after. Significant and sustained reductions in the length of care proceedings along with other improvements in the pace of work, such as more timely adoptions, mean that most children in Brent who need a permanent home that is not with their parents achieve this in a timely manner. However, the local authority's fostering strategy is not yet meeting its target to ensure that it has sufficient carers with the right skills to meet the needs of children looked after, particularly those who are older or who have brothers and sisters who also need to be looked after. Although the placement stability of children looked after is improving, it is still less good than that in similar local authorities and the overall stock of foster carers is reducing.

95. There are some good examples of the local authority listening to the views of young people and taking action as a result, such as inviting young people contributing to the content of a new leaflet for young people leaving care. However, more work is required to ensure that the views of children and young people are routinely sought and acted on. The take-up of advocacy for children attending looked after reviews is low and this is not a service normally available for those attending child protection case conferences. The wishes and feelings of children expressed to advocates in complaints or in return home interviews are not aggregated and analysed to identify key themes that could inform service planning.

96. At a strategic level, there is a lack of sufficient cohesion in the way that agencies work together to provide services for children. The joint strategic needs assessment (JSNA) lacks a strong enough focus on the social care needs of children. The Health and Wellbeing Board has suffered from poor attendance over the last year and has been described as having, 'lost its way'. There is no current shared plan that sets out how agencies will provide services or against which agencies can measure the collective difference they are making for children. The Health and Wellbeing Board held a workshop event in June this year to bring greater clarity and drive to its work and the leader of the council has recently taken over as the chair of the board. These are positive developments but are too new to have had an impact. Similarly, the new Brent Children's Trust, although developing fast and increasingly providing a real focus for agencies to discuss and plan services, is also at too early a stage to have had a significant impact. For example, discussions at the trust about establishing shared commissioning arrangements across agencies are detailed and thorough but are yet to be put into practice.

97. Targeted work by the local authority over the last year has led to dramatically improved communication and joint working between children's services and schools in Brent. Schools are positive about the advice and the direct support they receive in a number of areas and the positive difference it has made, including, children missing education, concerns they may have about possible female genital mutilation, gang affiliation, radicalisation and work with unaccompanied asylum seeking children. This improved relationship has not yet translated into schools being more ready to take on the role of lead-professional in CAFs. The local authority is aware of this and is working with schools to provide training and a clearer, briefer CAF form to help address this situation. However, schools currently take on the lead professional role in a relatively low 9% of CAFs.

98. The local authority has made progress in their work to combat child sexual exploitation. Extensive awareness training has been undertaken. This has not only included relevant childcare professionals and young people themselves but also over 100 licensed drivers and visits to all local hotels. Good joint working with the police has had a positive impact including the identification of 'hot-spots' and the issuing of abduction notices in cases of concern where this is appropriate (16 issued in 2015 between April and the start of the inspection). Some analysis of trends and themes has been undertaken but this needs to be in greater detail to inform future service planning. An additional data analyst position has been agreed but is not yet in place to support work in this area.

99. A risk assessment tool has been developed to assess risk and protective factors in relation to child sexual exploitation Inspectors found the tool was inconsistently used to assess risk and inform planning. This reduces the potential of timely interventions with some young people. A Safer London young person's advocate has been appointed to add capacity to the support provided to young people but plans to move away from spot-purchased therapeutic support for victims to a more focused and responsive contracted provision have not yet been realised. Although there has been good joint working with the police, this has not been consistent across all agencies, for example staff from genito-urinary medicine (GUM) clinics are yet to attend MASE panel meetings.

100. The local authority and partners are not making the best use of intelligence from return home interviews for children and young people who have been missing. The content of interviews is not collected and analysed to identify themes that could inform service planning in the future. The identification of the 'pull' factors that lead young people to go missing is a particular gap in the analysis of this information when it is considered alongside information about those who may be at risk of child sexual exploitation.

101. Joint work with the police is also strong in relation to countering the risk that young people may be at as a result of radicalisation. This area of work is mature, well-coordinated, and integrated into the broader offer of services for children. This ensures that children's wider welfare needs are considered

alongside their specific needs arising from radicalisation. Particular examples of good practice in Brent include projects specifically to support parents and organisations managing supplementary schools.

102. The use of performance management and quality assurance processes to assess the impact and improve the quality of services for children is under-developed. The range of data considered is largely appropriate but is not adapted as new priority areas are identified. For example once the local authority's own return home audit identified an under-use of return home interviews, this was not added to the data set to monitor if performance improved. Analysis of quantitative performance data is not enhanced by qualitative information from audits, feedback from children and families or the views of staff. This limits the local authority's ability to form a rounded analysis that would best support managers in understanding the reasons for any poor performance and identifying possible solutions.

103. Information from audits is not well-joined up, or routinely used to drive improvement. For example, the local authority's audit of child protection case conferences concluded that more Family Group Conferences should be undertaken at nearly the same point in time as the decision was made to terminate the existing service. Case audits are of a reasonable quality but do not give rise to specific recommendations to improve work with individual children. They are not collectively analysed for learning that could inform training or service design. This means that the local authority is not getting the best value from the auditing work it is undertaking.

104. The local authority has not appointed a principal social worker. The absence of such a post holds back their ability to embed good practice and limits senior managers' capacity to fully understand the quality and impact of front-line practice.

105. The supervision and management oversight of staff is variable. The majority of social workers receive regular supervision and management oversight. Where this is informed by the SoS approach, the quality of case discussions is generally good and contains a sharp focus on the wishes and feelings of children. However, inspectors found evidence of significant gaps in the supervision, case direction and oversight received by a minority of social workers. Where this occurs, it has led to delays in progressing work and improving outcomes for some children. Where this has been the case, it has largely been in teams that have experienced greater or more recent turnover of staff, including managers.

106. The local authority provides staff with a strong training and development package. Through the introduction of the SoS approach and the provision of mobile technology such as tablets, social workers are given both theoretical and practical tools to help them do their job. A broad range of appropriately focused training is available both directly from the local authority and via the West London Alliance, a consortia arrangement with other local authorities through

which external providers are commissioned to provide training. Newly qualified social workers who are in their assessed first year of employment (ASYE) describe the value of the training and support they receive and this is helping many of them decide to remain in Brent.

107. This strong training and development package, alongside targeted advertising and specific funding for additional staffing has enabled the local authority to reduce staff turnover. For this reason there is an increased percentage of staff who are full time and the borough has reduced its reliance on agency social workers. At the time of the inspection, agency staff made up 33% of staff rather than the 40% they represented in September 2014. Although turnover is still a problem in some social work teams, increased staffing levels mean that social workers in Brent have manageable caseloads. This not only means that social workers are more likely to be able to see children often enough to build relationships of trust with them but has also supported recruitment and retention of social workers.

The Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB)

The Local Safeguarding Children Board requires improvement

Executive summary

The LSCB requires improvement because:

The board meets all of its statutory functions and through its coordination of partnership working has an influence on frontline practice. However, the lack of sufficient rigour with which it has carried out its monitoring function has hampered its ability to understand the overall effectiveness of safeguarding services. This includes an inability to fully understand the positive influence that the board is having through its audits and programme of work.

The board's linkage with other strategic bodies has been weak but is improving. There is a recent improvement in the relationship between the LSCB and the Health and Wellbeing Board, but the LSCB has too little influence over the priorities of the Health and Wellbeing Board. The board is beginning to clarify its role in relation to the newly formed Children's Trust. There is, as yet, no formal link with the Family Justice Board. Although links with the third sector are made through the active Community Reference Group (CRG), there is currently no voluntary sector representative on the board, which is a gap.

The data-set which the board uses to monitor the performance of agencies is being refined. It does not currently support the board in effectively monitoring all safeguarding activity across the borough. The board is aware of the limitations of the data-set and is beginning to ensure that the story behind the data is captured, as well as presenting data from a wider variety of sources. This work is in its infancy so has not yet had an impact.

While the board has undertaken some awareness raising activity in relation to private fostering, the number of private fostering arrangements known about remains low.

Recommendations

108. Continue to refine the LSCB data-set to monitor the effectiveness of safeguarding services, ensuring that this includes data relating to areas of practice in need of improvement that are not currently monitored, such as: return home interviews for children missing from home or care; children and young people's attendance at child protection case conferences; and private fostering.

109. Ensure that intelligence from audits and data monitoring is analysed and used to influence the planning and commissioning of safeguarding services across the borough and that progress against recommendations is tracked.

110. Strengthen links with the Health and Wellbeing Board and establish links with the Family Justice Board.

111. Ensure that the voluntary sector is formally represented on the LSCB.

112. Improve the monitoring of private fostering activity across the borough to ensure that partner organisations report private fostering arrangements appropriately.

113. Prioritise the completion of a full section 11 audit to monitor how effectively agencies are discharging their statutory duties to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

Inspection findings – the Local Safeguarding Children Board

114. The Brent LSCB has an experienced and capable independent chair who has been in post since June 2015. He has undertaken a thorough self-assessment of the board's current functioning which has identified areas for improvement. The outgoing chair left the board in February 2015. During the intervening four months, the board was led by the deputy chair and while most activity continued, there was a delay in some areas of work pending the arrival of the new chair.

115. Links between the LSCB and other strategic bodies such as the Health and Wellbeing Board have only recently been established. There has been no link made with the Family Justice Board. This means that the board has not discharged the role of 'critical friend' to other agencies as effectively as it would if these links were better established.

116. Members of the board are at an appropriate level of seniority within their own organisations. They are committed and clearly give a high priority to safeguarding, undertaking joint work to forward the board's priorities. Currently, there is no formal voluntary sector representation, which is a gap,

although voluntary and faith sectors are effectively engaged through the active and influential CRG.

117. There are three lay members who sit on the Board; they are proactive and their work is a strength. The CRG, is chaired by the lay members and acts as a conduit reporting to the board on the views of the community and informing the community about the activities of the board while raising awareness of safeguarding. The work undertaken by the CRG to promote safeguarding has had a clear impact on community engagement, for example in the identification of a potential hotspot for child sexual exploitation. CRG meetings have been held in community and faith locations across the borough. The CRG has been active in ensuring that the voice of the child, and community, is represented at board meetings with young people actively involved.

118. The annual report 2014–15 is too descriptive and does not present a rigorous and transparent analysis of safeguarding across the borough. It identifies local priorities and these are well reflected in the business plan. Priorities link to sub-group activities, to the commissioning of audits and also to the planning of training. Coordinated work relating to the priorities has led to an improvement in frontline practice, for example, the work around children missing education has led to improved tracking of children and supported a reduction in the number of children missing education. There has also been activity to improve frontline practice regarding female genital mutilation and radicalisation and this is reflected in the improving quality of work seen by inspectors in these areas.

119. The board undertakes a range of multi-agency audits which include frontline practitioners. The audits are linked to the priorities of the board or to challenges presented to the board. A programme of audits is planned for the current year which is mid-way through. Audits are of variable quality, although the majority appropriately identify areas for improvement and lead to activity which has a positive influence on practice.

120. The data-set used by the board is being revised. It has been overly focused on children's social care and has lacked a broad range of data from across agencies that would give a fuller picture of the difference agencies are making for children and better highlight areas in need of improvement. Organisations are beginning to offer a narrative to accompany the data to provide a more qualitative analysis and an understanding of the story behind the data. This work has only recently begun so it is too early to assess how effectively this will assist the board to monitor the effectiveness of safeguarding practice. This lack of rigour in the way the board monitors and scrutinises agencies performance, tracks the completion of any recommendations it makes and assesses the difference this has made to the impact agencies achieve means that the board cannot be fully clear about the influence it exerts or the difference this makes for children and young people in Brent. For example, an audit into paediatric child protection assessments resulted in improved working arrangements between health and children's services, more clarity about the referral process, and assessments being undertaken more appropriately. However, data have

not been collected in a way which allows the board to assess the rate of improvement in this area.

121. Board members have relied on reports and presentations to enable them to understand what is happening at the front line, given the limitations of the data set. Frequent presentations, for example from early help, have enabled them to keep up to date and, in some cases, information presented to the board has allowed them to identify gaps and areas for improvement. For example, the identification of an issue involving young people in custody led to an audit, followed by improvement work. There was a resultant improvement in identifying young people as vulnerable and referring them to the Brent Family Front Door (BFFD). However, because of the way the board receives data, they are unaware of the percentage rise in referrals to the BFFD as a result of this activity.

122. The lack of clarity about the effectiveness of safeguarding services which has resulted from the quality of the data has meant that the board has had limited influence on the planning and commissioning of services. While there has been some influence, for example in the commissioning of specialist mental health services for children with disabilities and those who are looked after, this has happened in an ad-hoc and reactive manner. This means that the board cannot influence the direction of improvement in a systematic way which relates to priorities and identified gaps.

123. Work around child sexual exploitation has progressed since the Ofsted thematic inspection in 2014. Although further improvement is needed, particularly with regard to the risks to children missing from home or care, there is a sharper strategic focus, with better coordinated activity to pull together information, data and intelligence that is being used to build up a picture of activity across the Borough. Work with the Clinical Commissioning Group, Police and the Safer Brent Partnership has improved understanding and there is investment from board partners to resource future work, including the appointment of a dedicated child sexual exploitation analyst.

124. Social workers spoken to during this inspection were very positive about the training provided by the board. Training is responsive to changing needs and trainers quickly incorporate lessons from serious case reviews (SCRs), audits and other learning into current training programmes. Learning Pool is an electronic system which has enabled access to training for a range of professionals including those from the voluntary sector. Gaps in registration and attendance are followed up. Learning Pool enables access to free online as well as face-to-face training. Some evaluation of training takes place but assessment of ongoing impact is in its infancy.

125. There is a learning and improvement framework in place which the board uses effectively to promote learning from SCRs and to ensure that front line staff are aware of key messages. Social workers spoken to are aware of SCRs undertaken by the board and the implications for practice. The vast majority of

actions have been completed from the action plan arising from the most recent SCR.

126. The child death overview panel undertakes reviews appropriately. They have a group of trained professionals who are available to undertake home visits following a death. Cases are reviewed in a timely way, and good information sharing means that decisions can quickly be reached about the preventability of deaths. Trends are analysed and deaths are broken down into relevant categories such as, age, gender and postcode. A review of all deaths led to active awareness raising about safe sleeping. An issue around vitamin D deficiency was identified and linked to national health priorities, with training and awareness raising undertaken as a result.

127. The board has adopted pan-London LSCB policies and procedures which are localised if necessary and reviewed regularly. These are all accessible via the LSCB website. However, a section 11 audit is currently overdue which means that the board cannot have an up-to-date understanding of how rigorously and effectively these are applied. A recent section 157 audit with schools was prioritised over a full section 11 audit and this has proved useful in ensuring that appropriate work is undertaken to improve safeguarding in schools.

128. There is an up-to-date threshold document which practitioners are aware of. It is regularly updated to reflect changes in priorities, for example female genital mutilation and the Prevent duty. Thresholds are understood and applied consistently across the borough.

129. Private fostering has not been systematically tracked by the board and, although there has been some awareness-raising activity this has not led to an increase in identification or referral.

Information about this inspection

Inspectors have looked closely at the experiences of children and young people who have needed or still need help and/or protection. This also includes children and young people who are looked after and young people who are leaving care and starting their lives as young adults.

Inspectors considered the quality of work and the difference adults make to the lives of children, young people and families. They read case files, watched how professional staff work with families and each other and discussed the effectiveness of help and care given to children and young people. Wherever possible, they talked to children, young people and their families. In addition the inspectors have tried to understand what the local authority knows about how well it is performing, how well it is doing and what difference it is making for the people who it is trying to help, protect and look after.

The inspection of the local authority was carried out under section 136 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006.

The review of the Local Safeguarding Children Board was carried out under section 15A of the Children Act 2004.

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The inspection team consisted of eight of Her Majesty's Inspectors (HMI) from Ofsted.

The inspection team

Lead inspector: Dominic Stevens

Deputy lead inspector: Anji Parker

Team inspectors: Marcie Taylor, Tara Geere, Pauline Turner, Michael White, Anne Waterman, Brenda McLaughlin

Senior data analyst: Clare Atkinson

Quality assurance manager: Sean Tarpey

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Manchester
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T: 0300 123 4234
Textphone: 0161 618 8524
E: enquiries@ofsted.gov.uk
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Brent	**Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee 8 March 2016 Report from Strategic Director Regeneration and Environment**
For Information	

Pre-Cabinet Scrutiny of Proposals Relating to Tackling Illegal Rubbish Dumping and Litter with Uniformed Street Patrols

The Appendix to this report is Not for Publication

This paper has been prepared at the request of the Lead Member for Environment, Cllr Southwood. Cllr Southwood has asked that the formal report recommending options for the on-going deployment of litter enforcement patrols, and which is intended for decision at the April Cabinet, is offered first for pre-scrutiny.

This follows from the Committee's scrutiny of the trial proposals at its meeting on the 5th March 2016, and Cabinet's decision at that time to enter into a pilot contract with Kingdom Security Limited for the delivery of a payment-by-results, cost-neutral uniformed service for the enforcement of street scene and environmental offences in the borough for a period of 12 months. It also enacts the commitment made by Cllr Southwood to undertake a 6-month review that could then inform the long-term solution.

The Lead Member seeks the views and opinions of the Scrutiny Committee so the Cabinet report can be further refined to ensure the recommendations are clear, offer good value and can be the basis of a sound and effective operation going forward.

This report also addresses the views of the Scrutiny Committee expressed at its meeting in April 2016. Specifically, it describes the value of the trial in addressing litter and illegal rubbish dumping, the benefits of deploying a private contractor to establish a baseline over a time-limited period in Brent, the debate around in-house or contracted options and the relative benefits of both, and the need to engage fully with the Scrutiny Committee so that a helpful consensus is agreed on the best way forward.

The report presents a review of the trial's performance over the first 6 months, covering the period June – November 2016. This is used to substantiate recommendations around future, long-term deployment. It also presents the risks and issues associated with all the options.

It specifically addresses previously-raised concerns around the terms and conditions offered to enforcement officers, the consistency of the approach and how it aligns with other enforcement activities undertaken by the council. It also addresses the general approach to the procurement and commissioning of this type of service, and the scope, style and responsiveness of the proposed long-term option.

Officers are available ahead of the meeting and would welcome advance notice of further areas of interest in order that as much information as possible can be provided on the night.

Brent	**Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee** **8 March 2017** **Report from the Director of Policy, Performance and Partnerships**
For Information	Wards Affected: All

Update on the committee's work programme 2016-17

1.0 Summary

1.1 This report updates members on the committee's work programme for 2016-17.

2.0 Recommendations

2.1 Members of the committee are asked to note the contents of the report.

3.0 Background

3.1 Members of the Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee agreed their work programme 2016/17 over the last municipal year. The programme sets out what items will be heard at committee and which items will be examined by task groups. However, the assumption was that it could evolve according to the needs of the committee and spare capacity would be left to look at issues as and when they arise.

3.2 For operational reasons, it may be necessary to move items to be heard at a particular committee. In addition to this, members and those co-opted can at any time, suggest an item to be looked at during the committee meeting, which provided it is agreed by the chair, would mean the work programme changes.

3.3 Members may request information during a committee meeting or outside of a committee meeting as part of the scrutiny process. They also may make visits to do first-hand observations in order to better understand an issue for scrutiny.

4.0 Detailed Considerations

Updates from special scrutiny committee meeting on 30/11/16

4.1 Members of the Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee held a special scrutiny committee meeting on the 30th November 2016. The committee then recommended that the 12 month timetable regarding the development of the Carlton and Granville Centres Site be presented to the Resources and Public Realm Scrutiny Committee at the 8th of March committee meeting. This is attached below as appendix A.

Updates from scrutiny committee meeting on 10/01/17

4.2 The committee requested an update on the total of section 106 funding in the bank. There is currently £10.3 million of s106 funding available.

4.3 The committee asked for the table on page seven of the Budget Scrutiny Panel report to be updated with an extra column showing the median income for each borough and council tax collection rates. The Chief Finance Officer has advised that he does not possess this information and, as it is the scrutiny panel's report, it would be more appropriate for them to amend it.

4.4 The committee requested a time-series data update on the growth of median income in the borough over the last 4/5 years:

- **2012:** £29,042
- **2013:** £29,510
- **2014:** £30,588
- **2015:** £28,492
- **2016:** £27,692
- **Average:** £29,065

4.5 The committee has asked for clarification on the savings delivered by the Temporary Accommodation Reform Plan over the last two years, this has been confirmed at £1m.

4.6 The committee further requested that the Chief Finance Officer refer committee members to the relevant Cabinet report for the details of the revenue budget. This is in the December 2016 Q2 integrated performance report.

4.7 The committee also requested details of the revenue impact regarding the collection of commercial waste by Veolia and whether this is reimbursed to the council. The Public Realm contract currently provides for £694k per annum of guaranteed income to the council for commercial waste contracts provided by Veolia. There is a profit sharing arrangement for any revenue raised above that threshold where the council retains 75% and Veolia takes the remaining 25%. In practice however, their income is significantly below this level. Figures to date for 2016/17 (their strongest performing year so far) show a profit for the first nine months of £115k.

4.8 The committee made a data request of the revenue upscale for increasing fixed penalty notices (FPN). There is no scope to increase the penalty for FPN's for littering beyond the current level. The Environmental Protection Act 1990 sets a default, maximum and minimum penalty level, and also provides an opportunity for issuing-authorities to offer an early payment discount. Brent is already issuing fines at the statutory maximum level of £80, and gives no option for an early payment discount.

4.9 The committee further requested a rough approximation of the upscaling of the Kingdom contract over the next 2 or 3 years and the impact on revenue for the council for this. The options for taking the uniformed litter-patrol pilot forward over the next few years are subject to a discussion at PCG on 20/02/17 after which, further information may become available.

4.10 The committee has also requested a copy of the Kingdom contract project report that is going to the Cabinet meeting on the 13th of March. This report will be presented at the 8th of March scrutiny committee meeting.

5.0 Financial Implications

5.1 There are no immediate financial implications arising from this report.

6.0 Legal Implications

6.1 There are no immediate legal implications arising from this report.

7.0 Equalities Implications

7.1 There are no immediate diversity implications arising from this report.

Contact Officer

James Curtis

Scrutiny Officer

Strategy and Partnerships

James.curtis@brent.gov.uk

0208 937 4594

Appendix A: Carlton and Granville Centres Site – Indicative Timetable to September 2018

Key Stakeholders:

- Barnardo's Granville Plus Children Centre
- Brent Councillors (Lead Member and Ward Councillors)
- Brent Council - Estate Regeneration Team, Property Team, Schools Capital Team (Council)
- Brent START
- Concord Café (CC)
- Granville Community Kitchen (GCK)
- GLA
- Granville Plus Nursery School
- South Kilburn Trust (SKT)
- The Otherwise Club

Timetable:

Quarter	Date	Phase 1	Phase 2
Qtr3 2016/17	**December 2016**	**Actions** Finalising Lease between Brent and SKT Finalising agreement between the Council and the GLA Procurement of Consultants. **Meetings/Consultation** Draft Lease to be circulated to SKT. Design Brief for Phase 1 to be circulated to key stakeholders – SKT to co-ordinate Key Stakeholders project board held 9/12/16.	**Actions** Council to distribute design brief template to Key Stakeholders. **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders project board held 9/12/16.
Qtr 4 2016/17	**January 2017**	**Actions** Completion of GLA agreement Completion of Lease with Council (Property) and SKT Statement of Intent to be agreed between Council (Estate Regeneration) and SKT, SKT to move to Granville Centre **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders project board SKT and GCK to discuss sub-lease, other Key Stakeholders to also be included.	**Actions** Key Stakeholders to return design brief template two weeks before January's key stakeholders project board Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Consult with English Heritage via Brent Planning Heritage Officer (update - to engage Heritage Consultant) Key Stakeholders Project board (Brent Communications team to also attend) Meeting with Concord Café, Council (Property) and Brent START to discuss future when

			Brent START leave Carlton Centre. Wider meeting to be had with Key Stakeholders and Users, CC to advise of preferred process. Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders (update - will await the Communication Strategy)
	February 2017	**Actions** Appointment of Design Team Detailed design of phase 1 works **Meetings/Consultation** Individuals meetings by key stakeholders with architects	**Actions** Design Brief to be agreed Produce update information Engage a Heritage Consultant To produce Governance information – Draft Consultation Strategy, Draft Communication Strategy and Draft Terms of Reference **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders Meeting to sign off Design Brief and agree procurement route for Design Team Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	March 2017	**Actions** Cabinet decision for the procurement of phase 1 works and delegated award of contract **Meetings/Consultation** 2 Architect Workshops Practical Issues for Phase 1 (disruption etc) meeting with all Key Stakeholders (possibly in April) Meeting with SK Studios regarding move into Granville Centre (possibly in April)	**Actions** Out to procurement for Design Team Brent START leave Carlton Centre Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
Qtr 1 2017/18	**April 2017**	**Actions** Contractor Procurement	**Actions** Out to procurement for Design Team Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders

	May 2017	**Actions** Contractor Award Phase 1 works	**Actions** Out to procurement for Design Team Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	June 2017	**Actions** Phase 1 works South Kilburn Studios move to Granville Centre following completion of phase 1a works (provisional)	**Actions** Out to procurement for Design Team Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
Qtr 2 2017/18	**July 2017**	**Actions** Phase 1 works	**Actions** Out to procurement for Design Team Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	August 2017	**Actions** Phase 1 works	**Actions** Out to procurement for Design Team Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	September 2017	**Actions** Phase 1 works	**Actions** Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Cabinet meeting to agree Design Team Agree the consultation programme for the following six months at Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
Qtr 3 2017/18	**October 2017**	**Actions** Phase 1 works	**Actions** Produce update information

			Meetings/Consultation Publish the Consultation timetable for next six months Design Consultation Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	November 2017	**Actions** Potential completion of works Phase 1 works	**Actions** Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Design Consultation Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	December 2017	Completion of phase 1 works	**Actions** Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Design Consultation Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
Qtr 4 2017/18	**January 2018**		**Actions** Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Design Consultation Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	February 2018		**Actions** Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Design Consultation Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	March 2018	**Actions** All works to be completed for GLA funding requirements	**Actions** Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Design Consultation Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
Qtr 1	**April 2018**	**Phase 1 Complete**	**Actions**

2018/19			Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders to agree final recommendation at Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	May 2018		**Actions** Report writing for Cabinet Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	June 2018		**Actions** Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Options to Cabinet Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
Qtr 2 2018/19	**July 2018**		**Actions** Finalise Planning Application Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	August 2018		**Actions** Finalise Planning Application Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Key Stakeholders Project board Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders
	September 2018		**Actions** Planning application submitted Produce update information **Meetings/Consultation** Dissemination of update information by Key Stakeholders